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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this investigation is to consider the extent to which the processes and 
material stuff of painting remain central to its identity and meaning. Within writing 
that supports painting, the role played by the medium of paint is too often 
sidestepped—sidestepped within writings that take as their starting point the 
interdisciplinary assumption that the message owes little of consequence to the 
medium through which it becomes disclosed. The retreat from medium specificity, in 
the 1970s – a move largely made in opposition to the hegemonic force of 
Greenbergian formalism and the expanded field ushered in by studio practices, as well 
as an embrace of the text (promoted through theory) – dislocated image from that from 
which the image is constituted. To a significant extent, particularly in the most vibrant 
approaches to the medium, the iconographic possibilities of a painting came to be 
situated in opposition to the characteristics of the painted object.  
 
This project addresses how the reduction of painting to linguistic schemas has 
rendered the material object of painting redundant. The conception of painting as 
image – free of material baggage and operable through language alone – serves to 
disguise the temporal nature of the manner by which a painting is constructed. A 
painting’s surface is built incrementally and, in its stillness, offers clues to what it has 
been—perhaps the only clues to what it is. I will redress this in two ways. First, 
through a body of studio practice I will demonstrate the indispensability of 
spatiotemporal concerns in respect of the processes and object of painting. My 
painting is reliant on responsiveness to methods of making, and I will foreground the 
image’s construction, staging it as an imbrication of language and material in time.  
 
Secondly, I will engage in a written inquiry comprising of five chapters. In Chapter 1, 
I attest to my concerns as a painter. Chapter 2 embarks on an investigation into the 
notion of a medium within the post-medium condition. Chapter 3 will consider the 
positioning of painting: examining philosophical omissions and historiographical 
oversights, which have, together, contributed to misunderstandings. Chapter 4 seeks, 
through the work of Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Hölderlin, to negotiate a new 
ontological model for the medium of painting, and Chapter 5 re-considers my recent 
practice – and position on medium – through the lens of the aforementioned inquiry. 
	 5	
The context for this work is the realm in which painting’s ontological status is 
questioned—targeting the nodal point where there is recourse to consider the extent to 
which the meaning of a painting is dependent on the specificity of its material 
conditions. To that end, I argue that Heidegger’s notion of truth (and of 
equipmentality) – developed in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and the Hölderlin 
Lectures – offers the possibility of replacing the redundancy of the medium with a 
notion of regeneration, against the backdrop of the endism that haunts painting.  
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Introduction 
 
 
[O]ne might go so far as to argue that the media of the particular arts not only 
influence their character, they determine their very possibilities and 
interpretations.1 
 
 
This exposition takes as its starting point a practical and art historical notion of 
painting as a confluence of pigment and binder on surface.2 Certainly, within the 
expanded field of arts practice – an oft-misused term, since Rosalind Krauss applied it 
to developments in sculpture – painting has taken many forms.3 However, the 
arguments raised here, and conclusions drawn, reach practices that retain material, 
linguistic and historical particularities. This work accepts the notion that painting 
today is affected by earlier manifestations of objects and ideas. To take a contrary 
position would amount to a disavowal of contemporary painting’s propensity to 
impact on painting's future.4 This endeavour is an optimistic one—painting maintains 
its capacity to affect, and the properties of its medium underscore its distinctions. Such 
positivity must, however, contend with critics to whom painting’s presumed 
specificities conspire to thwart artistic innovation—a result of its inherent material 
limitations, connection to modernism and embrace of the mechanisms of capitalism.5 
 
From the emergence of photography, to misquote Mark Twain, rumours of painting’s 
demise have been greatly exaggerated.6 For several decades, photography has 
replicated painting in colour, which is noteworthy in terms of the likelihood of 
confronting a form of deception.7 Since Walter Benjamin, it has been a matter of great 																																																								
1 Philip Alperson, ed., The Philosophy of the Visual Arts (Oxford, New York, Toronto: Oxford 
2 Surfaces, including the edges and back of a material support, irrespective of location, placement or 
orientation. 
3 See: Rosalind Krauss’s “Sculpture in the Expanded Field”, 1979. Craig Staff discussed this, in After 
Modernist Painting, 2013, and deployed the term more precisely in respect of developments in painting 
since the 1960s. 
4 This would serve also to disrupt a dialectical linearity – associated with modernist thinking – from 
which the very idea of medium specificity emerged. 
5 Amelia Jones (1961-) would serve, in her work, to exemplify what Caroline Jones (birth date 
unknown), Eyesight Alone, 2005, has termed counter-formalist readings of modernism, which seek to 
challenge notions of aesthetics from a deconstructionist angle, re-applying the work of the French 
feminists, and psychoanalytical theory more generally, to a host of non-painterly practices, or else 
painterly practices re-interpreted through performative, non-optical, non-aesthetic, anti-Greenbergian 
lenses.       
6 Reputedly, on a trip to London, an American newspaper wrongly published an obituary, to which 
Mark Twain issued his now-famous statement. 
7 In the Platonic sense. 
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debate as to the extent that the mechanical image has assisted in robbing painting of 
one or more of its specificities.8 Unlike the photographic image, the picture of painting 
is not achieved simultaneously across its surface. The significance of the processes of 
painting – processes that guide material in space and time, and which through manual 
interventions determine a work’s form – are subsumed under the concept of image. 
Often, one confronts painting as facsimile.9 The lack of clarity as to such distinctions, 
and of how painting’s image functions once it is dislocated from site, has a secondary 
effect – the conflation of the object and processes of painting behind the single 
moniker – which must be unpacked if an understanding of the ontological condition of 
painting is to be reached.10 The object of painting is the result of its processes; and yet, 
processes remain informed by the very idea of an object, imbuing them with 
purpose—they orient towards. The materiality of painting is transformative—its object 
contains evidence of manipulation, temporal duration and purposeful construction.  
 
Notwithstanding, paintings remain ubiquitous. There are approximately 2500 public 
museums and art galleries in Britain today (excluding overtly commercial spaces).11 In 
addition, a host of student-led initiatives add significantly to the number of places in 
which one might encounter paintings. While many art competitions have broadened 
their entry requirements to reflect the plurality of current practices, paintings continue 
to be exhibited. Photographs of major art collections have been made available online 
as part of a broader drive to increase access to the paintings of the past. Moreover, the 
influx of Asian art – one manifestation being the Chinese section of the John Moores 
Painting Prize – has assisted in bringing back modes of practice that had fallen into 
abeyance (paintings adopting modernist sylistic traits).12 Within higher education, 																																																								
8 Since photography, mechanical means have reproduced painting; replacing an oily, chalky or resinous 
palimpsest with a homogenised, emulsified surface. All is altered/approximated, including: colour, 
scale, tonality and location. Today, vast matrices of pixelated coloured dots sit in many of the places 
where painted works once sat. Discourse can be rooted, for the most part, in the 1930s, in “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, 1936, by Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), and also in Box 
in a Valise, c. 1935-41, by Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968); in which Duchamp replicated the contents of 
his life’s work in miniature, offering a portable museum as a work in itself, yet one whose replicated 
form critiqued the idea of authenticity.   
9 Consider the prevalence of photographic reproductions within and outside of gallery spaces. 
10 This is the result of photographic reproduction. 
11 http://www.museumsassociation.org. On the high street, prints of famous works, gaudy originals (by 
painter-pop stars/actors/comedians/politicians), and kitsch classics sell in significant numbers. 
12 The John Moores Painting Prize has been the leading showcase for British painting since 1957. Past 
award winners include: David Hockney (1937-), Euan Uglow (1932-2000), John Hoyland (1934-2011), 
Lisa Milroy (1959-), Peter Doig (1959-), and Rose Wylie (1934-). In 1965, Clement Greenberg (1909-
1994) was the first non-British Jury Chair. 
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painting retains a position; although specialist Masters level courses in the UK have 
diminished in number, some BA programmes in Fine Art have re-implemented 
discrete strands.13  
 
Driving this project is an inclination to not only acknowledge the presentness of 
painted objects but also to pay heed to the part that the medium plays in respect of a 
painting’s meaning; to consider the causes, effects and consequences of painting’s 
practical, art historical and philosophical situatedness. As a painter and educator 
(painting has been central to my life for the past thirty years), there is a sense of a 
stored investment here—of an obligation even: to point to omissions and extensions—
to the implications of misunderstanding the role that the medium plays, and to the 
risks associated with its neglect. To do so requires a consideration of the relationship 
of painting’s present (of which I am a part) to painting’s past.14 This, then, forms the 
backdrop to a personal endeavour that has grown, also, out of the perception of an 
obfuscatory mode of address within recent discourses.15 Such disquiet, however, does 
not arise from having discerned a lack of material preoccupation per se (within or 
outside of the studio).16 Neither does it attest to a particularly strong desire to critique 
the role assigned to painting within the gallery, arts education, or even the market.  
 
It derives, perhaps, from the fact that formalist and contextual understandings have 
become naturalised as oppositional.17 This is supported by Benjamin Buchloh’s 
contention that, since Duchamp, there has been a tension: “[f]or the need, on the one 
hand, for both a systematic reduction and an empirical verification of the perceptual 
data of a visual structure stands opposed to the desire, on the other hand, to assign a 
																																																								
13 In Leeds College of Art, the general Fine Art programme branched into four strands in 2013 
(Painting, Sculpture, Drawing and Media), only to truncate its offer to three in 2015, when it abolished 
the Media strand. 
14 Painting’s past takes in that which painting has been, in historiographical terms, and also in respect of 
a cultural legacy of retained objects. 
15 James Elkins (1955-), in “Why Nothing can be Accomplished in Painting”, 2004, considers the root 
causes of this state of affairs, which I will consider in more detail in Chapter 3.  
16 Within artists’ or student-artists’ studios, or on gallery walls or floors, painting remains present. 
17 Michael Fried (1939-) preferred to use the term formal to denote a consideration of the properties of a 
work, as by the 1960s formalism (as an approach) and formalist (to denote a practitioner of such an 
approach) had acquired pejorative connotations. However, having acquired these, and in order to avoid 
confusion, I shall use the former term to denote the framework adopted by art historians and critics who 
seek to place form ahead of subject matter, or who deem form to be, itself, content. As a consequence, I 
will employ formalist too. I shall reserve form for the properties of the works themselves (in opposition 
to subject matter)—carrying the Friedian sense of formal. 
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new idea or meaning to an object randomly”.18 The impact of this tension on painting 
– as both a process and a cultural artefact with a long history of change – has been 
hugely significant. Worse still, from my perspective, is that, within this oppositional 
framework, context is too often applied unhelpfully.19 The term context is far from a 
simple, singular designation, and brings with it a surplus of slippery uncertainties.  
 
To Charles Harrison, artworks are perpetually discursive sites that establish their own 
theoretical frames.20 Linguistic in orientation, this nevertheless permits material 
interventions, yet within particular boundaries. Harrison emphasises the spectator’s 
discernment, which amounts to the promotion of a form of address with roots in the 
connoisseurial tradition.21 Keen to differentiate between linguistic potential and the 
sound bite, he contends that the modern period is noted for: “the development of a 
corporatist knowledge culture, that has flattened literature, art and the rest of the so-
called humanities into information”.22 Raymond Williams, however, presents the 
medium in broader historical terms, which allow for a spanning of moments of cultural 
schism. Here, the artwork is determined in respect of the social setting in which it 
becomes contextually embedded.23 Adrian Forty, in critiquing what he considers to be 
the prevalence of one-dimensional contextual (social) analyses, surmises that:  
 
 
[I]t has become fashionable to refer to the social context or the social 
background. […] Such cursory references to the social context are like weeds 
and gravel around a stuffed fish in a glass case: however realistic these may be, 
they are only furnishings, and taking them away would have little effect on our 
perception of the fish. The use of social context is rarely more than an ornament, 
																																																								
18 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the 
Critique of Institutions”, October, 55 (1990): 111. 
19 From the 1970s, context become everything, resulting in the establishment of a clear dividing line 
between what was taken to be form and what was re-presented as content. This was driven, in large part, 
by the politicisation of arts practice, by reactions to the ideas of Clement Greenberg, and by the 
emergence of Cultural Studies. 
20 Charles Harrison, Conceptual Art & Painting: Further Essays on Art and Language (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1993). 
21 In the eighteenth century, the connoisseur referred loosely to a man of taste, or even, sometimes 
derogatorily, of fashionable ideas. The nineteenth century brought about the professionalisation of 
connoisseurship. 
22 Charles Harrison, The Politics of Representation. Symposium, the University of Brighton, 1997, 
accessed July 13, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJJvXqhKg4Y. 
23 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
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allowing the objects themselves still to be regarded as if they had autonomous 
existence where all but purely artistic considerations are trivial.24 
 
 
Michael Fried, in resisting the notion of artwork as event, fuses together eighteenth 
century spectatorship and a notion of context in pursuit of the perpetuation of 
modernist concerns, so as to retain the aesthetic as of principle importance to the life 
of the artist and critic-spectator alike.25 With regard to the work itself, David Sweet 
maintains that: “the pictorial economy of a painting cannot be identified with its 
materiality, [suggesting that i]ts function is to offer an intelligible argument to support 
[…] materiality, as the organising principle of perspective orients the brush marks in a 
Titian”.26 W. J. T. Mitchell went further, proposing that medium-specificity is 
impossible in the manner outlined by Greenberg, as words are needed to explain the 
ideological motives behind the modernist retreat from representation.27 This change is 
predicated, perhaps, on the fact that Sweet is writing as a painter seeking to 
comprehend a painterly relationship, and possibly an intuited one. Mitchell, on the 
other hand, sees painting after the fact, as a work keen to explain itself to the world.  
 
Craig Staff has noted that even in the period of the mid-late 1970s (importantly, prior 
to A New Spirit in Painting, and at the height of hostility to Greenbergian modernism): 
“a significant number of artists evidently oriented themselves towards the medium, 
continuing to conceive it both as a viable form of cultural practice and as a 
contemporary form of art”.28 In spite of this, and in respect of a renewed interest in the 
																																																								
24 Adrian Forty, Objects of Desire: Design and Society Since 1750 (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1986), 8. Forty’s work deals primarily with architectural developments, though also the plastic arts 
more generally. 
25 Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood”, in Art & Objecthood: Essays & Reviews, ed. Michael Fried 
(Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 148-172. 
26 David Sweet, “Abstraction’s Organising Principles”, 2012, in response to David Ryan’s “What does 
This Represent”, Abstract Critical, 2012, accessed May 11, 2016,	https://abstractcritical.com/note/david 
-sweet-on -abstractions-organising-principles/index.html. 
27 W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Clement Greenberg, 
in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”, 1939, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 1940, and “Modernist Painting”, 
1960, constructed a highly influential account of the development of modernism, and of the centrality to 
the modernist project of medium specificity, and, in respect of painting, of flatness and the primacy of 
the optical as a mode of reception. This formalism built on the work of the art historians of the Vienna 
School, in particular, Alois Riegl (1858-1905), as well as on the works of the Swiss art historian 
Heinrich Wölfflin (1866-1945), and the English critics of the Bloomsbury Group, Roger Fry (1866-
1934) and Clive Bell (1881-1934). 
28 Craig Staff, After Modernist Painting: The History of a Contemporary Practice (London & New 
York: I. B. Taurus, 2013), 57. Exhibition held at the Royal Academy in London in 1981, and 
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medium and its connectedness to context and idea (and also to spectatorship, 
document and picture), Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Isabelle Graw consider that: “[t]he 
notion of medium specificity as a transhistorical essence of any artistic practice or as 
an agent of aesthetic teleology has largely been recognised as untenable”.29 The 
possibility of assigning the medium a role as a vehicle is of relevance here. Stephen 
Melville – in Becoming Medium – asks whether medium is invention or discovery, or 
even mere assumption.30 Might paintings have become medium, and, if so, how? 
 
A word on the structure and tenor of this work, and some notice of acknowledged 
limitations. This thesis contains no extended case studies, either of individual works or 
of artist-makers. Contextual analysis is limited, for the most part, to analyses of textual 
argument and historical positioning, and to a consideration of the development and 
orientation of my own practice. Nor have I thought it necessary to pay particular heed 
to aesthetics, outside of its entanglements with medium. Along the way, I will consider 
the historical, philosophical and logical bases of the medium’s distinctions.31 A 
reconsideration of medium specificity in painting requires an awareness of theoretical 
moves made in the period from the mid-1960s, yet there are pitfalls to look out for.  
 
Medium specificity does not, in itself, denote singularity, and I will explore a number 
of attempts to find grounds for medium specificities. Nor does it follow that medium 
necessarily designates physical extension (that painting’s medium is paint), and, when 
it does, there are difficulties in respect of painting’s secondary attribute—its picture. In 
the course of this work it will be necessary to consider the relationship of material to 
language (image), and to work (thing), and also to consider paint in its dual identity as 
a moving vehicle and a static object. It might, then, be possible to better understand 
the basis for what Amy Knight Powell has described as: “the profound attractiveness 
																																																																																																																																																																
showcasing, among other things, a return to painterly modes of figuration, that became known 
collectively as Neo-Expressionism. 
29 Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Isabelle Graw, Painting Beyond Itself. The Medium in the Post-medium 
condition (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016), 7. 30	Stephen Melville,	Becoming Medium, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=peXeZ3GAaNY. 
31 Medium specificity is closely aligned with the ideas of Clement Greenberg, though it is perhaps first 
seen in the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) in the late eighteenth century. Lessing 
considered a work’s success in terms of its adherence to the properties of its medium. In “Laocoön: An 
Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting”, 1766, he defined poetry as a temporal art and painting as 
a spatial art. 
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[…] of Clement Greenberg’s conception of the fruitfulness of painting that does not go 
in search of the world beyond painting for its subject matter”.32  
 
Rather than include extended summaries of the contents of subsequent sections here – 
indicating areas of engagement in a single extended narrative – I have placed shorter 
introductions within the five chapters that constitute this thesis. When dealing with a 
subject as contaminated by other lines of inquiry as this is, such an approach has the 
advantage of drawing closer connections between particular concerns; of establishing 
clearer aims and objectives; and of reminding and redirecting the reader at important 
intervals.33 The writing is designed to provide a practical blanket around the more 
theoretical chapters. Chapter 1 considers the core of my practice in the period prior to 
commencing this venture, and Chapter 5 addresses developements in my most recent 
work through the lens of the intervening material: this includes a shift in the choice of 
suppport and the inclusion of painted words. Together, these chapters work to provide 
a studio-based methodology of making. The intervening material comprises of a 
detailed historiographic survey of key moments within relevant texts; an identification 
of philosophical omissions and absences in the field; and the construction of a 
Heideggerian model to redress misunderstandings in respect of painting’s medium.  
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
 
 
 
	
	
																																																									
32 Amy Knight Powell, Depositions: Scenes from the Late Medieval Church and the Modern Museum 
(New York: Zone Books, 2012), 290. 
33 The chapter structure assumes a sequential reading, with threads becoming variously intertwined.  
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Chapter 1: Positioning Practice 
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
The following text supplies an elucidation of my activities as a painter (from 2010-
2015), positioning the project by advancing an account of the material and temporal 
concerns from which it emerged. Part 2: Becoming Attentive to Material provides a 
description of, and reflection on, a period marked by a reassessment of my 
understanding of the medium. This time witnessed a convergence of interests – within 
and outside of the studio – the result of a shift in attitude towards the idea of subject—
of what my paintings address and how they address it. I hope, here, to ground the more 
theoretical analysis of subsequent chapters in everyday, manual activities.34 The 
writing takes the form of an extended artist’s statement, wherein considerations are 
classified, grouped and recounted as intentions, suppositions and material 
preoccupations.35 Of primacy within the trajectory of my thinking about painting (and 
about medium specificity) has been the notion of practice itself, and of the studio as 
that which provides the conditions of practice. Part 2 attests to a fleshing out and 
recompression of these and related concerns within the purview of this undertaking.  
 
Painting has driven my understanding of painting.36 Along the way, this understanding 
has come up against theoretical approaches, one of which was the formalist. Though I 
																																																								
34 I extend this to include all forms of painterly doing (that results from marking, making and 
manipulating). 
35 It is sometimes necessary to draw connections with earlier work, either to identify where the seeds of 
later practices are sown, or else to detect where current practice extends into or reclaims past events. For 
a collection of shorter statements written prior to the period of this work, see: Tom Palin: Artist 
Statements 1992-2012 (Leeds: Workshop Press, 2013). 
36 This includes both making paintings and also looking at/thinking about the paintings of others. After 
studying in various institutions in Birkenhead and Wallasey I applied to undertake a degree in Fine Art 
at Liverpool John Moores University. The paintings that got me to university were a series of large-
scale acrylic works on paper, of local industrial buildings, particularly gasometers and cooling towers. I 
had become interested in encaustic processes, textures, surfaces, tonality and relationships between 
colours in close harmony. At University I specialised in painting, and graduated in 1996. In my final 
year I shared a studio with the painter Daniel Pulman (1975-), whose poetic seriousness and belief in 
figuration affected me greatly, though its impact was more noticeable later, when I returned, in a 
fashion, to the figure. On completion of my degree, I undertook a three-year Research Fellowship – 
Drawlab – in drawing and painting, at St. Helens College. Since then, I have painted from studios in 
Birkenhead, Wallasey, Liverpool, Leeds and London. Though as a boy I enjoyed drawing, I enjoyed 
filling in more. I was exposed to art early, through library books and visits to local galleries. Victorian 
painting and reproductions of works by: John Constable (1776-1837), Joseph Mallord William Turner 
(1775-1851), Hieronymus Bosch (c. 1450-1516), Pieter Bruegel (c. 1525-1569), Claude Monet (1940-
1926) and Pierre-Auguste Renoir (1841-1919) affected me a great deal, as did those of the Dutch still 
life painters, and the flowers of Henri Fantin-Latour (1836-1904). 
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became aware of its limitations and exclusions, formalism stuck.37 This was not so 
much an aesthetic appeal as it was an appeal to connect in as direct a fashion as 
possible with the works I admired. Early on, I knew that to appreciate a painting – for 
example, The Piano Lesson by Henri Matisse (Fig. 1A) – was also to appreciate a 
sensibility.38 Yet I had come to know. Thus, the painting, whatever its actual status, 
had acted as a locus, and my coming to know was a coming to know something. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1A 
																																																								
37 I have grown to comprehend theory as something approaching a parallel form of practice, for 
thoughts, also, are shackled to their methods of framing, much as the possibility of the colour green is 
framed by the colours blue and yellow. An awareness of the tangibility of ideas, in theoretical form, 
provides me with a direct link to my paintings, in that they, too, seem formed of prior and constituent 
parts. 
38 Perhaps the most radical work by Henri Matisse (1869-1964) – along with The Italian Woman, 1916  
– The Piano Lesson, 1916, appeared to me as approachable only through recourse to other works by 
Matisse. Additionally, coming to know through the work appeared to be a process of mutual exclusion. 
To know a sensibility is to see the work as (a sensibility), yet to presume knowledge of the work as 
work. Whereas, to see the work, meant to not see as (a sensibility), and, therefore, to deduce a 
sensibility from the work. Moreover, sensibility is a seeing as, and so, paradoxically, to not see as was 
to see as. 
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Part 2: Becoming Attentive to Material 
 
 
2.1: Beginning  
In late-2010, I began work on a series of paintings on small hardwood panels, re-using 
parts of an oak table that had acted as a workbench.39 For six months prior to this I had 
refrained from working in oils to focus on the completion of a commissioned mural 
that was to consist of two thousand paintings, in acrylics, on train tickets collected 
from personal journeys over a period of sixteen years. 2000 Journeys (Fig. 1B) ended 
in September 2010 and was exhibited in Dream Machine, as part of the Liverpool 
Biennial.40 Afterwards, I thought about how best to approach making paintings on 
wood.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1B 																																																								
39 I had painted on hardwood previously, having completed six small works in 2007 and one 
horizontally elongated piece at the start of the year, all from salvaged material. 
40 Dream Machine, 15th September - 23rd October 2010, Metal, Edge Hill Station, Liverpool. The 
exhibition also featured works by Gareth Brew (birth date unknown), Nicola Dale (birth date unknown), 
Phil Lockhart (birth date unknown), Richard Proffitt (1985-), and composer Ailis Ni Riain (1974-).   
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To begin meant to feel my way back into the material of oil paint.41 I felt strongly that 
the internal logic driving my work had – over fourteen years – played itself out, or else 
that something external had interfered.42 I purchased hardwoods of differing weights 
and densities: to consider the wood’s tendency to warp and to examine the prominence 
of the grain in respect of ease of filling—to gauge the finish and colour of exposed end 
grain, should I decide to leave it visible.43 Shifts were evident: most noticeable was the 
decrease in scale from what were, by most standards, already small-scale paintings. 
There were a number of constants too: chiefly, the maintenance of oil as the primary 
vehicle, and the retention of the palette from previous works, with some additions.44  
 
2.2: Studio 
The works that comprise this series have been constructed in one or more of six studio 
spaces. For most of the time since 2010 I have kept two spaces concurrently.45 Two 
have been of a modest scale, two somewhat larger, and one especially small; formed 
of a converted alcove. Two spaces have been external – in the sense of my having to 
travel to them from home – and the rest comprise of part of, or an extension to, my 
living space. It is important that a new studio affords me an opportunity to begin again 
with minimal change. I repeat a battening of walls, maintaining a consistent 
distribution of space. I retain items that provide links between where I am and where I 
have been. Additions appear, oddly, to be in receipt of the environment they enter. 
 
2.3: Support and Format 
I use materials that would have been recognised in earlier times (to ensure that what I 
do is painting) – wooden support, pigment, solvent, drying oil and varnish – and which 
connect me to a period of indeterminate past rather than to a singular moment.46 The 
																																																								
41 By this, I mean a getting used to its physicality and variousness. 
42 This was more than an instance of life getting in the way. In short: the paint seemed to get in the way. 
43 Including: ash, American white oak, sapele and steamed beech. 
44 These additions allowed me to extend the range of grey-greens, enrich the browns and cut the warmer 
hues more cleanly. Most of my paintings since the time of my graduation (1996) have been painted on 
resistant grounds, such as: hardboard, MDF and canvas board. From June 2016, I began to experiment 
with enamel and gloss paint too. 
45 In 2010, having worked in the city for some time, I rented a flat in Leeds, which mean that, in 
splitting my time between West Yorkshire and the Wirral, I was soon maintaining two studio spaces (in 
Birkenhead and Leeds). 
46 Panel painting dates to classical times, though it was during the period of Christendom and, notably, 
during the Renaissance, that working on wood peaked. This was especially the case for religious 
commissions, though it remained common into the seventeenth century for secular commissions, too, 
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use of a hardwood support – with a pronounced thickness – accentuates the material 
aspect of the work. An awareness of the altarpiece perhaps informs my thinking 
here—an object whose fixedness serves to situate meaning, providing a locale and 
determining a method of reception.47 I am more interested in tradition than in novelty 
– in the stillness of the relic than in the movement of the machine – and remain 
committed to the idea that one must look back in order to move forward.  
 
I set out to reconsider multi-panel arrangements.48 This was made easier by the small 
scale of the works and the ease with which I could juxtapose them. I wanted to keep 
open the possibility of interrelationships: especially of narrative, formal and material 
connections. The idea of storytelling informed my thinking. Probable groupings and 
numbers pertaining to groupings were also left open to consideration, to be explored 
during the process of painting, and finalised on the completion of the panels. In some, 
I worked paint across the joins between panels, altering alignment, proximity and 
orientation. Works were approached from all sides, and frequently rotated to explore 
compositional variants and to assist in the conjuring of representations. In joining 
horizontally, I am introducing a material horizon in opposition to the pictured one. 
 
This lack of determination allows for rapid reworking: the result of an altered mood 
bringing with it a change of heart. From the beginning, individual panels were relieved 
of their responsibility to account for the entirety of the work, which deferred 
completion. I reasoned that the indeterminacy of the size of a gap or gaps between 
panels – and of the uneven globulous lip overspilling the edge – would compel 
incompleteness upon the work, whose parameters remain approximations, to be 
reconsidered when displayed. I consider the place where the painting begins and ends, 
which perhaps stems from an interest in early Renaissance painting: where cropped 
stairs, windows and doors appear to ramp up the presence of what is not visible.49 My 
																																																																																																																																																																
mostly in Northern Europe. Poplar, oak, walnut and the fruitwoods – such as lime and pear – were 
particularly popular. 
47 Painted panel altarpieces date to 13th century Italy. The polyptych, with decorative carvings, appeared 
in the following century. Melville considers the medium’s distinctions and possibilities with respect to 
forms of painting, noting that the fresco, the altarpiece and the easel painting offer room to distinguish 
function of a medium in relation to how it is found. See: Becoming Medium, 2013. 
48 I had previously completed several diptychs, triptychs and polyptychs, and explored the idea of 
grouping works thematically and formally in the studio and in the gallery setting. 
49 Giotto di Bondone (1266/7-1337), Masaccio (1401-1428) and Fra Angelico (c. 1395-1455). 
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works could be likened to frames in a storyboard, with peripheral sequences remaining 
absent. Stills and breaks tell of temporal duration and spatial extension (Fig. 1C).50    
 
 
 
Fig. 1C 
 
2.4: Scale 
Why so small? Gesturing on a scale beyond one’s reach requires bodily movement (of 
arm, wrist and torso).51 Tensions build at the periphery of gestures, which impact on 
the way the paint sits. With a scaling up of equipment this can be compensated for. 
More problematic is the replication of the weight of paint across a larger area. The 
possibility of adding bulking material underpins the assumption that small paintings 
can be made larger through modifications to technique, equipment and the vehicle 
itself, yet remain essentially unchanged. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
reproductions can be projected or printed at any scale. It is the material properties of 
paint that determine its scope, not the ability to replicate gestures on a larger scale. The 
ratio of texture to smoothness: of surface to edge: of peak to trough – and the effects 
of gravity and drying time – are rooted to (determined by and bound up in) the work’s 
scale. A reproduction of a painting at another scale constitutes an impossible view.  
 
This, in itself, does not explain my predisposition for small paintings, though it does 
tell of my preference for effects achievable at a small scale. There are accompanying 
																																																								
50 In film, the storyboard permits alterations at the early stages of a project, allowing the director to 
explore dislocation, juxtaposition and repetition in order to build tension, insert flashbacks and re-
sequence or layer narratives.   
51 Willem de Kooning (1904-1997) was noted for his methods of enlargement, using poles to extend his 
brushes, which, in turn, acted to extend his gestures. 
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explanations. As a student, I worked on larger canvases, in acrylics.52 A growing 
dislike of the messy physicality of the hanging, bagging canvas (and of the claims 
made in support of the large-scale expressive canvases of the 1980s) dampened my 
enthusiasm.53 Mostly, there was a need to understand materiality at close quarters, 
within my field of vision and within my reach. To me, the making of a painting is an 
act of intimacy, and, consequently, this decrease in scale was a drawing towards. 
 
2.5: Ground and Finish 
I apply an acrylic gesso primer, initially diluted so as to engorge the grain and coat the 
fibres of the wood. Subsequently, I put on additional layers; increasing the viscosity 
and the vigour with which it is applied until I establish a ridged, opaque surface that 
can be cutback with abrasive papers. My principal concern is how best to protect the 
wood from the long-term effects of the oil.54 I test levels of absorption, assessing the 
rapidity of sinkage. To finish, I usually varnish with a soluble gloss; thinned a little. 
This protects the surface of the painting, allowing it to be cleaned. However, its 
primary function is to unify surface variance. Diluting the paint throughout the making 
of the work (with solvents, varnishes and oils) prevents the material from sticking in a 
predictable and stable manner. Lean over fat can cause separations, cracking and a 
lack of cohesion. I employ retouching varnish at various stages of the painting’s life, 
to bring the image back and to bind layers of paint together. Sinking causes matt areas, 
which interfere with spatial relationships and disturb the balance between the image 
and the object. To varnish is to come closer to what the painting was when wet.  
 
2.6: Application and Handling 
This is tied to scale. I use brushes of varying sizes and coarseness, mostly flat.55 I 
enjoy the feel of the brush; it extends me and connects me to the painted surface (to 																																																								
52 I moved from making reasonably small, close-harmony paintings with a blade, under the influence of 
Nicolas de Staël (1914-1955), to fractured arrangements of pieces of landscape and still life, influenced 
by Cubism and Abstract Expressionism, especially the pre-drip paintings of Jackson Pollock (1912-
1956), and somewhat in the manner of Lee Krasner (1908-1984). From there, I re-established a singular 
horizon and introduced chromatic greys. 
53 Euphoric, indulgent and theatrical. In particular, the Neo-Expressionist canvases of Julian Schnabel 
(1951-). 
54 Refined linseed and stand oil, or occasionally poppy oil. 
55 Flat brushes permit the painter to work back from an edge and to modify from an immediate sense of 
squareness and structure, rather than to impose these things upon roundness. Paul Cézanne (1839-1906) 
is notable for his use of a round brush to generate angularity and flat-depth, which became modified and 
tightened using a palette knife. 
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the material constituents of the work). I can push, pull and roll paint: draw and fill. 
The viscosity of the paint is felt as much as it is seen, and I remain attuned to changes 
in fluidity, speed of application, and resistance. Painting is reliant on muscle memory. 
I can drag, shove and bully material; drawing thinner glazes across thicker areas of 
impasto or stippling. I work on several panels simultaneously, which allows me to a 
stagger processes across the series of works, maintaining differences along the way. 
 
Much of what I leave is the result of applying more fluid paint to partially dry, viscous 
underpaintings, or from a thinned wash laid across the face and allowed to settle over a 
heavier ground. Dry painting involves layering on top of already established 
palimpsests—drawing with paint around areas of interest; obscuring sections that seem 
no longer to serve a purpose. I sometimes work through a recently applied, thinned 
and semi-opaque wash, unearthing partially dried, more heavily bodied material. The 
contrast in viscosity permits me to bring forth the underneath layer gradually – almost 
grittily – with resistance. I find, with this, that I can adjust gradations within the 
surface of a painting much more subtly than would be possible using a standard wet in 
wet approach, where each covering is equally viscous and manipulable (Fig. 1D).  
 
 
 
Fig. 1D 
 
I mix colours in pots, to varying consistencies, modifying as I go, whilst ensuring that 
I am able to access undiluted pigment from a glass plate or wooden board. 
Adjustments take place throughout, and I combine the contents of pots; pulling one 
colour through another – on palette and painting – towards elusive tints, until the base 
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colour is scarcely visible. This provides me with knowledge of colour at its most 
delicate, when barely distinguishable from white. I do the same with the shades, taking 
complementaries towards black: cooling and warming. I use knives, too, mostly for 
mixing, separating and scraping. Sticks, rags and gloves make up the rest of my kit.  
 
2.7: Colour and Tonality 
A propensity to seek out the indeterminate informs my palette also.56 I am inclined to 
refrain from colours that appear too singular.57 Blues and greens become grey-blues 
and grey-greens, and I remain aware that colour – as paint – is tangible. Red rarely 
remains red. I use it mostly to mix a range of browns and purples, to neutralise the 
greens and to warm the blacks.58 Pure colours tend to be cut back, whitened, greyed or 
generally polluted. I am drawn to close harmonies (to the vividness of non-vivid 
colour) and to simultaneous contrasts.59 Quiet colours affect me more than loud.60 
 
I begin by accentuating a tonal range—widening local contrasts around or within 
extended areas of harmony, that, most of the time, draw towards each other, then 
away, and back towards, in the course of the period of making. I find myself 
responding to tiny tonal differences as I open and close them. Close harmonies – the 
nearness of passages of paint – draw me to the moments prior to an evening’s 
stillness—a time when things (by which I mean all things) appear to me as something 
more than they are. In tone and colour, in light and shade, the motifs emerge partially 
formed and fugitive, akin to the period of transition that connects the day to the night.  																																																								
56 Philosophically, indeterminacy draws from the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and from his 
ideas as to the unapproachability of the noumenon (thing-in-itself). Within Romanticism, changeability 
comes to be understood, especially by William Wordsworth (1770-1850) and John Keats (1795-1821), 
as a mode of thinking about the world and its events—as a prerequisite of reception. Materially, 
indeterminacy serves to define aspects of the painting process (the transition from liquid to solid). 
Nothing is fixed in the making, where all remains in flux, and is therefore subject to change. 
57 Primary and secondary colours. 
58 What Keats might have called a constrained verdurousness. 
59 In his book of 1839, De la Loi du Contraste Simultané des Couleurs, Michel Eugène Chevreul (1786-
1899) demonstrated that the fading of dyed threads is not fading at all, but instead due to the effects of 
simultaneous contrasts between adjacent coloured threads. 
60 Changes in weather – and, more specifically, seasonal variations – certainly infuse my works, altering 
my understanding, both in the making and afterwards (I am likely to introduce warmer hues in the 
winter and cooler greys in the summer). More often than not I paint out of season, perhaps to ensure an 
avoidance of verisimilitude and to maintain a reliance on the ebb and flow of memory and mood from a 
place outside. A painting attests to what is has been, yet rests within the context of its making. As 
liminal limitation it stands positioned: a sonorous circumventing of the tide. I am Northern, in European 
terms—at home in cooler climes. I favour a backdrop that is amenable to, even encouraging of, changes 
in mood, tending to prefer the colder light of the northern Renaissance – of Bruegel, Cranach (Lucas, 
the Elder, c. 1472-1553) and Dürer (Albrecht, 1471-1528) – to its warmer southern counterpart.	
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2.8: Surface and Time 
I do not apply paint thickly—rarely as a single impasto. The surface bothers me, 
because it is all there is; all I have access to. Meaning begins where surface ends. For 
me, that surface is, after day one of painting, a composite of other surfaces, visible 
through gaps or transparent washes, most frequently the result of dragged material 
catching the blobs and brushed edges of older passages of paint (Fig. 1E). I used to 
think that the accrual of paint was merely the result of an inability to establish the 
motif quickly. Taken to an extreme, such an idea sees paint at the service of image, 
with the most successful image – in material terms – being the most parsimoniously 
painted. The alternative explanation seemed less desirable, namely: that I had become 
fond of a process that resulted in knobbly, pitted and uneven surfaces (an oily Artex).61  
 
 
 
Fig. 1E 
 
There is a third possibility, and it is the one I favour: that the weight of the painted 
surface is tied to the probability of bringing forth motifs from the substance itself—of 
sitting layers of material close to an indeterminate divide between the paint and its 
representation, where each might inform the other. As technique changes, so too does 
the balance of elements that are required to lock-in this interdependence, in order to 
resist either an emotive pull towards the image and the there, or else a bodily pull 
towards the paint and the here. A painting appears as a still object that time happens 
to. Its stillness punctures that time and permits another time – the time of its making 																																																								
61 A surface coating, similar to plaster, often applied to ceilings to create textures.  
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(of all that has constituted its making) – to become visible and knowable. This time 
takes the form of surface amendments, visible as an array of gestures and marks. 
 
2.9: Pictures and Paint 
The idea of one thing standing in for or another – of resemblance and illusion – seems 
miraculous, and has intrigued me for a long time. From early on, to be affected by a 
painting was to be transported into the world of pictures. This world told wonderful 
stories, but it also looked a certain way. That this was, in fact, a constructed world (in 
that it arose from manual work, chemical processes and acquired techniques: and from 
intentions, limitations and chance occurrences) was something that came to me later, 
though as a young child I made a clear distinction between painting-pictures and 
photograph-pictures. The former could even be mine. I painted more than I drew.62 
 
The seductiveness of picturing supplies me with something to work off. However, 
picturing became compromised as my awareness of painting’s artifice increased. I 
acquired a sense of paint’s material presence as something at odds with the pictures 
that paint fashioned. Presence became a barrier to the world of picturing, resulting in a 
loss of faith in the image. If the image became wholly that which it stood in place of, 
then the painting vanished. Moreover, an over-awareness of the properties of paint 
disavowed the possibility of picturing, allowing me to resist the associated meanings 
generated as shapes and patterns become pictures (Table 1). With time, this negation 
of the image (through an awareness of its constructedness in paint) was replaced by a 
delayed response to it. And now, I feel able – again – to let pictures seduce me. 
 
Paint/Material—HERE PAINTING Picture/Image—THERE 
 
Table 1: Paint and Picture: Here and There 
 
My process is one of having paint acquire an image, and of having an image acquire a 
host of associations. I am convinced that modifications to form modify content too. 
The meanings of the constituent parts of a work are tied to relationships (Stetson to 
cowboy, bird to branch, cloud to sky) that are established outside of the painting, 
																																																								
62 Drawing was a big part of my childhood, and I believed painting to be an extension of drawing.  
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forming a closed loop and a point of reference.63 To me, painting is an arrow that 
points not to the world, but to an imaginative world suspended between the painting 
and the world. This is a distancing device that protects me from the ebb and flow of a 
world outside, allowing me to function in a painterly place of paint’s choosing.  
 
I think of the place of painting as a medium-sized stage: a purpose-built theatre of 
operations, where what is seen is rehearsed. Not everything can be staged in this 
limited arena, but here I retain a director’s privilege. This strategy circumvents the 
needs for a contextualised rationale (which acts to impose a reading in advance of the 
work, so as to determine origins) for which I have little time. Images simply turn up in 
costume and are lit variously; assume roles and adopt characters and accents. They can 
be hired and fired (and even re-hired) and the play is rewritten every night.64 
 
2.10: Edges 
The messiness of the painting process – the necessity of manhandling the support – 
results in an accumulation of oily fingerprints that eventually cover the sides of the 
work. I could apply a protective covering to edges of the support prior to painting, 
though this would require a gauging of the likely thickness of the final surface skin as 
it presses and bulges over the front edges, building with time. Sometimes paint 
thickens at the corners, and, with an uncertainty as to how long each painting might 
take to unfold to completion, such a decision becomes a matter of guesswork.  
 
In unframed works, an exposed edge can be left to stand: or stained, varnished, painted 
to blend in or oppose the surface colour, or else hidden in close proximity to the edge 
of another work. I have also explored a method whereby I route the well-smeared 
edges back to the wood and behind and up to the lip, removing all traces of paint. This, 
too, comes with problems: most notably the likelihood of removing the edges of the 
wood itself, or of splintering the lip from the support. Too even a line could be 
																																																								
63 I occasionally return to the Western (in its filmic form, both classic and spaghetti), having borrowed 
motifs from films for a series of paintings earlier in my career – between 1996-2002 – and for a later 
series of monotypes, in 2011. Images include: hats, tumbleweed, cowboys, cigars, smoke signals, cacti, 
horses, saloon (batwing) doors, and Monument Valley (Appendix 1). 
64 The metaphor of the play is useful. A play is a singular unit comprised of acts; themselves comprised 
of characters, locations and exchanges. The play becomes operable only when performed (which 
includes reading). 
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interpreted as a forced containment, or as a concession to decoration. This method 
results in an illusionistic effect that exaggerates the surface’s thickness (Fig. 1F).65 
 
 
 
Fig. 1F 
 
2.11: Hanging Methods 
I have exhibited some of these works in the course of the continuing series: a series 
that from the beginning had no determined end.66 Wanting to accentuate the material 
object of painting, I thought to sit the works on specially made shelves (Fig. 1G). I 
also tried placing them undercover – on plinths – so as to resemble the artefacts found 
in museum displays (Fig. 1H).67 Sensing too deliberate a move towards the material 
(introduced to the paintings, not established by their surfaces), I have fallen back on 
two solutions. 1: unframed, with the means of attachment hidden. 2: black lacquered 
hardwood frames (Fig. 1I), with a darkened gap between the edge of the support and 
the inside of the frame. The former serves to expose the object, and the latter 
foregrounds the picture. I have yet to arrive at a solution that unites both concerns.  
 																																																								
65 I’ve backed off from this somewhat, thinking it too artificial a method of pulling forth the material. It 
now seems additive. 
66 Shown within group exhibitions in Leeds, Liverpool, Salford and London, and in solo exhibitions in 
Halifax, Leeds and York. 
67 The cabinet of curiosities intrigues me. In offering the particular within the general, it serves to frame 
the general nature of the particular. 
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Fig. 1G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1H 
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Fig. 1I 
 
2.12: Place 
I am interested in things in a setting, and in settings as things in themselves: as places 
where other things show up and proceed to interact with one another—as backdrops to 
events.68 By this I mean that I define place as a location that I have a physical or 
emotional connection to. My entry into painting was, in large part, the result of early 
encounters with the landscape paintings of John Constable, initially through access to 
library books and to a print of Flatford Mill (Fig. 1J) that hung on the living room 
wall during much of my childhood.69 Later, I saw several of his watercolours in local 
galleries, and, later still, the majority of the great six footers in public collections.70  																																																								
68 Events require locations, and a sense of an openness…to be closed. I return to the unchanging 
changeability of Snowdonia, paying attention to indeterminacies and schisms between one vantage and 
another. 
69 Constable is, to me, the landscape painter par excellence—a fusion of Romanticism and Realism, 
conservatism and radicality: a highly inventive painterly maker of pictures, yet one nevertheless intent 
on preservation (on the maintenance of things past). 
70 For most of his life, Constable worked on a much smaller scale. However, from 1819-1831 he 
produced a series of six-foot paintings, each of which was accompanied by a six-foot oil sketch. Within 
the Western tradition, landscape painting acquired prominence in Northern Europe during the medieval 
period, and in the South of Europe during the Renaissance, in part through the works of Giotto, then 
later, Giorgione Barbarelli da Castelfranco (c. 1477/8 -1510) and Giovanni Bellini (c. 1430-1516), who 
began to place greater emphasis on the natural world and to formulate conceptions of landscape in 
respect of idealised notions of the pastoral. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a considerable 
growth of interest in landscape, especially in Dutch painting. In the Romantic period (in Britain, France 
and Germany) landscape painting became the vehicle through which notions of the sublime and the 
picturesque could become visible within plastic form. Within early modernism, the landscape painting 
remained prominent, especially in the works of the Impressionists and Post-Impressionists, before 
ceding ground to abstraction by the early-mid twentieth century.   
	 42	
 
 
Fig. 1J 
 
2.13: Motifs 
The imagery in my paintings is largely the result of a confluence of material and 
memory (recognised more than determined), yet it would be remiss of me not to 
accept that the paintings are populated by recurrent motifs – pictures of things in the 
world – drawn, for the most part, from a repository of objects, actions and locations. 
These are often rather simple, with distinct and recognisable internal shapes or 
outlines. While it would, under the circumstances of the processes of making, be 
misplaced to supply an account of this imagery – in terms of my reasons for using it – 
it does seem useful to relate the recurrent motifs that have inhabited the paintings 
during the processes of making, or else on their completion (Appendix 1). 
 
In using these motifs, I am not interested in external origins, functions or purpose: at 
least not when painting (by which I mean the source of the images and their 
applications outside of the work). The motifs originate in, function through, and have a 
purpose as a result of the painting they appear in. A painted hat, bird or cloud takes the 
role of a hat, bird or cloud in the service of becoming a painting. This notion arose 
from a growing resistance to the more tyrannical tenets of observational drawing, 
which, taken to an extreme, carry the implication that the more an image can be like 
something, in shape and tone and hue, the more real it is—and in being real, is seen to 
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point elsewhere.71 For me, a painting’s being is determined by the extent to which it 
remains visible in and of itself whilst imparting some sense of that which it is not.   
 
2.14: Memory and Seeing 
To see is to have seen, and seeing is remembering.72 I start from here. Memory filters, 
distorts and relays out of sequence. This generates present meaning in respect of what 
has been—meaning established outside of the moment, and freed from the 
oppressiveness of the now. I let paint remind me of, or permit me to recollect.73 I 
employ processes and strategies that draw images from the paint—to generate 
involuntary memories, which become modified and amended once up and running.74 I 
throw out an idea, only for it to become changed in the course of the painting. I 
establish line through overlap and masking, which relieves it of its role as determiner. 
I return to colours, shapes, marks and motifs. When painting, I allow myself to 
become preoccupied and to roam without censure—to attend to the painting’s making. 
To move forward is to have other things enter the arena, and to let things leave too. 
 
2.15: Titles 
My method of titling is akin to my method of painting. A title is a name that 
designates a thing with properties. I sometimes let others title my work, or supply me 
																																																								
71 According to Pliny the Elder (AD 23-79), Zeuxis and Parrhasius, in the 5th century BC, competed in a 
contest to determine the greatest painter in Greece. Zeuxis’ painting of grapes appeared so real that the 
birds flew down to peck at the fruit. Impressed, Parrhasius asked Zeuxis to pull back the curtain to 
reveal his own painting, yet in attempting to do so Zeuxis discovered the curtain itself to be a painted 
illusion. Zeuxis determined that, though he had managed to deceive the birds, Parrhasius was the greater 
painter on account of him having deceived Zeuxis. 
72 John Berger (1926-2017) begins Ways of Seeing with, “Seeing comes before words”. However, there 
is a contradiction, for, in following a claim by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Berger presumes that 
knowledge (seeing) precedes language (reading). Postructuralism determines that knowledge is the 
result of language. Seeing, therefore, in this light (and along with reading), is a form of knowledge 
construction. 
73 In The Optical Unconscious, Rosalind Krauss (1941-) mocked the capacity of John Ruskin (1818-
1900) to collect moments of seemingly disconnected experience from the visual world around him. The 
world of Ruskin clearly required a form of sensory engagement at odds with Krauss’s rigid 
theoreticism. 
74 A term used by Marcel Proust (1871-1922) in À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time, 
previously, Remembrance of Things Past, 1909-1922. In the novel, an incident of eating madeleines 
soaked in tea transports Proust back to his childhood. Proust was familiar with the writings of Henri 
Bergson (1859-1941). In particular, he took note of his speculations as to the nature of the links between 
time and the body, and of the role of perception and modes of memory. Bergson’s concept of pure 
duration – a succession of qualitative changes, melding into one another imprecisely – permitted a non-
linear thinking of time (this parallels the space-time of Albert Einstein, 1879-1955). Thus, time is not a 
sequential line in space, but, instead, a form of overlapping, heterogeneous structuring of existence. 
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with possibilities drawn from an encounter with the work itself.75 I change my mind, 
retitle, and bolt titles together. Untitled is never used, for it denotes nothing save an 
inability to decide, or else an ideological bent to which I remain indifferent. I favour 
the singular over the plural, and the moment over the duration.76 I hope to designate an 
object as present. A title is a method of access, before word gives way to image and 
material, which, together, in turn, resituate the word. To me, titles do not infringe on 
the fundamental aspects of a painting’s being.77 However, they appear to be additive. 
Titles can be flowery or minimal, austere or romantic. More often than not, I fall back 
on objective titles involving a description of the painting’s picture or place, or even its 
mood.78 Rarely, I’ll employ a more extended description freed of the definite article. 
More recently, I’ve appropriated the titles of films – as prompts – though I remain 
suspicious of such borrowing, and of the rules of appropriation more generally.79 
Titles are never the painting, but remain of the painting and with the painting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
75 This grounds the title in an experience of the object, and in the verifiable, even communal. 
76 In the sense, in the first instance, of the painting avoiding generalisations and/or claims to aspire to 
the condition of the subject depicted, and, in the second, of ensuring to remind that though painting 
remains in and of time, time nevertheless happens to it.  
77 By which I mean that the painting is something without it. 
78 Clement Greenberg suggested Lavender Mist as the title for Jackson Pollock’s early drip painting 
Number 1, 1950. A perhaps surprising concession to the Romantic, the richness of evocation is 
reminiscent of Dew-Drenched Furze, c. 1890, a late work by John Everett Millais (1829-1886). 
79 In his earliest work, referred to by Martin Sorrell (birth date unknown), in Federico García Lorca: 
Selected Poems, as his juvenilia, Lorca (1898-1936) utilised the names of composers to indicate mood. 
Later, he rejected this form of shorthand as somewhat heavy-handed.  
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Chapter 2: The Medium within the Post-Medium Condition 
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
By the mid-late 1960s, the notion of a medium had come to define that which was 
most insular and protectionist about painting, with the idea of medium specificity 
seemingly entirely synonymous with the formalist criticism of Clement Greenberg.80 
As such, the richness of the term, and its historical situatedness, was lost behind a 
particular defence of the virtues of modernist painting. This chapter sets out to address 
the legacy of formalism in respect of the fate of the notion of medium specificity 
within key writings that seek to shed light on the condition of the art object (and its 
material extensions) in the aftermath of the period of high modernism. I will chart the 
medium’s various and complex entanglements within subsequent discourses.  
 
Part 2: Revision, Reappraisal and Reapplication comes in two parts. Initially, I will 
examine four recent and related postgraduate papers, foregrounding the retention and 
currency of the medium (and the language of formalism) within contemporary debates. 
I will consider the uses of the terms interdisciplinary, purity, grid and surface: 
analysed in turn and drawn one from each thesis.81 Of importance, here, is the extent 
to which challenges and modifications to Greenbergian formalism serve, in locating 
Greenberg as a source and not a result of thinking about form, to reify his framework, 
thus limiting a re-examination of the medium. Part 2.2: Costello: Uncoupling 
Aesthetics and Medium Specificity focuses on Greenberg’s responsibility for, in 
Diarmuid Costello’s account, a recent marginalisation of aesthetics within discourse.  
 
Part 3: Formalism: Contestations and Withdrawals encounters formalism (and 
medium) under fire—confronted on several fronts by new and external (in the sense of 
having no formalist allegiance) lines of inquiry.82 The focus, however, is not so much 
these challenges, but the responses to them by those with some sympathy for 																																																								
80 Craig Staff, After Modernist Painting, 1. 
81 Interdisciplinarity is founded on an opposition to disciplinary and media distinctions, such as those 
that Greenberg supplied for painting. Interdisciplinary practices encourage the generation of concepts 
and material possibilities through an embrace of new media, or the reconsideration of old. 
82 Lucy Lippard’s Six Years: The Dematerialisation of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972, 1997, 
extended her earlier piece (co-authored with John Chandler), “The Dematerialisation of the Art Object”, 
1968, and chronicled a network of recent conceptual practices whose tendency was to foreground idea 
or action ahead or in place of material preoccupations, such as surface, vehicle or medium. Among 
others, Lippard (Lucy, 1937-) addressed works by Sol LeWitt (1928-2007), Susan Hiller (1940-), Mary 
Kelly (1941-), and Barbara Kruger (1945-). 
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Greenberg’s approach.83 Rosalind Krauss’s term The Post-Medium Condition is 
contextualised in respect of developments within the trajectory of her thinking, and in 
relation to her split from Greenberg. Michael Fried is considered in terms of his 
restatement of the usefulness of the dialectic as a tool to legitimise swings in painting 
between the optical and the material, for the significance he assigns to shape and 
surface, and for the emphasis he places on the conditions of engagement.84 Fried’s 
critique of Minimalism is recounted in some detail. Of particular importance is the 
distinction he makes between presence and presentness. Towards the end of Part 3 I 
will return to Krauss to address her notion of technical support, and her attempt at 
rethinking the question of temporality in respect of Fried’s position, which, together, 
form part of a much wider aim to resurrect, for visual practices, the idea of content. 
 
In Part 4: The Later Post-Medium Condition I will explore Yve-Alain Bois’s effort to 
liberate thinking about medium from questions of autonomy and purity (from its 
relationship to Greenberg), so as to rethink materiality anew, through locating the 
painted object as residing between, on the one hand, its material constituents, and, on 
the other, its type and locale. I will draw from Bois’s influential essay “Painting: The 
Task of Mourning”, to demarcate an art historical perspective on modernism’s end as 
something written into its beginning.85 In addition, I will address recent perspectives 
on time and the centrality of the maker, including David Joselit’s conception of 
painting as marked time, Isabelle Graw’s notion of liveliness – lived painting – and 
Matt Saunders’s interesting distinction between the medium and material of painting. 
  
																																																								
83 Challenges originating outside of formalist discourse (from those with no investment in formalism’s 
history).  
84 Peter Osborne, in Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art (London & New York: 
Verso, 2013), has written of the revival of interest in Fried’s opticalism (on the back of an interest in the 
gaze and a renewal of interest in Greenberg’s ideas). 
85 And consequently, the medium’s end. 
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Part 2: Clement Greenberg: Revision, Reappraisal and Reapplication86   
 
 
2.1: Greenberg and Medium Specificity within Recent Postgraduate Theses 
Within recent discourses, Greenberg is considered still.87 There is a significant 
investment within MPhil and PhD theses, too, where, although Clem-bashing has not 
yet abated (though there is some mollification in its mode of expression), his ideas 
resonate; and where purity, autonomy and flatness serve as points of location for a 
renewal of thinking about modernism, medium and the senses.88 The ubiquity of 
references would suggest that in order to position contemporary painting critically 
(and fairly), Greenberg’s ideas are to be worked through rather than around.  
 
2.1.1: Payne and Interdisciplinarity 
Alistair J. Payne begins “Redefine and Reteritorialise: Painting as an Interdisciplinary 
Form” with the assertion that: 
              
   
Any examination of painting as a practice or discipline must necessarily analyse 
the philosophical underpinning of formalist modes of thinking. Although 
contemporary practices are not as driven by the inherent rules of the discipline, 
they are still dependent upon the theoretical foundations within which they 
work, and effectively this leads to a retention of medium and material 
specificity.89  
      
      
Payne introduces Gilles Deleuze, as an antidote to the Hegelian thinking underpinning 
Greenbergian formalism, and develops an idea of: “the virtual rather than the 
boundaried, rule-based and medium specific limitations of previous formalism”.90 In 
so doing, he hopes to demonstrate the diversification of approaches to painting. This 
involves a detailed tracing of the development of thinking about medium, so as to 
expose painting’s inherent interdisciplinarity and permit it a newfound freedom.  																																																								
86 Appendix 2 offers a glossary of Greenbergian terms and an account of medium specificity within 
formalist discourse. 
87 Notably: Caroline A. Jones’s Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg's Modernism and the 
Bureaucratization of the Senses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), where Greenberg’s 
emphasis on sight is framed as an exemplar of a positivistic management of the senses in mid-twentieth 
century America. 
88 Clem-bashing is a term used to describe the landslide of abuse directed at Greenberg from the 1970s 
onwards. 
89 Alistair J. Payne, “Redefine and Reteritorialise: Painting as an Interdisciplinary Form” (PhD diss., 
University of the Arts, London, 2005), II. 
90 Ibid. 
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Payne argues that painting has become refracted, by which he means that the 
enmeshing of theoretical perspectives – in opposition to formalism – has provided 
painting with opportunities to redirect the search for meaning away from the 
internalised pursuit of an autonomous identity.91 Deleuze’s notion of the fold is 
employed in an attempt to dissolve the relationship between painting and architecture 
by re-examining the idea of parameters for surfaces.92 Henri Bergson’s concept of 
becoming is invoked, too, though in the service of demonstrating the inadequacy of a 
conception of painting that foregrounds its ontological status as a static object.93 
 
The central point is that medium specificity has been replaced by interdisciplinarity—
by an understanding of practice that takes as its starting point the notion that the 
refraction of critical theory serves to account for – and perhaps drive – a refraction of 
practice. The withdrawal from a formalist position that works back from the object of 
painting – towards theory – is an attempt to free idea from an alignment with material 
constraints.94 To be interdisciplinary, to Payne, is to dissolve distinctions that serve to 
separate theory from practice (or from anything else) rather than to address what it is 
that might work to keep theory and practice apart, or else idea and form together.95 
Such an omission affords an opportunity for further consideration: for interdisciplinary 
approaches would appear, paradoxically, to erase material distinctions between object-
based practices on theoretical grounds whilst establishing clear theoretical divides 
between formalist and non-formalist positions in respect of those very practices.     
 
2.1.2: Stubbs and Purity 
With criticism of medium-specificity necessarily comes criticism of the idea of purity: 
medium-specificity is, to Greenberg, a local manifestation of a universal truth.96 Purity 
has a twofold application, supplying both clarity and foundation. In “Digital 
Embodiment in Contemporary Abstract Painting”, Michael Stubbs ponders what he 
terms Greenberg’s discredited claim: “that painting should seek its own purity through 																																																								
91 Of which medium specificity is the chief support. 
92 In works on Gottfried Wilhelm (von) Leibniz (1646-1716) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Gilles 
Deleuze (1925-1995) presents the fold as a doubling of one’s thoughts onto the thoughts of another. 
93 Ibid., 276. To Bergson, becoming is the operation of self-differentiation: the identification and 
elaboration of a difference within a thing—a quality or a system that emerges in duration. 
94 A historical imposition, the result of formalist–orientated thinking. 
95 Ibid., 316-323. 
96 The truth of fundamental difference, as opposed to an ontological indistinction. 
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the acknowledgment of its material”.97 His central argument arises, however, from a 
sense of dissatisfaction with irony rather than from an aversion to purity.98 To Stubbs, 
any visual practice that extends or refutes the modernist position – as outlined most 
forcibly in the work of Greenberg – becomes caught up in dead-end experience. The 
death of modernism, to Stubbs, is also the death of practices that take modernism’s 
historical essentialism as a starting point.99  
 
Stubbs endeavours to back painting out from this cul-de-sac through a re-employment 
of the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who claimed that: “the painter transforms the 
relationship between the body and a painting by overlapping the interior sense of self 
with the world of external objects as an imaginary texture of the real”.100 In refraining 
from a simplistic attack on purity, detachment and wholeness – and in resisting the all-
too-knowing strategies of irony – which serve only to embed a dualistic 
interrelationship between postmodernist and modernist discourses, Stubbs presents 
painting as the body reformed—an equivalent of the impure, acting body, wherein a 
carnal equivalence can be found.101 Meaning becomes grounded in a commonality 
between the body and painting, against the backdrop of an age wherein images are 
inescapably compromised by digital mediation and must adapt to suit a different role.  
 
Stubbs redeploys Merleau-Ponty’s comment, in which he claims that Cézanne’s 
paintings: “suspend[…] the habits of thought and reveal[…] the base of inhuman 
nature upon which Man has installed himself”.102 Within the exposition, this becomes 
indicative of a desire to demarcate a shared temporal space between body and work. 
Moreover, the digital, to Stubbs, turns out to be embedded in the form and reception of 
painting, and painting emerges as an embodied simulacrum of that which it once 
																																																								
97 Michael Stubbs, “Digital Embodiment in Contemporary Abstract Painting” (PhD diss., University of 
the Arts, London, 2003), 2. The claim was discredited, initially, by Rosalind Krauss and her followers. 
98 Since the 1990s, there have been rumblings in cultural theory regarding the possibility of a post-
postmodern. A tiredness with irony, and a return to faith of one kind or another appears to define it. 
99 Michael Stubbs, “Digital Embodiment in Contemporary Abstract Painting”, 2. 
100 Maurice Merleau Ponty, in Michael Stubbs, “Digital Embodiment in Contemporary Abstract 
Painting”, 46. 
101 Ibid.,166-169. 
102 Maurice Merleau Ponty, “Cézanne Doubt”, 1945, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy 
and Painting, ed. Galen A. Johnson, trans, Michael B. Smith (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1994), 241. 
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was.103 Greenberg’s conception of modernist painting as autonomous did not allow for 
the possibility of technology impacting upon painting’s identity, and for a reason other 
than that he was writing some time in advance of the advent of the digital age. If 
technology were to become manifest in painting, it would – in accordance with 
Greenberg’s analysis – become so as a result of (or out of, or from) painterly concerns. 
In other words, to consider the digital as able to infuse a painting with something 
particular to itself would be to put the cart before the horse. The digital arises 
dialectically – from painting – as an immaterial effect of a material cause. 
 
2.1.3: Key and Grids 
In the process of critically framing formalism’s historicity, the idea of a post-formalist, 
interdisciplinary understanding of practice is itself historically positioned. This can be 
seen in Sarah Key’s “Grids: Painting in a Dialogue with the Digital”, where an 
embedding of the digital within contemporary painting is pursued in respect of an 
archetypal modernist device (the grid has underpinned design strategies, perspective 
drawing and modes of utopian abstraction), in order to extend modernist concerns 
rather than to refute them.104 This amounts to claiming the grid for the digital age by 
grounding it within historical parameters, whilst nudging it away from transcendental 
claims that serve to valorise its form and workings, thus denying it currency.105 
 
Key considers the extent to which practice and theory reposition the grid, absorbing 
visual languages and making them accessible to/through digital technologies. There is 
clearly an intention to take up where Krauss left off with “Grids”, though it is worth 
noting that she does not revisit the central paradox of Krauss’s essay, namely: that the 
modernist painter is compelled to find originality in – and claim inventiveness through 
– what amounts to a repetitious re-application of the grid: examples of which can be 
seen in Cézanne’s Rideau, Cruchon et Compotier, Pablo Picasso’s The Guitar Player, 
																																																								
103 Michael Stubbs, 203-207. Simulacrum is Latin for likeness. To Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007), the 
simulacrum is not a copy, but becomes real as it enters the hyperreal (Simulations, 1983). To Deleuze, 
however, the simulacrum precedes the original (The Logic of Sense, 1969). Incidentally, Krauss later 
translated Deleuze’s essay “Plato and the Simulacrum”, for publication in October, 1983.  
104 Sarah Key, “Grids: Painting in a Dialogue with the Digital” (PhD diss., Loughborough University, 
2008). In particular, first generation European abstract painting, including: František Kupka (1871-
1957), Kazimir Malevich (1878-1935), Piet Mondrian (1872-1944), Wassily Kandinsky (1866-1944), 
Paul Klee (1879-1940), Sonia Delaunay (1885-1979), and Robert Delaunay (1885-1941). 
105 In line with postructuralist discourses with roots in Heideggerian thought. 
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and Ad Reinhardt’s Abstract Painting (Figs. 2A, 2B, 2C).106 To Key, the grid becomes 
a universally applicable matrix to be reclaimed for, and extended by, contemporary 
painting. In permitting deep illusion and flattened rectilinear surfaces, the grid is seen 
to underpin both representational and abstract modes of production.107 
 
 
 
Fig. 2A 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
106 With “Grids”, 1979, Krauss asserts that the grid became emblematic of modernist art – in particular, 
with the Cubists and with the pioneers of Western abstract painting and sculpture – in that it acted as a 
tool to assert the present, which, until that moment, painting and sculpture either did not possess, or else 
had not employed with such assertiveness. 
107 Sarah Key, “Grids: Painting in a Dialogue with the Digital” (PhD diss., Loughborough University, 
2008), 4. Krauss had alluded to this position also, but did not expand on it. 
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Fig. 2B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2C 
 
	 54	
The possibility of considering the grid outside of its modernist application offers Key 
an opportunity to see in painting the prospect of a resistance to: “the homogenising 
aesthetic conditions of the digital”.108 This, then, serves to supply painting with a tool 
to circumvent its own end through re-navigating its beginning. Key places 
Greenberg’s emphasis on the self-referentiality of painting against the backdrop of 
debates around the end of art. Medium specificity, flatness and opticality thus acted, 
for Greenberg, as bulwarks against the dissolution of distinctions made possible by 
unchecked subjectivity—by what Roger Fry had termed wish-fulfilment.109 
 
The advent of digital technologies operates, in Key’s analysis, to extend painting 
through the development of image tools that generate digital equivalents of painterly 
effects.110 However, processes of replication, to Key, serve only to foreground the 
absence of the material conditions of painting in reproduced form. Presumably, the 
notion that medium has become obsolete through the homogenising of the aesthetic 
conditions of digital generation (reproduction) is questionable on the grounds that 
digital imagery that references painting references only its image, preventing an 
embodied understanding of the object whose visual effects it reproduces.111 
 
2.1.4: Mathus and Surface  
The question of the visual, and of the surface of paintings, is explored in more detail 
by Miguel Ruiz Mathus, in “Tactility and Optimality in Contemporary Abstract 
Painting”. Mathus examines the construction of surfaces in more recent abstract 
paintings, considering Greenberg’s rejection of tactility in favour of opticality (retinal 
sensation), with recourse to three analyses of the work of Robert Ryman: “Irreducible 
Ryman”, by Thierry de Duve, and Yve-Alain Bois’s “Ryman’s Tact” and “Painting: 																																																								
108 Ibid., II. 
109 In 1924, in a lecture to the British Psychological Society titled Artist & Psycho-analysis, Roger Fry 
identified two types of artist, leaving no doubt as to whose endeavours he ascribed value. First, there are 
artists who are intent on constructing a fantasy-world in which wishes are fulfilled. Secondly, there are 
artists who concern themselves with the contemplation of formal relations. Wish fulfillment thus 
became an important barrier to truth. Fry’s acknowledgment of content, though an aversion to its import 
warrants comparision with the notion of defamiliarisation, developed by Viktor Shklovsky’s (1893-
1984), in “Art as Device”, 1917, where he claims that the role of art is to find methods of accessing that 
which is unfamiliar. In this view, art is thus a calling attention to itself—avoiding submersion into the 
ebb and flow of events through strategies that make the familiar seem strange. In Fry’s case, he seeks to 
make the familiar unfamiliar – retaining recognition of an object’s shape – by hiding worldly 
associations behind aesthetic disinterest. 
110 Sarah Key, “Grids: Painting in a Dialogue with the Digital”, 34. In particular, of applications such as 
Photoshop, which appeared in 1988. 
111 Ibid., 4. 
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The Task of Mourning”, the latter of which I will consider in Part 4.  
 
Though the inquiry is situated within a broad analysis of the relationship between 
photography and painting, Mathus takes as his starting point Greenberg’s resistance to 
both literalism and tactility – in spite of his promotion of discrete medias and his 
resistance to interdisciplinarity – and the repeated emphasis on flatness, which he 
explores through de Duve’s essay. Greenberg’s keenness to exclude the literal and the 
tactile (opposing them with the pictorial and the optical) is seen to be indicative of his 
desire to establish objective parameters to underpin value judgments.112 It is the notion 
of a pictorial space that separates the space of painting from the space of the literal 
world. Such a space is dependent on the optical: for it is in its relationship to, and 
contrast with, the literal space of the world and that pictorial space becomes operable.  
 
This notion is especially problematic in respect of a work such as Ryman’s Untitled 
(Fig. 2D), from 1962, where such a distinction appears to dissolve – and where the 
pictorial is less easy to maintain – as a result of the intrusion of the tactile, and a 
foregrounding of the situatedness of the object of painting. Mathus turns to Fried, 
whose rejection of literalism, he argues, extends Greenberg’s reliance on the optical by 
presenting the work as static in respect of the moment of the viewer’s comprehension 
of it. For both Fried and Greenberg, the modernist work exists as a form of painting: 
one that avoids running in step with the viewer through its declaration of a pictorial, 
optical space and a steadfast resistance to the worldly seductiveness of the tactile.113 
The battleground becomes the skin of the painting, and the restrictions imposed on it 
attest to a desire to circumscribe its mode of reception in order to maintain the 
integrity of the aesthetic. 
 
																																																								
112 Miguel Ruiz Mathus, “Tactility and Opticality in Contemporary Abstract Painting” (MPhil diss., 
University of London, 2011), 5-6. 
113 Ibid., 26-57.  
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Fig. 2D 
 
2.2: Costello: Uncoupling Aesthetics and Medium Specificity 
 
 
In the predominantly anti-aesthetic climate of Anglophone art theory since the 
early 1980s, the discourse of aesthetics has been notable only for its absence—in 
contrast to postmodern art theory’s willingness to draw on a variety of other 
theoretical discourses of varying degrees of externality to art.114 
 
 
British philosopher Diarmuid Costello, in his essay, “Greenberg’s Kant and the Fate of 
Aesthetics in Contemporary Art Theory” considers the extent to which Greenberg’s 
conflation of medium specificity and aesthetics has overdetermined artworld 
conceptions of the aesthetic, resulting in its demise. However, the absence of 
aesthetics from Anglophone art theory is secondary, here, to that which Costello 
deems responsible for its discrediting, namely: medium specificity. What follows 
serves as a summary of Costello’s key ideas, and points to a possible route to a more 
foundational understanding of the identity of painting’s medium. To Costello, 
Greenberg’s conception of modernist painting as an investigation into the constraints 
of the medium – and his establishment of flatness as that which grounded painting – 
																																																								
114 Diarmuid Costello, “Greenberg’s Kant and the Fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art Theory”, The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, no. 2 (2007): 1.  
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became entwined with an understanding of judgement and taste.115 Costello argues 
that:    
 
 
When Greenberg identified modernism with the pursuit of aesthetic value in art, 
he was thereby identifying medium-specificity with the pursuit of such value, for 
the simple reason that cleaving to the specificity of their respective media is 
what made the modernist arts modernist.116 
 
 
Costello’s intention in freeing aesthetics from its misapplication by Greenberg and his 
followers is to resurrect it within critical theory, to be re-applied elsewhere. He asks: is 
there the possibility of a postmodern aesthetic, or of an anti-aesthetic modernism?117 
These avenues appear cut off, which he considers in respect of Greenberg’s influential 
heirs, Fried and Krauss.  
 
 
While Fried’s criticism came to be regarded as emblematic of everything that 
later generations of theorists found restrictive about modernism (the stress on 
artistic autonomy, evaluative judgement, medium-specificity, and the like), 
Krauss’s star rose in inverse proportion, and largely as a consequence of the 
extent to which she went on to take issue with the fundamental commitments of 
Greenbergian modernism.118  
 
 
In an argument reminiscent of that made more broadly by Stubbs, Costello claims that, 
in seeking to occupy the ground on which Greenberg’s view of modernism was 
formed, both Fried and Krauss fail to escape his system, and end up embedding his 
terms of reference. The result: neither can navigate Greenberg’s conflation of 
aesthetics and medium specificity so as to redefine a more rounded, non-formalist 
conception of both terms for the contemporary practitioner.119 
 
To Costello, Greenberg’s empiricism and rigid alignment of the arts with the optical 
overlooks the mind’s propensity to imagine or extend beyond the material data 
compiled by the senses.120 Conceptual artworks thus appear, in this analysis, as able to 																																																								
115 Ibid., 2. Through his foregrounding of what was unique and irreducible. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., 3.  
118 Ibid. 
119 And theorist alike. 
120 To access stored sense data/knowledge. 
	 58	
reside within a category of that which can be considered aesthetically—one consistent 
with, and underpinned by, Kant’s aesthetic formulation.121 Costello expands the notion 
of an aesthetics unburdened by medium specificity, yet deals only implicitly with a 
medium specificity freed of the baggage of aesthetics. To do so explicitly would run 
counter to the broader thrust of his hypothesis, which is to provide an aesthetic basis 
for conceptual and neo-conceptual practices. Hence, Costello is now comfortably able 
to think of an aesthetic postmodernism, and perhaps even a non-aesthetic modernism. 
The uncoupling of aesthetics from medium specificity, however, affords a fortuitous 
opportunity to consider the possible (in)dispensability of the latter term too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
121 Part 1 of the Critique of Judgment, 1790, outlines the four reflexive judgments. Reflexive judgments 
differ from determinative judgments in that they seek to discover unknown universals from determined 
particulars, rather than subsuming assumed particulars under known universals. Intuition, to Kant, 
amounts to sensations formed according to the conditions of space and time. 	
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Part 3: Formalism: Contestations and Withdrawals 
 
 
3.1: Context 
In “The American Action Painters” – against the existentialist backdrop of post-war 
America – Harold Rosenberg advanced a novel and poetic conception of the practice 
of painting. To him, the meaning of a painting’s object draws, at least in part, from the 
actions that served to determine the painting’s form (irrespective of medium 
considerations), taking place in, “an arena in which to act”.122 This shift in location – 
from Greenberg’s picture plane to a place of external origin – positions the painting as 
an index or document of the actions of a performing subject. In opening the work’s 
meaning to the body of the artist, Rosenberg provided greater legitimacy for the 
sublimation of psychoanalytical material too.123 According to Amelia Jones: 
 
 
While modernists such as Clement Greenberg veil Pollock’s narcissism (and 
their own) to confirm him as a unified source of divinely inspired intentionality, 
incipient postmodernists such as Happenings performer and theorist Allan 
Kaprow claim Pollock’s performativity openly, emphasizing his body in its 
public display as central to the transformation of the art project into an open-
ended process rather than a set of mute products that can be made to speak their 
true meanings only by privileged specialists.124 
 
 
As the decade advanced, opposition to medium specificity grew, supported by works 
that seemed to dispense with specific boundaries, such as Flag, by Jasper Johns (Fig. 
																																																								
122 Harold Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters”, 1952, in Art in Theory 1900-2000: An 
Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 589. Rosenberg’s was a distinctly social (and existentialist) approach to 
painting, in its evocation of the artist’s act. Greenberg countered this by denying the action legitimacy, 
in part the result of its incomprehensibility to artists of earlier times. Parallel to this, in 1954, a group of 
young Japanese artists founded the Gutai Movement of Concrete Art. Jiro Yoshihara (1905-1972), 
Shozo Shimamoto (1928-2013), and others, set out to emphasise the notions of holistic creation, pure 
materiality, freedom and the beauty of decay. Aware of the processes of recent American Action 
Painting, the Gutai group combined materials together in diverse fashion, presenting works as theatrical 
events. This activity pre-dated the emergence of Happenings, in the latter part of the same decade. 
123 As object: the result of process and inclination. The advent of modernism – in particular, of 
formalism’s readings of modernism – foreclosed the body as site of meaning in favour of the object, and 
in opposition to Romanticism’s heightening of subjectivity. 
124 Amelia Jones, Body Art: Performing the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998), 52. 
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2E), or Robert Rauschenberg’s Bed (Fig. 2F), as well as a host of performative 
interventions.125  
 
 
 
Fig. 2E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2F 																																																								
125 Most notably, Fluxus Happenings. A perhaps greater threat – from outside – took the form of 
theoretical models keen to root meaning in the personal, the social and the linguistic. These 
developments had a profound effect on attitudes to form and, by extension, on attitudes to medium, 
supported as they were by ideas of purity and autonomy. Johns’s Flag, 1954-55, combined oil paint, 
newsprint collage and wax, on three canvases mounted on a plywood base. Bed, 1955, was the first 
combine by Robert Rauschenberg (1925-2008). He intended it as a material hybrid between painting 
and sculpture. 
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3.2: The Post-Medium Condition 
The tenor of the discussion as to the significance of the medium in the aftermath of the 
period of high modernism was highly combative. Those hostile to Greenberg took 
comfort from the proliferation of practices intent on foregrounding plurality, 
interdisciplinarity and inclusivity—what Payne refers to as refraction.126 If Greenberg 
was discriminatory, then the form of painting he espoused – post-painterly abstraction 
– must be equally suspect? The retreat from formalism to the text dislocated image 
from material.127 Counterformalist narratives of painting – dealing with referent, 
context (with relationships to) – were foregrounded at the expense of the optical 
constituents of painted objects.128 In time, Greenberg’s picture plane was disbanded. 
 
The irony with which Rosalind Krauss later declared the post-medium condition 
betrayed not only her distaste for those practices that rejected a medium, but also 
served as a restatement of her debt to Greenberg’s form of address.129 For Krauss, the, 
“monstrous myth” of the post–medium condition signalled the death knell of serious 
visual practice through the proliferation of bottomed out information.130 Critics could 
either take issue with the commitments of Greenbergian modernism – in favour of a 
Rosenbergian Romantic model – or else, whilst questioning its teleological imperative 
and emphasis on purity, nevertheless seek to maintain its fundamental approach.131 
 
3.3: Fried: Resistance and Extension  
In “Three American Painters”, Michael Fried presents a critique of the works of 
Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski and Frank Stella. In his attempt to establish a critical 																																																								
126 Notable examples include: Lucy Lippard’s “Eccentric Abstraction”, 1966, Lawrence Alloway’s 
“Systemic Painting” 1966, and Leo Steinberg’s “Other Criteria”, 1972. The medium of paint, loaded as 
it is with historical and ideological baggage, became the primary target. 
127 From the late-1960s, though there were notable alternatives to formalist thinking from at least as 
early as the 1940s, including the frameworks of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Meyer Schapiro 
(1904-1996). 
128 Caroline Jones, Eyesight Alone, 257-258. Jones relates how Greenberg contemptuously referred to 
Rosenberg as a literary critic, keen to listen to artists talk rather than to spend time looking closely at 
their pictures. 
129 Rosalind Krauss, A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 2000), 10. 
130 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013), xvi. 
131 Both Krauss and Michael Fried took the latter route. Differences in outlook tended to take the form 
of considerations as to what extent the world external to the work could be kept out, and if let in, how so 
and at what cost? Costello, in “Greenberg’s Kant and the Fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art 
Theory”, 4, recounts how Krauss inverted many of Greenberg’s terms…and so we have: the tactile for 
the optical, the material for the virtual, the horizontal for the vertical, production for reception, and low 
(bassesse) for pure. 
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space for these painters, he addresses criticism of modernism’s reliance on the 
Hegelian dialectic.132 Fried acknowledges problems in applying the dialectic to earlier 
periods: the result of a conflation of the mechanisms of Church and state.133 When 
applied, however, to recent history – a radical period notable for a loosening of this 
relationship – the dialectic becomes a legitimate tool by which to gauge progress (and 
justify change), amounting to: “an ideal of action as radical criticism of itself founded 
upon as objective an understanding of one’s present situation as one is able to 
achieve”.134 Fried, wary of the teleological, couches it in terms of a state of perpetual 
revolution: and it is no surprise, then, to discover that the painters he esteems are those 
attuned to the Greenbergian notion of art as, “unceasing radical criticism of itself”.135  
 
For Fried, the dialectic permits painting to renew itself as it oscillates between an 
optical and material primacy.136 Fried’s affirmation of dialecticism is more radical 
than Alois Riegl’s, who expressed some concern as to the propensity to over-prescribe 
cause and predict change (style); favouring instead, an openness to the unexpected.137 
The dialectic provides both a method and means of location. Fried acknowledges his 
debt to Greenberg’s notion of an avant-garde (and to Riegl), yet parts company with 
his mentor over a stressing of the teleological, whilst accepting his attempts to: 																																																								
132 The dialectic proved problematic to critics of formalism in so far as, in the first instance, it provided 
too neat a solution to problems of difference, and, in the second, it tied all manifestations of practice to 
what appeared to be strict formal antecedents, irrespective of intention.   
133 Notably, the Renaissance, though the implication is of dominant Christian cultures prior to the 
modern period. In particular, a system of patronage and common iconography.  
134 Michael Fried, “Three American Painters: Noland, Olitski, Stella”, 1965, in Art & Objecthood: 
Essays & Reviews, ed. Michael Fried (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 218. The recent 
period evidenced a marked social alienation and philosophical and religious skepticism. To establish 
separation is, to Fried, to seek to establish an account of the means of separation. 
135 Ibid. Fried objected to the implication of a purpose that appeared to precede the works themselves, 
and thus a constituted end. Perpetual revolution is similar, in some respects, to the notion of permanent 
revolution, devised in 1904 by Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), and developed in response to the work of 
Marx and Engels, yet in opposition to the more orthodox notion of socialism in one country. Trotsky’s 
conception of revolution was one that would allow for a disbursement of the mechanism that permitted 
capitalism to give way first to socialism, then to communism, and was not, therefore, a call for 
revolution in and of itself. To Fried, however, perpetual revolution in practice denoted both a method of 
advance and a method of securing a method of advance.      
136 In deeming the painting a necessary utterance in respect of future painting, the painter is pincered 
between and evolved past and a to-be-evolving future, with responsibilities to both (consider in relation 
to Stubbs’s rumination on purity, 2.1.2, and Mathus’s consideration of surface, 2.1.4. 
137 Since the 1990s, there has been a renewal of interest in Riegl’s methods, most notably by Margaret 
Olin (birth date unknown), in her study of Riegl and representation, 1992. Olin detects a 
representational agenda, and one of particular interest within the post-formalist period. Alois Riegl in 
Diana Reynolds Cordileone, Alois Riegl in Vienna 1875-1905: An Institutional Biography (Farnham: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), 170. 
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“objectify [the] experience of painting and sculpture in terms that derive from those 
media alone”.138 Alone, then, was not the problem, but rather an overly material sense 
of the medium. As painting became flatter, flatness – as its defining condition – 
became progressively problematic. Fried set out to clarify what else need be taken into 
account if one were to maintain distinctions between the work and that which was not 
the work. In so doing, he draws attention to some necessary conditions of encounter. 
 
3.3.1: Art and Objecthood: Conditions of Encounter 
 
 
Flatness and the delimitation of flatness ought not to be thought of as the 
irreducible essence of pictorial art, but rather like the minimal conditions for 
something being seen as a painting, and the crucial question is not what those 
minimal and, so to speak, time and conditions are, but rather what, at a given 
moment, is capable of compelling conviction, or succeeding as painting.139 
 
 
“Art and Objecthood” established Fried’s reputation.140 In it, he demarcates the ground 
for an opposition to Minimalism, which, in spite of its emphasis on the limits of 
material, proves to be largely ideological.141 To Fried, literalist art, in spite of this, is 
nevertheless a serious attempt to establish a position between modernist painting and 
sculpture that, subsequently, it, “aspires to occupy”.142 Donald Judd’s opposition to 
painting’s relational character, and to its privileging of medium considerations – as 
well as its inability to escape pictorial illusion (however downplayed) – points to the 
exhaustion of painting. To Fried: “the success or failure of a […] painting has come to 
depend on its ability to hold or stamp itself out or compel conviction as shape—that, 
or somehow to stave off or elude the question of whether or not it does so”.143  
 
What matters, then, to Fried is not that a painting contains this or that form, or that it 
evidences properties as such, but, rather, that that which a painting contains (what it is) 																																																								
138 Ibid., 216. 
139 Michael Fried, Art & Objecthood, 169. 
140 Rather peculiarly, the work attests to both a re-affirmation of medium distinctions (through an 
emphasis on containment) and a compromising of them (through the direct invocation of spectatorship). 
Fried saw this work as an attempt to move beyond formalism, as it was understood up until the mid-
1960s. 
141 In so far as its meaning can be translated into words, and exists in advance of its realisation in works. 
Fried preferred the term literalism, or literalist art…a what you see is what you get encounter. 
142 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, 149. 
143 Ibid., 151. 
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is able to be experienced as a painting. The legitimacy of painterly objects, Fried goes 
on to argue, is dependent on them holding up as shapes, and shapes that belong 
pictorially to the painting, as opposed to shapes that present themselves literally, as a 
form of physical attachment.144 An example of what Fried means by contained can be 
seen in Frank Stella’s The Marriage of Reason and Squalor II (Fig. 2G).  
 
 
 
Fig. 2G 
 
Fried contends that modernist paintings suspend their objecthood. In performing its 
objecthood, the literalist object, on the other hand, negates the pictorial and, in so 
doing, becomes illegitimate.145 This property of objecthood is an unusual one, and 
warrants definition. Fried turns to Greenberg, and to his discussion of presence in 
reference to the work of Anne Truitt. Greenberg admired Truitt, yet, as a proto-
minimalist, he believed her, in a work like Valley Forge (Fig. 2H), to have, “flirt[ed] 
with the look of non-art [in order to] confer an effect of presence”.146 As even the 
meagre, tacked-up, unpainted canvas could lay claim to being a picture – though not 
necessarily a successful one – the look of non-art was denied to painting from the 
start.147 Those in search of it had to look elsewhere, towards the three-dimensional 
																																																								
144 A Rauschenberg Combine would serve as an example of the latter. 
145 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, 151. That which is separates it from the material world of things, 
yet which positions it in relation to those things, and permits it to comment on. 
146 Ibid., 152. Caroline Jones, in Eyesight Alone, has described presence as the metaphysical (not 
political) twin of Walter Benjamin’s aura…the work’s temporal and spatial uniqueness—where it 
happens to be. 
147 Clement Greenberg, “Recentness of Sculpture”, in Art & Objecthood: Essays & Reviews, ed. 
Michael Fried (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 152. 
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realm of sculpture: “where everything material that was not art also was”.148 Thus, 
objecthood, to Fried, amounts to nothing less than the condition of non-art.149 
 
 
 
Fig. 2H 
 
3.3.1.1: Theatre and Non-Theatre 
Literalist art’s promotion of objecthood – its concern with the actual circumstances in 
which the beholder encounters – at the expense of an engagement with what it is that 
the work bears witness to, is reasoned, by Fried, to be synonymous with the 
experience of theatre.150 Robert Morris, in a work like Untitled (Fig. 2I), is seen to be 
concerned with presence, in part through his employment of a larger scale (to be 
distinguished from size in so far as presence is the result of a response to and not a 																																																								
148 Michael Fried, Art & Objecthood, 152.  
149 Ibid. Hal Foster, in The Return of the Real (1996), argues that Fried’s move positions the literalist 
object as personage in disguise, which brings with it a situation to be contended with, which thus 
separates it from art. It is interesting to note that painting was deemed ineffective, by Donald Judd 
(1928-1994), and others – as minimal object – on the grounds that it brought with it illusionistic 
conventions—pictures. Therefore, language forever compromises painting’s claim to material purity 
(the relationship between language and material will be considered in detail in Chapter 4). 
150 Ibid., 153. Conventionally, theatre immerses its audience in its situations. Fried’s presentness is more 
akin to the distanciation of Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956), first outlined in “Alienation Effects in Chinese 
Acting”, 1936. Brecht meant to signify a form of awareness. Here, the artifice of theatre becomes 
foregrounded through processes whereby the audience is prevented from having a full engagement in 
the narrative, so as to bring about a heightened sense of awareness and a critical distance from which a 
deeper intellectual engagement might be arrived at. Later, cinema mimicked such effects, in large part 
through processes of lighting, editing and cropping. Also of importance is the fact that Stanley Cavell 
(1926-) was Fried’s friend and mentor at this time. In “Music Discomposed”, 1964-65, and “A Matter 
of Meaning”, 1967, Cavell considers the possible dissolution of the notion of a medium in music, which 
he saw challenged by the incorporation of real time interludes into musical compositions to disrupt their 
structures, particularly by John Cage (1912-1992). Cavell also provided Fried with an understanding of 
the necessity of considering tradition. To what did painting have to remain faithful in order for it to 
remain painting? Additionally, how are new instances of what painting can be incorporated into what 
painting is? See: Stephen Melville, Becoming Medium, 2013. 
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recognition of something that the work contains).151 To Staff, it was the enveloping of 
the embodied spectator’s presence by the minimalist object that contributed, at least in 
part, to Fried’s particular stance on presence.152 Objecthood, then, is the result of (and 
not that which is established by), and resides within the viewer’s compass. For: “the 
presence of literalist art, which Greenberg was the first to analyse, is […] a theatrical 
effect or quality—a kind of stage presence”.153 This demands awareness, and so 
awareness is therefore temporal. Moreover, it is temporal as we know it. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2I 
 
To Fried, the requirement of indefinite duration in the experience of objecthood 
supported the theatre hypothesis in that theatre, too, demands to be taken into account 
temporally.154 By contrast, modernist art: “has no duration—not because one in fact 
experiences a picture by Noland or Olitski or a sculpture by David Smith or Anthony 
Caro in no time at all, but because at every moment the work itself is wholly 
manifest”.155 Fried terms this presentness, and contrasts it with the presence of 
literalist art and theatre (Table 2). To Fried, a modernist work is experienced as a, 
“kind of instantaneousness”.156 It is, therefore, in their presentness that modernist 
works defeat theatre. Theatre is the condition of common relations, which is cause 																																																								
151 Ibid., 154. 
152 Craig Staff, After Modernist Painting, 51. 
153 Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood”, 155. 
154 Ibid., 166. 
155 Ibid., 167. 
156 Ibid. 
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enough to seek out what modernist art offers, and to allow oneself to be moved by it. 
To Fried, “[p]resentness is grace”.157 However, in spite of Fried’s protestations, 
theatricality and objecthood won the day.158 In 1979, Douglas Crimp commented: 
  
 
Over the past decade we have witnessed a radical break with [the] modernist 
tradition, effected precisely by a preoccupation with the theatrical. The work 
that has laid most serious claim to our attention throughout the seventies has 
been situated between, or outside the individual arts, with the result that the 
integrity of the various mediums – those categories the exploration of whose 
essences and limits constituted the very project of modernism – has disappeared 
into meaninglessness.159 
 
 
 
Art (Modernist) Objecthood (Literalist/Minimalist) 
Presentness 
(No Duration) 
Presence 
(Endless Duration) 
 
Table 2: Fried’s Conditions of Encounter 
 
There is a comparison between Fried’s theatricality and Riegl’s beholder, as Margaret 
Olin has pointed out.160 Riegl’s conception amounted to a binding of the observer to 
the observed through the internal structures of the work. Whereas, for Fried, the work 
presents itself to the observer as an a priori: the potential meaning of which precedes 
the encounter to which the viewer subsequently attests. This has proven of interest to 
those seeking to reconstitute theatricality as a form of intersubjectivity in support of 
post-minimalist, performative and participatory practices. Attentiveness, to Riegl, 
amounts to a form of exchange—the beholder comes across a work’s structure in light 
																																																								
157 Ibid., 168. Peter Osborne (Anywhere or Not at All, 24) characterises Fried’s invocation of grace as 
that which establishes as absent all sense of the imaginary or the fictitious.  
158 Fried maintained his trajectory well into the 1970s, before he abandoned criticism for history, 
writing a trilogy of works: Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Didero, 
1980; Courbet's Realism, 1990, and Manet’s Modernism, 1996. Into the new millennium, Fried 
redirected his concerns towards photography, with Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, 
2008, reinforcing his position in respect of painting and sculpture through an extension and 
reapplication of his themes. Douglas Crimp, however, sees, in the video and performance pieces of the 
1970s, the victory of theatricality, which is re-contained within/as surface in the photographs of Cindy 
Sherman (1954-). 
159 Douglas Crimp, “Pictures”, October 8 (Spring 1979), 76. 
160 Margaret Olin, “Forms of Respect: Alois Riegl’s Concept of Attentiveness”, The Art Bulletin 71, no. 
2 (1989): 285-299. 
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of what he might already have encountered. Thus, there is a temporal prerequisite to 
Riegl’s position, and so attentiveness thus amounts to one’s attentiveness in time.  
 
3.3.2: Shape: The Interplay of Opticality and Materiality 
In “Larry Poons’s New Paintings”, Fried sought to protect against objecthood. 
Resistance to the everyday is to be: “fought out through the medium of shape”.161 To 
Fried, this is achieved only by accepting shape as residing within surface and not upon 
surface. Fried does admit to the historical precedent of an all-surface painting, whose 
surface, “competes for presentness”: for this, he contends, is the key to understanding 
the shift from Abstract Expressionism to Colour Field Painting, then to a new 
involvement with tactility, as evidenced by Poons’s paintings circa 1970, such as 
Donen (Fig. 2J)—each move can be seen to begin and end with the painting, which 
presents itself as, in effect, a static moment of internalised affirmation.162 
 
 
 
Fig. 2J 
 
Put another way, the assertion of painting’s materiality that began with the drips and 
spatters of Jackson Pollock gave way to a concern for opticality – in the form of the 
colour fields of Morris Louis – before swinging back to the tactile properties of paint, 																																																								
161 Michael Fried, “Larry Poons’s New Paintings”, 1972, in Art & Objecthood: Essays & Reviews, ed. 
Michael Fried (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 197. 
162 Ibid., 197-201. 
	 69	
with the elephant skin paintings of Larry Poons. Presentness, to Fried (and counter to 
Riegl), results from a periodic interplay between the optical and the material, which 
shape each other in a common dialectical practice.163 Fried’s use of the term surface 
avoids the awkwardness of Greenberg’s preferred term flatness, and denotes a lack of 
spatial circumscription. Surface, here, is material and optical: design is medium and 
location. Surface extends infinitely, yet remains self-contained and near. Nearness, to 
Fried, is an important concept when considering works, and determines the legitimacy 
of shapes. Outside of modernist practices, nearness meant only one’s nearness to. 
 
Mick Finch has explored these issues in respect of the Supports/Surfaces group.164 In 
particular, the notion of thickness in relation to surface, which he considers in terms of 
its potential to open up the possibilities of painting. In reflecting on Hubert Damisch’s 
work on Jean Dubuffet – in which Damisch described the vigorous scarification of 
surfaces – Finch questions the Greenbergian notion of an a priori condition of flatness. 
In shutting down talk of thickness – through the promotion of opticality – Greenberg, 
in effect, denied American painters the possibility of exploring the potential of surface 
(as materially present), and thus undermining the modernist rhetoric of ground and 
field.165 To Finch, Supports/Surfaces operated in the space between the prescriptions 
of Greenberg and the dissolutions of Minimalism: unable to sanction either the 
specificity of optical painting or the absolute disbanding of a notion of a medium.166 
 
3.4: Krauss: Redefinition and Redirection 
In her third collection of essays, Krauss provides an overview of her thinking: from 
her years as a critic for Art Forum to the founding of October, and on into the 1980s 
when: “[t]he onset of postmodern practices […] saw the collapse of traditional 
mediums such as painting or sculpture”.167 Krauss saw this as a challenge for both 																																																								
163 Presentness was a term invented – or at least used – by Fried to account for the material properties of 
the surface. In Fried’s analysis, presentness is the result of competition between the material surface of 
the painting and what sits beneath it, orienting its position. 
164 A loose grouping of approximately fifteen artists, mostly from the south of France, who, from the 
late 1960s, explored materiality, colour and abstract modes of making, in close affinity to their 
American contemporaries. 
165 Mick Finch, “Supports/Surfaces: Contexts and Issues”, 1999, accessed June 12, 2017, http://mickfinc 
h.com/texts/ss.html. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, viii. Founded with Annette Michelson (1922-) and Jeremy 
Gilbert-Rolfe (1945-), in 1976. October, named after the Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948) film of 1928, 
took issue with what it perceived to be the loose social tone of much of the criticism of the time. Krauss 
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critic and maker, and: “welcomed the perseverance of new artists in leveraging the 
meaning of their work in relation to what [she] came to call technical support”.168 In 
her attempts to: “wrestle new mediums to the mat of specificity”, whilst freeing 
practice from its Greenbergian hold, Krauss conjures a series of ingenious conceptions 
of structure.169 Importantly, she regarded Fried’s: “[making] shape into the medium of 
abstract painting”, in opposition to an obdurate reductionism, as a critical moment in 
the medium’s liberation.170  
 
Krauss invokes an expanded notion of medium. Mirrors (the specular) act to supply 
video with its specificity, and the index becomes the bedrock of photography. Krauss 
finds, in all she examines, a discrete condition – referred to as apparatus – by which 
practices become operable.171 The stop-frame of animation, in respect of William 
Kentridge’s Sobriety, Obesity and Growing Old (Fig. 2K), or a slide tape installation 
by James Coleman, such as INITIALS, (Fig. 2L), or Christian Marclay’s employment 
of a synchronous soundtrack in Video Quartet (Fig. 2M), or the automobile to explain 
Ed Ruscha’s fascination with gas stations and parking lots, in a work such as Standard 
Station (Fig. 2N), all serve to: “allay the confusion of the use of Medium, too 
ideologically associated as the term is within an outmoded tradition”.172 Matt Saunders 
contends that while the hand remained banished, the idea of a medium safeguarded 
modernist concerns by mobilising a sense of discrete modes of practice.173 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																
later recounted how she and Michelson had: “fled Artforum […] because of the new commitment […] 
to art as social statement [which she saw as hostile to] the aesthetic concerns necessary to formulate the 
basis of formal coherence” (Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 1). October quickly became a 
pioneering contributor to the proliferation of French critical theory in the visual arts. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., xiii. 
170 Rosalind Krauss, Under Blue Cup (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011), 8. 
171 In A Voyage on the North Sea: Art on the Post-Medium Condition, 2000, Krauss employs the terms 
differential specificity and the essence of Art itself alongside apparatus.  
172 Ibid., xvi. Marclay (Christian, 1955-) pieces together over seven hundred film clips, unified as a 
result on an emphasis on sound or music. The work is projected through four adjacent screens and 
looped in a soundproof room. Nothing can be added to the work, and nothing taken away. 
173 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, 2013, in Painting Beyond Itself, ed. Isabelle Graw and Ewa 
Lajer-Burcharth, 174. 
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Fig. 2K 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2L 
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Fig. 2M 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2N 
 
Like Fried, Krauss began as a disciple of Greenberg, and was impressed by his 
steadfast resistance to, “the psychologising whine of existentialist criticism”.174 More 
generally, Krauss was resistant to any approach to art criticism that viewed painting 
and sculpture as: “the language of sense expression, mental images and private 
sensation”.175 This, Krauss equates with the privileging of a private, unverifiable 
language.176 Nonetheless, even early on, there were discernible points of difference 
between them, which with time grew more pronounced. As Dylan Kerr puts it: 																																																								
174 Rosalind Krauss, “A View of Modernism”, 1972, in Perpetual Inventory (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013), 121. This was epitomised by Rosenberg’s brand of criticism. 
175 Rosalind Krauss, “Line as Language”, 1974, in Perpetual Inventory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2013), 210. Krauss wrote her PhD thesis on the work of David Smith (1906-1965), who 
Greenberg had consistently championed. Terminal Iron Works: The Sculpture of David Smith, 1971, in 
expanded and revised form, became her first book. 
176 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1953). For both Krauss and Greenberg, to recognise how social conditions impacted on a 
work is one thing, but to understand the work socially – as the product of broad, intersubjective 
concerns – is another. 
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For Greenberg, truly avant-garde art strove for an ever-increasing purity and 
adherence to the history of its medium, a view Krauss eventually came to regard 
as overly simplistic. As she says, [Greenberg’s] whole relationship to art was 
incredibly teleological. His idea was that art had to end up in a certain place, and 
if it didn’t contribute to that trajectory then he dismissed it.177  
 
 
By the early 1970s, Krauss regarded her mentor’s adherence to purity and medium 
specificity as able to be maintained only through a form intellectual denial, or an act of 
faith. She became convinced that the meaning of a work of art amounted to more than 
that which could be pointed to. What of intentions, knowledge, understanding and 
feeling, and of the temporality of works? Driving all of this was not a question of the 
suitability of medium in respect of an individual work, or even distaste for flatness in 
and of itself. Krauss had come under the influence of structuralism and, later, 
postructuralism.178 This arrival forced a crisis. In her attempts to work through, and to 
understand how it is that the world impacts on the object of art, she drew from 
phenomenology, too, though, as with Fried, remained resistant to its propensity to 
psychologise—to extend beyond the parameters of the work to what she termed 
context.179 In her introduction to The Originality of the Avant-Garde and other 
Modernist Myths, Krauss points to Greenberg’s privileging of judgment over method, 
in spite of, in Krauss’s view, the establishment of a framework to support judgments. 
Krauss could not accept Greenberg’s refusal to concede that formalism was, in fact, a 
methodology, complete with its own history, structure, language and purpose.180  
 
3.4.1: Content 
“A View of Modernism” marked a divergence from Greenberg, and signalled Krauss’s 
																																																								
177 Dylan Kerr, “How to Understand Rosalind Krauss, the Art Critic who made Theory Cool (and 
Inescapable)”, 2016, accessed May 10, 2017, http://www.artspace.com/magazine/art_101/know-your-
critics/how-to-understand-rosalind-krauss-53988. 
178 In particular, the works of Foucault, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), Roland Barthes (1915-1980), 
Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), and Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924-1998), whose, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge was first published in 1979. 	
179 To Krauss, Greenberg provided a coherent account of developments within modernism, managing, 
through his invocation of Kant, to root the aesthetic in a response to the conditions of the object—to 
provide testable and objective criteria from which qualitative assessments could be made. However, 
structuralism and developments within conceptual and sculptural practices from the late 1950s 
convinced Krauss that she was in danger of becoming saddled with an indefensible metanarrative in the 
face of a changing climate hostile to the form of power that Greenberg now represented. 
180 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 117-122. Nor could she accept his enmeshing of judgment 
and value, which, to Krauss, Greenberg had long since determined to be the same thing. 
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split from Fried too.181 More importantly, it stands as a meditation on the significance 
of content. Krauss recounts an incident in the Fogg Museum, where she and Fried 
were challenged by a student to explain why a copper painting by Frank Stella was 
any good.182 Fried responded that Stella wants to paint like Velasquez, but this isn’t an 
option that is open to him so he paints stripes.183 For Krauss, this made clear the 
significance of a temporal link that connected artists three centuries apart. Also, it 
foregrounded the fact that stripes were, for Stella, a form of subject matter—
something he chose to paint: that it was still possible for him to paint. Ruminating on 
criticism from Judd, Krauss charts a gradual distancing from her mentor, describing 
her reaction to a seemingly unexpected comment by Greenberg that: “formalism was 
one of the most intellectually vulgar notions he knew of”.184 To Krauss: “the 
experience of a work of art is always in part about the thoughts and feelings that have 
elicited – or more than that, entailed – the making of the [art]work”.185 
 
Fried’s decision not to address the role of colour in his review of the series paintings 
of Noland and Olitski attests, to Krauss, to the difficulties of writing about arbitrary 
decisions – based on feeling – as opposed to structural decisions based on reason.186 
For Krauss, modernist works display feelings reined-in within structures whose mode 
of address, in resisting the inessential, aspires to presentational lucidity.187 So, too, 																																																								
181 Ibid., xii. Greenberg had commented: “[s]pare me smart Jewish girls with typewriters”. What Krauss 
shares with both mentor and colleague – a deeply embedded concern for a rigorous and publically 
verifiable underpinning for modernism – can too easily become lost behind the engorged ingenuity of 
her theoretical constructs, and her tendency towards loaded personal anecdotes, biting sarcasm and 
oppositional rhetoric. 
182 At Harvard, USA. 
183 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 115. 
184 Ibid., 117. Based, or so Krauss thought, on the assumption that Fry’s and Bell’s hostility to subject 
matter (as interfering with form) was objectionable on the grounds that art amounted to more than an 
arrangement of disembodied design elements. Judd had recently and rather contemptuously described 
her and Fried as Greenbergers. 
185 Ibid. Later, Greenberg expanded on his previous comment, describing aesthetic value as originating 
in content, though content underscored by formalist technical (artisanal) considerations. 
186 An opposition of colour to drawing had helped to shore up distinctions between Classical and 
Romantic paintings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Drawing appeared, 
increasingly, to represent reason, and colour to represent emotion. Yve-Alain Bois (1952-) considers 
what Matisse referred to as the, “eternal conflict between drawing and colour”, in “Matisse and Arche-
Drawing” in Painting as Model (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), 59. Also, consider the 
remarks by Robert Ryman (1930-) on white as colour, accessed February 11, 2016, http://art21.org/read 
/robert-ryman-color-surface-and-seeing/ 
187 It was from a distaste of subjective indulgence, and a belief in objectivity, that Krauss accepted 
Greenberg’s account; in particular, of the necessity of material inventiveness as perpetual advance. If 
the logic of modernism compelled its advance, then it was the critic’s job to point to the accrual of 
detritus that builds around it in the course of its journey. Moreover, it was the critic’s job to ensure that 
that which interfered with function was not mistaken for a friend.	
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with the best writing about modernist art, where a perceived lack of upfrontness 
mistakenly positions the critic as cold, distant and removed.188 To Krauss, feelings 
must not attach themselves to works from the outside. Desired attachments (stories) 
are precisely the attachments that Roger Fry termed wish-fulfilment.  
 
Krauss takes issue with Fried’s disavowal of temporality as inherently unfriendly to 
the modernist project. Fried’s claim that a modernist work must declare itself: “in 
terms of a continuous and entire presentness amounting to the perpetual criticism of 
itself, […] to be experienced as a kind of instantaneousness, […] proves problematic 
on the grounds that [to Krauss] the two parts of the statement are in contradiction, or at 
least conflict”.189 For Fried, temporality is narrative. To maintain a shared temporal 
space between work and non-work is thus to inhabit the work as one inhabits the 
world. Yet for Krauss: “a series […] is diachonic in character—the experience of it is 
entirely temporal”.190 It must, therefore, present itself in time. Thus, either Fried is 
mistaken in the instantaneousness of modernist practices, or else instantaneousness 
and the diachronic must be reconciled in respect of series painting, so as to gauge what 
happens at the seams.191 Either way, a new definition of narrative has to be found.   
 
3.4.1.1: Towards and Away 
Through recourse to the works of Richard Serra, Krauss makes the case that sculpture 
is about sculpture.192 It is also about, “one’s own perspective”.193 Perspective is 
dictated to by the encounter, the relationship between sculptures, and the sculpture 
itself, which together Krauss calls narrative. This is not wish fulfilment (Table 3), as 
the extent to which narrative is within, outside or part of the work is crucial. To her, 
Greenberg had known that some works contained more than others, and that that 
which is contained is content. Consequently, that which cannot be pointed to becomes 																																																								
188 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 118-121. In part, Krauss saw this as the result of having to 
draw-in a large body of discourse. This remains a problem for theoretical writing. 
189 Ibid., 125. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Krauss’s issue with Fried’s idea of time is considered in James Meyer’s: “The Writing of Art and 
Objecthood”, in Refracting Vision: Essays on the Writings of Michael Fried, eds. Jill Beaulieu, Mary 
Roberts and Toni Ross (Sydney: Power Publications, 2000), 83-85. Meyer deems Krauss to have 
grafted a notion of real time and space onto post-war art, to replace the idealist time and space she 
perceived Fried to be overly concerned with. This involved a centering of the perceiving body by 
subverting the instantaneousness of presentness, in favour of the play of forms of movement.  
192 Presumably, painting is about painting too. 
193 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 128. 
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visible not in addition to formal-material relations but because of them.194 A pointing 
towards, it turns out, in following Krauss, is also a pointing away. For a work is two-
faced, looking out towards the beholder as it looks back towards the shaped sum of its 
being (Table 4). Therefore, to behold a work is to remain attentive to its directedness. 
To be modernist is to avoid, “bringing in the world’s perspective”.195  
 
P        A        I        N        T        I        N        G 
Form 
Formal Relations 
 Wish Fulfillment 
Desires 
   
 
Content 
Associated Meanings 
 
Table 3: Positioning Wish Fulfilment 
 
 
 
 
                   Beholder (Away) 
 
                         
                        Painting (Picture Plane) 
 
         
                                                 Sum of its Being (Towards)  
 
 Table 4: Krauss’s Work Diamond 
 
																																																								
194 As opposed to being more than others, which didn’t require the accrual of externally sourced 
components. 
195 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 128 
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Part 4: The Later Post-Medium Condition 
 
 
4.1: Bois: Redrawing Formalism 
 
 
The vast corpus of American criticism, […] so superior to the French, was 
largely dominated by the reaction against Greenberg. But the terms of this 
reaction were still entirely ruled by the tenor of his theory. What the critics 
writing at the time could not see, […] was the dialectical relationship of their 
positions to that which they were rejecting.196 
 
 
From a European perspective, the American formalist enterprise had, by the mid-
1970s, played itself out, and with its demise went medium specificity and the notion of 
painting as visual.197 In Painting as Model, Yve-Alain Bois presents two formalisms. 
This arose from the perceived unfairness of having to take sides and declare oneself 
either formalist (oblivious to subject matter) or else antiformalist (uninterested in 
configuration).198 Such an opposition, to Bois, acted only to limit an understanding of 
the object of art, attesting as it did to the morphological and the structural.199  
 
The economy or arrangement of a work (its shape) in relation to its context (its 
situatedness) became central to Bois’s understanding of formalism. Greenberg’s 
disinterest in the latter – or its conflation with the former – resulted, so Bois claims, in 
the perception of formalism as essentialist and detached. To unpack this meant to 
connect with the object as material process.200 Also, the dialectic – prized as a 
legitimating tool by formalists, from Riegl to Fried – is seen, in this instance, to 
provide little that would help one to understand the relationship of the material 
constituents of the object of painting to one another, or to the world outside.201  
 
																																																								
196 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), xvii. 
197 In the sense of its meaning remaining rooted in the optical alone. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Bois borrowed these terms from linguistics. The morphological describes a discrete unit of language. 
The structural denotes a place within the language.  
200 Not as a means to an end, as it had been for Greenberg and Fried (as a route from, or resistance to, 
picture) but perhaps as an end in itself, in so far as the concerns of painting could be considered finite 
and discrete. 
201 A Heideggerian solution to the dissolution and resolution of joins will be put forward in Chapter 4.  
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Bois writes that: “[f]orm, for Greenberg, had become an autonomous ingredient, and 
meaning a virus that could be dispensed with”.202 Greenberg had resolved the 
form/content dualism – rooted in Plato – through reclassifying content as form.203 
However, Bois detects in this too easy a resolution and sets out to reclaim a materialist 
conception of form from the safety of its idealist dwelling.204 Greenberg’s solution 
was a sleight of hand, and paid scant attention to the means of production—referred to, 
by Bois, as a technical model.205 This is close to Krauss’s technical support – what 
Saunders refers to as: “the technology of doing something and the conventions 
attached to it”.206 However, there is an emphasis on the tangibility of stuff. To Bois, 
Greenberg’s form was, an: “a priori, […] an idea pre-existing its actual projection, its 
actual descent into the realm of matter, just like the image had been for Sartre”.207  
 
4.1.1: Painting: The Task of Mourning 
In Reference and Simulation in Recent Painting and Sculpture, Bois addresses the 
notion of the death of painting and, in particular, the death of abstract painting against 
the backdrop of a host of proclaimed deaths (including of the medium), and 
apocalyptic discourses more generally—what Finch refers to as: “a now you see it, 
now you don’t game”.208 To Bois: 
 
 
[T]his [claim] is bounded by two historical circumstances: the first is that the 
whole history of abstract painting can be read as a longing for its death; and the 
second is the recent emergence of neoabstract painters who have been marketed 
																																																								
202 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, xix. Bois’s articulation of Greenberg’s conception of form 
reminds one of the formalism of Fry, in particular of the notion of classic quality. 
203 Plato (428/427 or 424/423-348/347 BC) speculated as to the nature of shape (eidos), which 
developed into his famous theory of forms. To Plato, the deceptiveness of shape was the result of the 
thing itself (truth) being non-reproducible. Therefore, to replicate the thing through shape in art (to 
bring it into the world of Man) required the employment of artifice—of representation. 
204 The notion of reality as immaterial (later construed as mental) derives, in large part, from Plato’s 
theory of forms. 	
205 Ibid. 
206 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 173. 
207 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, xix. 
208 Mick Finch, “Painting as Vigilance”, 1997, accessed July 30, 2016, http://mickfinch.com/painting_as 
_vigilance.htm. This work is a catalogue of an exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Art (Boston, 
Massachusetts, 25 September-30 November 1986). For more on endism, see: Tom Lawson’s: “Last Exit 
Painting”, 1981; Douglas Crimp’s: “The End of Painting”, 1981; Arthur Danto’s: “The End of Art”, 
1994; Francis Fukuyama’s: The End of History and the Last Man, 1992; Jacques Derrida’s response: 
Specters of Marx: The state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new international, 1993; and 
later; Eva Geulen’s: The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour after Hegel, 2006. 
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as its official mourners (or should I say resurrectors?). But we will see that it is 
the same.209 
 
 
This leads Bois to reflect on the constitution of the end’s beginning.210 The end stands 
as a precondition of modernism, and abstraction; for, in its earlier formulations, 
abstraction had fully intended: “to bring forth the pure parousia of its essence, to tell 
the final truth and thereby terminate its course [and with it the course of painting]”.211  
 
Bois agrees with Greenberg on the centrality of industrialisation to the modernist 
project, and in respect of the crises that photography and mass production brought 
about.212 However, he goes further, and, in seeking to extend a notion developed by 
Meyer Schapiro, suggests that the birth of the readymade signalled a form of 
resistance in painting, and a sharp redirection of its interests towards touch, texture 
and gesture—towards all that stood in opposition to capitalism as it systematically 
sought to, “banish the hand”.213 This emphasis on the manual, and on individual 
crafting, is a defining characteristic of modernism that, to Bois, reaches its zenith with 
Robert Ryman, who, in his series of white works, such as Ledger (Fig. 2O):214 
 
 
[P]roduces a kind of dissolution of the relationship between trace and its organic 
referent. The body of the artist moves towards the condition of photography: the 
division of labor is interiorized.215  
 																																																								
209 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 230. 
210 Bois subdivides this questioning so as to allow for a consideration of the possibility of abstract 
sculpture, of non-abstract painting and sculpture, and indeed of painting at all. 
211 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 230. European abstraction as opposed to North American. 
Invocations of essence situated the material of paint as a sign of that which transcended it. 
212 From Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, 1936. Also of 
interest, is John Berger’s Ways of Seeing, 1972, which addresses the condition of painting in respect of 
1970s mass production. Berger acknowledges Benjamin as his primary influence. 
213 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 231. In “The Nature of the Abstract”, 1937, Schapiro takes issue 
with the assertion of Alfred H. Barr (1902-1981) that abstraction concerned itself purely with its own 
laws, and that representation simply mirrored the world (and was, therefore, superficial and of less 
importance). Tactility was something Greenberg largely ignored (for both painting and sculpture), or 
else downplayed as of marginal interest. Consider Riegl, Krauss and Fried on the nature of the haptic 
(see: Chapter 2, Part 2). 
214 Ryman adopted Malevich’s square format, and his use of white. However, unlike Malevich, or 
indeed any of the earlier European abstract painters, Ryman concerned himself primarily with surface 
and texture. Working in numerous media within very tight, self-imposed restrictions, Ryman eschewed 
representation, foregrounding extreme subtleties (both of an optical and a material nature), and 
considered the work’s internal relations as situated in respect of the wall. 
215 Ibid., 233. 
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To Bois, this permitted an appearance of mechanisation. Taking form, as it did, within 
abstract painting, it ramped up an appeal to the haptic, or what Krauss called 
tactilization, which sat on the periphery of the pictorial, fusing the symbolic, the 
optical and the material together.216 
 
 
 
Fig. 2O 
 
This tension – between the condition of the readymade and the condition of painting – 
allows Bois to position Ryman at the crossroads of modernism and postmodernism, as: 
“the guardian of the tomb of modernism”.217 Bois considers the role played by the 
mechanical, which subsequently and paradoxically – in respect of modernism’s 
attempt to escape the industrial – became evident as an emphasis on process, 
culminating in Pollock.218 Modernist painting is couched in terms of its resistance to, 
and incorporation of, the structures of capitalism and commodification: incorporation, 
in respect of both its reliance on technological innovation (from the portable tube of 
paint onwards) and emphasis on process: and resistance, in the sense of a railing 
against what Baudelaire called, “[t]he terrifying and endless return of the same”.219 
 
																																																								
216 Rosalind Krauss, “Agnes Martin / The Cloud”, 89. 
217 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 232. 
218 Ibid., 233. 
219 Charles Baudelaire, in Painting as Model, 234. 
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Bois relates Benjamin’s analysis of Baudelaire’s predilection for identification – with 
the dandy, the prostitute, the flâneur, the bohemian – considering them to be: “heroic 
roles bearing the stigmata of commodification”.220 Thus conceived, Baudelaire’s 
formulation of novelty attests to a perpetual desire to resist: “the inevitable process by 
which the novel [or the painting] becomes antique”.221 To Bois, however, Baudelaire 
failed to recognise that the commodity and the novel were derived of the same 
fetishistic impulse, which blinded him to the limitations of the new.222 And yet, in 
attempting to escape an encroachment of the market, the poets and artists of the late 
nineteenth century grasped at methods of elevation and resistance. The distinction of 
the medium served such a purpose, in tandem with the idea of a materialisation of 
language as a means of resistance to the abstraction of commodification.223  
 
4.1.2: The Authenticity of the Medium 
Authenticity becomes, in Bois’s analysis, complimentary to medium specificity, which 
can be seen in Duchamp’s negation of painting in favour of the already mechanised, 
non-imaginary readymade, such as Fountain (Fig. 2P). To Duchamp, an embrace of 
the already-mechanised was as effective a strategy for the critique of commodification 
as a retreat from it.224 A demonstration of the terms of the end, to Duchamp, ensured 
its peculiar ineffectiveness and exposed the structures of the thinking out of which 
endist discourses arose. In contrast, Bois reflects on the utopian endism of the 1920s, 
recounting a lecture by El Lissitsky, of 1922, in which he related Rodchenko’s 
description of his contribution to an exhibition of 1921, stating: “I reduced painting to 
its logical conclusion and exhibited three canvases: red, blue and yellow. I affirmed: 
it’s all over. Every plane is a plane, and there is to be no more representation” (Fig. 
2Q).225 
 
																																																								
220 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 235. In Le Fleurs du mal (The Flowers of Evil, 1957) and Le 
Peintre de la vie modern (The Painter of Modern Life, 1863). Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) coined 
the term modernity, which typified fleeting experiences in urban metropolises. The responsibility of art 
was, therefore, to capture such experiences and, in so doing, become modern. 
221 Ibid. 
222 And to what became Benjamin’s position. 
223 Ibid. Later, this became a strategy of Andy Warhol (1928-1987), and of Jeff Koons too (1955-). 
224 So as to subvert it from within. 
225 Ibid., 238. This lecture was delivered in Berlin, on the subject of recent developments in Russian art. 
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Fig. 2P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig: 2Q 
 
What El Lizzitsky points out, is that Rodchenko’s gesture was an important moment, 
not just within modernist practice, but also in the very evolution of painting itself:  
  
  
 [N]ot because it was the first monochrome – it was not the first nor the last – and 
not because it was the first last picture, […] it was because it showed that 
painting could have a real existence only if it claimed its end.226 
 
 
																																																								
226 Ibid. 
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Rodchenko’s work, according to Bois, needed to present itself as real (not imaginary) 
in order to end art—a gesture repeated more than forty years later with Minimalism. 
The optimism of this approach to the end, in opposition to Duchamp’s knowing 
negation, redirected the creative impulse – the spiritual – through an avatar of what 
had once been painting, back towards the social oneness from whence it came.227 This 
reached an apotheosis in Mondrian, to whom the general principle of plastic 
equivalence amounted to the employment of artificial means to permit a subsumption 
into the world and engender a state of being wholly present.228 Powell has gone as far 
as to claim that the death of painting at the hands of the machine underwrote 
modernism’s optimism: from Suprematism to performance and video practices.229  
 
Bois, then, asks if the end has come, couching it in Lacanian terms not discussed 
here.230 He discounts the prevalence of painting today as a reason to answer no to this, 
on the grounds that most painting has dispensed with: “the task of belonging to 
modern painting, [and exists simply as] artefacts created for the market and by the 
market”.231 However, to answer in the affirmative comes with its own problem, 
namely: to risk a historicism that discounts painting because of what has happened to 
it.232 In attempting to escape from this double bind, Bois employs the game theory of 
Damisch, distinguishing between game (practice) and match (incident), to conclude 
that declaring the match modernist painting finished is not the same as affirming the 
game painting to be over.233 Though the imminence of the end has been a 
preoccupation of modernism since its inception, one hundred years have unfolded 
undercover of this foreboding.234 To Bois, to release painting is to throw off 
																																																								
227 Both shared the desire to dissolve the conceit of art, be it aesthetic or representational. 
228 Piet Mondrian, Bart van der Leek (1876-1958) and Theo van Doesburg (1883-1931) – through De 
Stijl (The Style) – sought a universal underpinning to abstraction founded on a utopian mysticism, and 
leaning heavily on the theosophical teachings of Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891) and Rudolf Steiner 
(1861-1925). “Neo-Pasticism: The General Theory of Plastic Equivalence”, 1920, was published 
periodically, in French in 1920 and German in 1925. 
229 Amy Knight Powell, Depositions: Scenes from the Late Medieval Church and the Modern Museum, 
40. 
230 Bois maps his argument onto Lacan’s conception of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, 
themselves mappable onto Freud’s Ego, Id and Superego. 
231 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 241. 
232 Ibid. 
233 For an understanding of Hubert Damisch (1928-) and, in particular, of the development of his 
thinking in this area, see: A Theory of Cloud: Towards a History of Painting (California, Stanford 
University Press, 1992). Also of interest is the recent anthology of Damisch’s essays on architecture: 
Noah’s Art: Essays on Architecture: Writing Architecture (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2016). 
234 Usually considered to be locatable to France in the 1850s.	
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melancholy in favour of, “the difficult task of mourning”.235 The desire to paint is 
painting’s strength. Alongside the desire to situate it in history, it becomes its hope. 
 
4.2: Post-Medium/Pre and Early-Modern 
 
 
The Term beyond may be said to define painting today: it speaks of painting’s 
attempt to reach outside of itself – to situate itself beside itself, as David Joselit 
put it – in an effort of self-redefinition. In this way, contemplating painting 
abolishes and yet sustains itself.236 
 
 
Bois and Costello have each identified the dangers of positioning Greenberg’s notion 
of medium as a point of location. Krauss, too, attempts to manoeuvre the medium 
more freely, so as to release it from its formalist harness. Yet there is clearly a 
balancing act to perform: one that requires the performer to gauge the extent to which 
Greenberg’s conception of modernism is, in fact, a willed imposition or else an 
intuitive response to a specific set of changed cultural and artistic conditions. With this 
comes a second difficulty: that of determining the degree to which medium and form 
can become safely disentangled without reifying the tangibility of the former or the 
optical objectivity of the latter.237 More recent theory tends to work back from here. 
 
In Painting Beyond Itself, David Joselit, Matt Saunders, Benjamin Buchloh, and 
others, attempt to bypass much of the modernist teleology, framed as it is by 
Greenberg (and also by developments in nineteenth century formalism): what, 
together, Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Graw term its, “monolithic articulations”.238 In so 
doing, the intention of the authors is clearly not to re-privilege painting, but to re-
historicise the medium so as to produce an alternative account of its development—
one that situates the work and its material parameters as site rather than support of 
meaning.239 And so, these works tend to draw from earlier periods, including from the 
																																																								
235 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 243. 
236 Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Isabelle Graw, Painting Beyond Itself, 9. 
237 Riegl’s problem returns, to be rearticulated today (see: Sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2). 
238 Ibid., 7. This work is edited by Isabelle Graw and Ewa Lajer-Burcharth. The text results from a 
series of conference papers delivered at Harvard University in April 2013. 
239 This has arisen out of the emphasis on making, and the renewal of interest in crafting and material 
investigations within contemporary practices more generally. 
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Renaissance, when definitions of painting’s specificity were first formed.240 If, pre-
Kant (and pre-Baumgarten), beauty meant goodness, Pre-Greenberg, what did medium 
mean?241 
 
To move backwards in order to go forwards is, to Lajer-Burcharth and Graw, to 
consider painting as subject, in opposition to the Hegelian formulation wherein 
subjectivity is seen to be: “the very principle that governs painting as medium”.242 It is 
to re-contaminate painting – to un-form it – only to reinternalise the results (to not 
have them float about outside, as context).243 This subject involves moving away from 
a consideration of medium in respect of formal properties, and has splintered into 
discussions of use, agency and intention. There is now, it seems, a discernible desire to 
locate for painting a mode of temporality at odds with that of the moving image.244  
 
4.2.1: Joselit: Marking Time 
 
 
In every work of art there is an irreducible singularity; a fund of affect and visual 
stimuli that is inexhaustible.245  
 
 
Joselit, in his reconsideration of time in respect of processes of scoring, stays mostly 
within the modernist period, building his analysis around Cézanne, Duchamp and 
Pollock. He considers the work as that which stages meaning (as opposed to supplying 
it). This allows for the possibility that works of art operate on a different temporal 
horizon to, for example, politics, which deals with the immediate and the pressing. To 
Joselit: “painting marks time, rather than intervening in the events which populate 
it”.246 This is presented as a challenge to the appreciative faculty, in that painting – in 
marking time rather than following it – permits an inexhaustible attenuation of the 																																																								
240 Ibid., 7-8. 
241 Preziosi, Donald, “title unknown”, The University of Manchester, lecture and Q&A session, 
Manchester, 2006. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) shifted the meaning of the term 
aesthetics from the more general meaning of sense, to sense of beauty, laying the foundations for Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment. 
242 Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Isabelle Graw, Painting Beyond Itself, 9. 
243 Ibid.  
244 This was Krauss’s project, too, though nevertheless filtered, in part, as Costello and Stubbs have 
commented, through a Greenbergian lens. 
245 David Joselit, “Marking, Scoring, Storing, and Speculating (on Time)”, 2013, in Painting Beyond 
Itself, 11. 
246 Ibid. 
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scrutiny afforded it. Once reproduced, this vast repository of possibility far outweighs 
the capacity – or the time – of an observer to survey it for meaning. In effect, it 
becomes an infinite library of resources at the mercy of a limited loaning facility.247 
 
Joselit cites Jonathan Crary, as drawing attention to the link between painting as 
marked time and distracted spectatorship, which Cézanne was perhaps the first to 
conceive of, in so far as in Cézanne’s paintings: “the accumulation of marks [in the 
medium] is dialectically linked to distraction”.248 Joselit distinguishes film, video and 
photography (which store time), from painting, in which the: “marking and storage or 
accumulation of time are simultaneous and ongoing”.249 With a nod to history, Joselit 
declares painting: “[on] the air as opposed to plein air”.250 This opens painting up to 
choice: to what Merleau-Ponty referred to as Cézanne’s doubt—the indecision as to 
what to add to the surface, which, to Joselit, gives painting its existential edge.251 
There are overtones of Rosenberg, too, which surprisingly go unacknowledged.252 
 
4.2.1.1: Wholeness 
This brings us to the problem of wholeness – that troubled Cézanne – and which has to 
a great extent been dispensed with in recent practice, where there is a sense of the 
impossibility of resolving the complexities of a work into a single composite equating 
to the work’s meaning.253 It is advisable to recognise this energy, as Joselit puts it, and 
to accept a deferred resolution.  
 
 
																																																								
247 In particular: on mobile phones, for museum catalogues and websites, and on/through all variety of 
digital platforms. 
248 David Joselit, “Marking, Scoring, Storing, and Speculating (on Time)”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 12. 
This is reminiscent of Benjamin’s presentation of modes of distraction as that which define 
modernism’s sensibility. The reference is to Jonathan Crary, Suspensions of Perception, Attention, 
Spectacle, and Modern Culture (Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999). 
249 David Joselit, in Painting Beyond Itself, 11. 
. Film and video do this by having an indexical link to the time of the exposures. 
250 Ibid. Painting outdoors became common in the mid-late nineteenth century, with the Barbizon 
School (France), The Hudson River School (USA), the Newlyn School (England), and, most 
importantly, the Impressionists (France). Constable and Turner had worked outdoors, but completed 
works indoors, from studies and memory.  
251 Ibid., 14. 
252 In 1956, Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) commissioned Rosenberg to write a chapter on Marx for 
Famous Philosophers. 
253 This draws heavily from the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004): in particular, his work 
on différance. See: Of Gramatology, 1967. 
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 One of the marvels of modern painting is that this tension between making and 
storing time remains present on its surfaces, since its constituent marks, which 
are laid down over time, are always simultaneously available to vision.254 
 
 
Interestingly, Joselit roots the picturing of works, through reproduction (by galleries 
such as MOMA), in Pop Art’s response to Cézanne’s doubt.255 Accumulation, Joselit 
asserts, is at the heart of what is now the practice of painting—of marks within 
individual paintings, and images/reproductions of works within collections or 
repositories of images. In explaining the unremitting snapping of images, Joselit 
invokes Guy Debord’s definition of spectacle as: “the accumulation of capital beyond 
a certain threshold to the point where it becomes an image”.256  
 
Of most relevance is Joselit’s notion of snapping as: “scoring experience rather than 
devolving [it] into spectacle”.257 He seeks to draw a connection between painting as an 
unregulated form of marking time, and reproduction: which he terms a, “reified 
representation”.258 Pollock provides an answer. Thus, Pollock’s methods of application 
– the drip and spatter (Fig. 2R): “opened an aesthetic threshold between disorganised 
sensation and organised form”.259 This tension is evident in Pollock’s attempts to 
maintain non-referential painting whilst under a constant pressure to re-assert the 
image, or to formalise a method, or even to resist falling back on the decorative.260  
 
 
[I]t is important to insist that this pressure to become a picture characterised the 
most important painterly styles after Pollock—namely, Pop and Neo-
Expressionism. Here, the accumulation of marks is no longer located at the 
threshold between unregulated sensation and its registration in form. Rather, the 
mark has come to occupy the threshold between a painterly mark and a picture, 
defined by Pop, and appropriation as a commodified image.261 
 
 
																																																								
254 Ibid. This can be seen in paintings’ production, and also in its consumption. 
255 In the reproduction and enlargement of a brushstroke, by Roy Lichtenstein (1923-1997). 
256 Ibid., 15. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid.  
259 Ibid., 16. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid., 17. 
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Fig. 2R 
 
Joselit presents what he terms Duchamp’s doubt – that of an anxiety as to the 
circulation of works as images rather than perceptions and productions per se – as 
exemplifying the post-Pop condition.262 This is an externalised doubt as to the work’s 
situatedness—not what it is, but what it will do, where, and to whom. Joselit sees this 
as the extension of scoring to incorporate the entirety of the possible whereabouts of 
painting, and it includes: archiving, delegated spectatorship, performativity, an overt 
interactivity with technological media, and an acute awareness of the discourses into 
which painting will enter.263 Thus, the post-medium condition, to Joselit, amounts to 
an: “eruption of external conditions into the traditionally well-bounded object of 
painting”.264 This aligns with a globalised, digital age: its anxieties and speculations. 
 
4.2.2: Graw: Liveliness 
Graw takes a different approach, focusing attention not on the score but on the 
brushstroke: not as evidence of medium’s particularity, but as a carrier of something 
else. She notes Damisch’s notion of the brushstroke as an indicator of subjectivity – a 
translation of the activity of the eye through the brush – and runs this idea past the 
pluralistic practices of today, free as they are from the more restrictive material and 
																																																								
262 Ibid. 
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utopian conceptions of painting.265 By subjectivity, Graw does not mean to invoke the 
individualistic feelings of the painter (as sensations passed to the observer through the 
work), but, rather, to consider painting as able to bring with it what Damisch referred 
to as, “its own narrative”.266 Graw situates the idea of painting as subject as opposed to 
object within the French tradition of Louis Marin and Georges Didi-Huberman; made 
legitimate because of painting’s: “specific language, or, more precisely, because of its 
specific indexicality”.267 Graw’s notion sits comfortably close to Krauss’s sense of 
content, yet with greater ambivalence as to the potential horrors of contamination.268 
 
4.2.2.1: Indexicality 
Indexicality permits a finger to be pointed in the direction of a maker, irrespective of 
intentions.269 Though other art forms rely, to varying degrees, on indexical models, it 
is painting, Graw writes – in foregrounding the physicality of the sign – that unifies its 
semiotic functions, in order to: “simultaneously evoke the ghostlike presence of [the] 
absent author”.270 Graw terms this notion of presence liveliness. There is a 
Heideggerian flavour to this, in so far as, to Graw, a painting contains and withholds 
what she terms labour (Table 5).271 The storing of the labour of the painter in the 
object is, so Graw argues, and in seeming contradiction, a withholding of the life of 
the artist. The artist need not connect through touch for this form of indexicality to 
become operable, and nor is the work reducible to the artist’s labour alone.272  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
265 Isabelle Graw, “The Value of Liveliness: Painting as an Index of Agency in the New Economy”, 
2013, in Painting Beyond Itself, 79. 
266 Hubert Damisch, Im Zugwang: Delacroix, Malerei, Photographie (Berlin: Diaphanes, 2005), in 
Painting Beyond Itself, 79. 
267 Isabelle Graw, “The Value of Liveliness”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 80. Broadly speaking, as 
residing within French postructuralist discourses of the 1970s and 1980s. 
268 From all that lies outside of the varying parameters that together constitute the work. 
269 Graw cites the examples of Sigmar Polke (1941-2010) and Gerhard Richter (1932-), who each 
expressed anti-authorial intentions. 
270 Ibid., 81. The physical (object), the iconic (image/graph/diagram) and the symbolic (written/spoken, 
including number). 
271 The implications of which will be explored in Chapter 4. Consider, then, the dual process of 
disclosure and concealment. 
272 Ibid., 82. 
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Artist’s Labour 
 
 
 
Table 5: Graw’s Release and Retention of Labour 
 
The emphasis on the artist’s life – which the social history of art played a large part in 
helping to inauger – serves as a retreat from the image and from the material support 
on/through/by which the image sits.273 Graw points to the practices of Francis Picabia, 
Yves Klein and Niele Toroni, as important early refutations of a narrow sense of 
liveliness, which was rooted, within modernism, in the physical and linguistic 
properties of the object itself. Graw employs the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt 
(lifeworld) to expand it.274 On Picabia’s Natures Mortes (Fig. 2S), she writes: 
 
 
It is not only a manifestation of how boundaries of painting exploded but stands 
for painting’s fusion with something external to it: a consumer object. On the 
one hand, Picabia’s painting literally integrated the readymade by attaching a 
consumer item – a stuffed monkey – to the surface of a canvas.275 
 
 
																																																								
273 Within poststructuralism, the image doesn’t sit (sit is a Greenbergian term), which makes this 
contentious. 
274 Edmund Husserl (1859-1958) used Lebenswelt to denote that which is given, out of which 
experience occurs. 
275 Ibid., 83. 
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Fig. 2S 
 
The novelty of Graw’s position is that, far from seeing the incorporation of the 
readymade into the schema of painting as a threat, she sees in it the possibility of 
renewal (as, in fact, had Bois).276 In short: Graw considers the incorporation of, social 
living labor, which the readymade readily supplies, as affording painting an 
opportunity to contaminate the aesthetic.277 What Graw sees – at first glance – to be a 
refutation of essence – the result of the transformation of the names of, “supposed 
master artists” through a reduction to linguistic propositions – is problematic on the 
grounds that propositions function as terms of reference, and thus remain 
affirmative.278 However, Graw perhaps sees this coming and backtracks, claiming that:  
 
 
On closer inspection, the painting is simultaneously revitalized because it 
seemingly speaks, albeit in silent fashion. And only living things can speak. To 
the same extent that this painting has opened up – towards the sphere of 
commodity, labour and textual propositions – it gains vitality and liveliness.279 
 
 																																																								
276 In reflecting on Duchamp’s response to Baudelaire’s consideration of the new. 
277 Ibid., 85. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
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4.2.2.2: Boundedness 
Graw enlivens painting again, this time through Klein’s employment of the body, and 
then through Sigmar Polke’s conflation of fashion and painting, which brings with it 
the trace of the actual body (as dress) through its proximity to the artist’s skin (Fig. 
2T).280 To Graw, the boundedness of painting – the result of its recourse to liveliness – 
attests to the delimitation of the Greenbergian and Friedian boundaries of flatness and 
wall.281 Painting today, in Graw’s analysis, speaks of the institutional boundaries to 
which painting bears witness, which serve, in turn, to impute to it a life of its own—
what Graw terms its, “subject-like qualities”.282 And so, in the face of such 
uncontainability it appears redundant to seek for painting the distinction of specificity. 
Such a notion, however, falls in line with a Hegelian teleological approach to which 
contemporary criticism takes issue. An exponential expansion of painting – to include 
all conditions – acts to deny painting its particularity, whilst reifying situatedness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
280 Polke’s The Large Cloth of Abuse, 1968, was worn like a gown. 
281 Consider the work of Daniel Buren (1938-). Buren’s work highlights fracture, mostly in installation, 
and draws on painting and performance, and on writing too. 
282 Ibid., 86. 
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Fig. 2T 
 
Graw demarcates practices that seek to: “push beyond the edge of the frame, while still 
holding onto the specificity of the picture or canvas or to variations of this format (on 
the grounds that the prevalence of such practices make them viable and functional in 
some manner or other)”.283 She writes that: “If it were not for [painting’s] residual 
specificity, it wouldn’t make sense to speak of painting at all”.284 I will consider the 
residual in Chapter 4, in respect of Heidegger’s ideas. The problem, then, seems like a 
restaging of that which Greenberg and Fried faced at the onset of the 1960s – that of 
untangling a sense of residual specificity from an external world of things – yet 
without the requisite faith in the modernist project to re-invoke formalist distinctions. 
 
In addressing this, Graw draws from Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of indexicality, 
which permits her to consider the sign outside of its painterly manifestation, and also 
to consider the union of object and person—especially strong in painting.285 Graw 
refutes assertions as to performance art’s greater bondedness to the artist’s body, on 
the grounds that, in performance art, the body is (or becomes) the vehicle, whereas in 																																																								
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid., 89. 
285 Owing, in part, to Rosenberg (and to notions of gesture). Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is 
sometimes referred to as the father of Pragmatism. 
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painting the vehicle sits in proximity to the body.286 Such an appeal to the maintenance 
of reduced proximity parallels Fried’s disavowal of presence as aspiring towards the 
unification of the work and the spectator through the dissolution of difference. To 
Graw: “[t]he metonymic relationship between product and person is mediated and 
negotiated through the picture on canvas”.287 Painting and the body are thus kept apart 
in their linking, much as the moon is kept from catastrophe: maintaining its position in 
respect of the Earth by virtue of its velocity, mass, and a mutual gravitational pull.288 
 
Graw re-applies indexicality – the physical connection of object to subject – and 
situates it in respect of the longstanding idea that photography is the best fitted of art 
forms to provide automatic inscription without an author: based on well-established 
anti-subjectivist assumptions (in part, the result of the work of Roland Barthes).289 To 
Graw, painting provides an alternative indexical link between the work and: “the one 
who left his or her marks”.290 But how is this different from the commonly understood 
assumption as to an object’s connection with the person or persons who made it? Graw 
stretches the theory, claiming that: “[w]hereas Pierce places emphasis on the factual, 
physical connectedness of the index to its object, I highlight the index’s faculty for 
evoking such a physical connection”.291 Thus construed, the index opens up a direct 
channel to the idea of authorial preoccupation, yet one whose medium aspect 
approximates painterly possibility rather than quantas of transmogrified intentions. 
 
To Graw, a painting brings with it an author, a connection, a place and a probable 
intention (though not necessarily physical contact).292 Presumably, as with Key’s 
analysis of the role of technology, new media approaches to painting maintain an 
indexical link through the inference of decision. The object thus determines the power 
of the indexical sign: “which in this case is a subject—the person of the artist”.293 
Graw recognises that such links also exist between a sculpture and its maker, yet: “it is 																																																								
286 Ibid., 90. 
287 Ibid., 91. 
288 Graw ponders the idea, developed by Daniel Arasse (1944-), of sensing the thoughts and dreams of 
Piero della Francesca (c. 1415-1492) through an encounter with his frescoes. 
289 To Graw, this allowed authorship to be conceptualised as a blank spot. See: Camera Lucida, by 
Roland Barthes. 
290 Ibid., 92. 
291 Ibid., 92. 
292 This allows for the inclusion of paintings made by a machine, or else the result of instruction of one 
form or another.  
293 Ibid., 95. 
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only painting that is backed up with a plethora of historical arguments, attesting a 
subject-like power to it”.294 Graw relates Diderot’s claim that paint is the place where: 
“a man’s character and temperament” comes to the fore, arguing that deconstructivist 
approaches fail to exorcise the ghost of presence.295 Thus, an artist like Gerhard 
Richter – who refutes the written – is resituated through inscription. The squeegee 
imprints the body and its various actions and rhythms (Fig. 2U): “allow[ing] the artist 
to enter through the back door”.296  
 
 
 
Fig. 2U 
 
Graw concludes with an assessment of painting’s value, which she underpins with a 
notion of the memorial and the trace, shored up by Marx’s conception of the, 
“congealed state of labour”.297 And so, ironically, in light of the ubiquity of references 
to painting’s propensity for commodification, painting becomes valuable as that which 
																																																								
294 Ibid. Graw (Isabelle, 1962-) relates Hegel’s presentation, in Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 1835-
38, of painting as a repackaging of subjectivity—as a general condition rather than a host of individual 
conditions. 
295 Ibid. Denis Diderot, “Notes on Painting: To Serve as an Appendix to the Salon of 1765”, in Diderot 
on Art, Volume 1: The Salon of 1765 and Notes on Painting, trans. John Goodman (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1995), 197-98. 
296 Isabelle Graw, Painting Beyond Itself, 96. 
297 Ibid., 98. 
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reveals rather than conceals the labour-value of the work.298 The liveliness Graw 
writes of is, therefore, a bulwark against commodification in favour of, “a concrete 
foundation of value” (which painting is best suited to supply).299 Painting’s stored 
labour – in its expanded temporality – is viewed at once, and its brush marks are seen 
to serve nothing less than a: “new economy that is busy absorbing life”.300 
 
4.2.3: Saunders: Material and Medium 
In “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, Saunders explores distinctions between medium and stuff, 
yet as a practitioner, and from a post-medium platform teaming with false assumptions 
as to the seeming safety of its position, which he reminds the reader of when he writes:  
 
 
[D]espite how proudly post-medium we are, when have dead ideas truly stayed 
in the ground? […P]robably half our heroes were specific to their means and 
forms. So what is wrong with considering the particular traits – perhaps needs – 
of the medium?301  
 
 
Saunders equates the bad taste left by medium specificity with a dislike born of the 
student years, wherein young would-be artists struggle to get to grips with the 
requirement of bridging the unbridgeable gap between: “the muddling, stupid work we 
do with our hands, and all the sexy things we read about that came before”.302 
Saunders sees painting as defined by a defensiveness born of uncertainties as to the 
role of its medium. Thus, today’s successful painter is he or she who can wrestle 
productively with what being a contemporary artist means, and with the: “potentially 
pleasurable difficulties of the real problems of material and visual construction”.303 
The resulting anxiety becomes, to Saunders, a mechanism of advance.304 This feels 
rather unconvincing, as it too easily situates the contemporary as an operational base. 
 
 
 																																																								
298 Wary of ascribing supernatural power to labour, Marx did not use the term labour theory of value. 
He used the term law of value. 
299 Ibid., 99. 
300 Ibid., 101. Notably, Eugène Delacriox (1798-1863), in his Journal, asserted the instantaneousness of 
reception. There are overtones of Fried’s idea of presentness, too, though they appear inversed. 
301 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 172. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid., 173. 
304 This smacks of dialecticism, akin to Riegl’s or Fried’s. 
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4.2.3.1: Mobility 
Saunders considers Krauss’s notion of technological openness in respect of the 
disassembling and building up of painting and the prevalence of aggregate mediums – 
such as film – where Krauss’s apparatus extends to all that permits of making, 
screening and viewing.305 This sets up a line of questioning designed to consider how 
(if post-medium) media can still pollute or intersect, which permits of an interesting 
distinction.306 To Saunders: “materials stand in for medium, [being] freer to 
wander”.307 Thus, it is paint and support that do things, including being images. 
Materials cling, which allows him to claim that: “the future of medium is increasingly 
bound to mobility”.308 Mobilisation, to Saunders, is at its most pronounced when 
materials are misused—only then might one recognise functionality. Saunders’s 
examples include: the blocked out photograph (the photogram), a print drawn on 
plastic (inverting light and mark), and a photograph printed on a canvas (showing the 
weave). Such merging reveals the, “fissures and particularities in each [medium]”.309 
 
The result (and importance) of intersections is not that medium specificity is 
disbanded, but that new specificities are acquired in place of old assurances—not so 
much an aggregate, in the Kraussian sense, but an addition to the pantheon of 
possibility. To Saunders, by equating medium with material, the medium becomes 
more about its own image, as the material becomes reinvigorated and redeployed.310 In 
this light, material is considered to be: “the nuts and bolts and a signifier of a broader 
endeavour (medium)”.311 In Saunders’s analysis, painting is haunted by medium, yet 
he sees it as the painter’s job (more so than the theorist’s) to challenge borders—to 
delve, literally, into the murky world of materials so as to consider what is seen.312 
  
																																																								
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid., 174. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid., 175. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. 
312 It is interesting to note a return to seeing (the optical) within recent approaches to painting. This 
perhaps underpins a return to the picture (and to picturing), and seeing might well support contextual 
rather than aesthetic inquisitiveness.  
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
Mira Schor states, in reference to her work, that: “you are, I hope, trapped onto the 
surface for long enough to have to deal with the image”.313 Here, she draws image and 
surface together, conflating word and picture. Schor opposes Greenberg’s privileging 
of opticality and distance, as well as his classificatory impulse, fondness for 
oppositions and distaste of narrative (Table 6).314 To Greenberg, writing had no place 
in painting, for it offered an escape; serving an aesthetic purpose only when 
considered as calligraphic shape in a language to which the reader had no access.315 In 
considering Schor’s remark, it is interesting to note how critiques of Greenberg tend to 
take the form of pulling terms apart that have – intentionally or otherwise – become 
illegitimately enmeshed, or else closing gaps that have been kept open—the former on 
philosophical grounds, and the latter seemingly the result of a distaste of apertures.316 
 
Avant-Garde (High Art) Kitsch (Low Art) 
Picture plane Object & Writing 
Purity Narrative (Story) 
Form Subject 
Autonomous Dependent 
Aesthetic Literary  
Flat Sculptural & Illusionistic 
Eye Body 
Art Life 
 
Table 6: Greenberg’s Oppositions 
 
To Melville, questions of medium go all the way down.317 This chapter considers a 
series of absences: the consequences of not going far enough—an outcome of adopting 
too physical a conception of medium as material (a by-product of formalism’s inability 																																																								
313 Interview with Stuart Horodner (birth date unknown), 1993, at the Horodner Romley Gallery, New 
York. 
314 At the same time, however, Schor (Mira, 1950) is acknowledging what might be considered a 
staggered temporality—images, unlike surfaces, take time to deal with. 
315 See: Chapter 3, Section 2.5. Cy Twombly (1928-2011) fused mark making and writing together. 
316 Consider in respect of Heidegger’s understanding of linguistic, spatial and temporal gaps (Chapter 4: 
3.2.1). 
317 Stephen Melville, Becoming Medium, 2013. By down, Melville implies to the core of things. 
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to maintain its Greenbergian distinctions), or else too immaterial a notion of content as 
idea. In looking for medium, I will lay the foundations for a phenomenological model 
of medium as interval and/or meeting in time and place, which I will assemble in 
Chapter 4.318 Difficulties in understanding the idea of a medium can be rooted in how 
painting – as object and practice – has been approached within critical writings, and 
also in assumptions as to what it is that painting addresses, and how it addresses it. I 
will point to three interrelated areas marked by a sense of lack. These concern:  
 
1: The extent to which a painting orients itself towards other. 
2: The degree to which a painting (and a medium) can lay claim to its own time. 
3: The consequences of positioning painting in terms of social and linguistic 
structures. 
 
Furthermore, I will explore the processes of making a painting, and reflect on the 
usefulness of adopting a threshold model of animal behaviour to gauge the extent to 
which imagery (language-use) might actually be predicated on material manipulation. 
Though problems of forming, and of absence, are ontological concerns, they bear upon 
perception.319 Where they do, I will take them up – and in respect of concerns 
pertinent to the previous two chapters – and consider resemblance and the relationship 
between image and world, and between images. In Part 3, I will interrogate the impact 
of mimesis on ideas about the medium and, in particular, problematise proximity and 
likeness against the backdrop of a sense of painted images as having been formed of. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
318 Through the employment of the ideas of Heidegger and Hölderlin. 
319 Within the discipline of Art history, E. H. Gombrich (1909-2001) is noted, in particular, for his work 
in drawing together the iconographic, perceptual and manual facets of works of art. 
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Part 2: Painting: The Absents 
 
 
2.1: Writing about Painting 
Writing about painting has become compromised by its merger with writing about 
other things.320 Though perhaps merely a reflection of the diversification of visual arts 
practices, there are, nevertheless, important implications. James Elkins has pointed to 
the dearth of exploratory literature on painting, providing a five-tier taxonomy of types 
of writings that support painterly practices today: none of which (excluding, of course, 
the classificatory tier) does he consider to be particularly helpful (Table 7).321 
1 Writing that is opportunistic, impressionistic and informal 
2 Writing that seeks to classify and order 
3 Writing concerned with declaring painting dead 
4 Writing that declares a distance from modernism, or aversion to Greenberg 
5 Writing that takes painting as an occasional subject among others 
 
Table 7: Elkins’s Taxonomy of Types of Writing about Painting 
 
To Elkins, this phenomenon is part of a more pervasive problem: that of a dislocation 
between theory and practice, with neither now seemingly grounded in, reflective of, or 
able to account for the concerns of the other. “As a medium and a set of practices, 
painting is practically dismembered, torn to pieces among many media. It seems to be 
faltering, directionless, indecisive”.322 In respect of current discourses that seek to 
account for and position painting, he maintains that: “[t]hey drift, they are indulgent in 
regard to logical argument, they take pleasure in very small occasions and try not to 
look too far afield or compare things that appear too different”.323 Elkins speculates as 																																																								
320 In 1989, Michael Podro and Ernst Gombrich discussed the related problem of the conflation of the 
discipline of Art History with other areas of enquiry, and, in terms of knowledge of the object of art, of 
the possible advantages of isolation. https://gombricharchive.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/showdoc109 
1.pdf. 
321 James Elkins, “Why Nothing can be Accomplished in Painting”, 109 (2004): 38-41. Related: What 
Happened to Art Criticism (New York: Routledge, 2003). Additionally, What is Interesting in Writing 
an Art History (this is a blog, which Elkins frames as: “probably a book project, or maybe just a series 
of class notes”). And: What Painting is? (New York: Routledge, 2000). Elkins (James, 1955-) is a critic 
and historian whose work spans painting, photography and writing about art. In particular, Elkins 
concerns himself with images as constantly developing forms of language, positioned between science 
and nature. 
322 James Elkins, “Why Nothing can be Accomplished in Painting”, 38. 
323 Ibid. 
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to whether such a tone: “represses an anxiety about the possibility that there may in 
fact be a significant form beneath the scattered surface of the present moment”.324 
Though presented as polemic, any invocation of the significant is significant.325 
 
Charles Harrison has remarked on the conflation of word and image, which he sees as 
key to maintaining the current orthodoxy, where: “the typical tendency of the critic is 
now to emphasise the mutual implication of the verbal and the visual”.326 Such a 
languid passivity as to the possibility of linguistic distinction is not the result of a 
suspicion as to painting’s ability to deal with the modern world. Nor, paradoxically, is 
it a comment on painting’s popularity. On the contrary, painting’s dependence on a 
representational scaffolding equips it fully, in an age of image, to reference that which 
lies near or far, to draw from the imaginary and the real, and to seek out the personal 
and political. Graw argues that: “one can relate painting’s regained popularity to how 
it seems to store the artist’s life—and work time”.327 No doubt painting’s longevity – 
its exhaustion of novelty – remains close to the root of its ubiquitous indistinction?  
 
If historical baggage alone is not culpable, then difficulties perhaps reside in the extent 
to which painting’s medium drags on its bearing in a manner that eludes comparison 
with other practices.328 To understand this more fully is to consider the causes and 
effects of a series of absences. Here, I mean to suggest that what I’ve described is a 
symptom, not a cause, of painting’s problem, and that to approach this is to wrestle 
with concerns that, though not specific to painting, are more pronounced as a result of 
the nature of its medium in respect of the constitution of its object. This object – in its 
																																																								
324 Ibid., 41. 
325 Clive Bell’s formalist stock waned, then collapsed with Greenberg’s. 
326 Charles Harrison, Conceptual Art & Painting: Further Essays on Art and Language (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1993), 13. 
327 Isabelle Graw, “The Value of Liveliness”, 82. 
328 As material, and also as ideological construct. Less attention has been paid to the notion of medium 
specificity (and related areas of enquiry) in respect of sculptural and photographic practices within a 
comparably recent period of art historical and philosophical discourse. Fried is an exception, in “Art and 
Objecthood”, 1967, and Why Photography Maters as Art as Never Before, 2008, and Krauss, too, in 
“Sculpture in the Expanded Field”, 1979. Also, Vilém Flusser (1920-1991), in Towards a Philosophy of 
Photography, 2000, and Into the Universe of Technical Images, 2011, explores a complex notion of 
apparatus within photography and media practices. His works have only recently been translated into 
English. Additionally, Susan Sontag (1933-2004) has expressed formalist, if not fully fledged medium-
specific inclinations in respect of photography, and a distrust of textual hermeneutics, in Against 
Interpretation, 1966. 
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material and temporal extensions – is present. And yet, within theory, there appears to 
be a subtle legerdemain at play, which serves to deny the medium its legitimacy.329  
 
2.2: Is or Of: Painting as Prompt 
One effect of the indeterminacy accompanying the role of medium is that abstraction 
and figuration sit side by side, as images—the former too easily stripped of 
ideological, religious, political or aesthetic meanings, and the latter now wholly 
mimetic.330 The past three decades have been a golden age for pictures, with the image 
seemingly able to lay claim to whatever meaning is reckoned to be appropriate to a 
projected intention at the moment of reception. The beholder circles an object that, in 
its appeal to image, has been hollowed out.331 If painting is in/of its time: then time, in 
painting, is conceptually, perceptually and perpetually now—the richness of its 
extensions truncated by a suspicion of tomorrow and the repudiation of yesterday.  
 
In the early 1980s, Tom Lawson considered painting’s potential to provide a, “never-
ending web of representations” to be useful still.332 And yet, painting is seen here as 
something approaching a living death: the painter caught between a position of blind 
faith and the adoption of co-opted ironic strategies no longer at the service of the 
radical artist.333 Notably, Jean-François Lyotard’s critique of grand narratives preceded 
																																																								
329 Here, legitimacy means its distinction from other things and also the importance placed on it.  
330 Consider the ubiquity of crapstraction and zombie formalism (abstraction’s equivalents of Stuckism). 
Such labels serve to denote groundless, decontextualised modes of practice…paintings that happen to 
look like art. 
Abstraction in painting has its roots in theosophy and mysticism. Kupka, Mondrian, Kandinsky, Klee, 
and Sonia and Robert Delaunay considered it, therefore, though in varying manners, to be symbolic of 
knowledge (ideas) that existed outside of the painting. These pioneers of abstraction rooted their works 
in the material conditions of the painted object, which, in turn, could be seen to act as the material 
vehicle on which transcendence rested. Today, severed from its origin, abstraction is rarely taken to 
mean more than not bearing a strong resemblance to. Within modernity, mimesis took a secondary role, 
as painting found other things to do (moreover, photography sought its own version of medium-
specificity around 1910, when photographers ceased to imitate the idioms of painting). 
331 Panofsky (Erwin, 1892-1968), in Idea: A Concept in Art Theory, 1924, recounts Plato’s aversion to 
mimesis, and to artists concerned only with the rendering of appearance, contrasting them with those 
artists who, within the means at their disposal, sought to pursue ideas. Though, in his own time, the 
pursuit of idea in the Platonic sense would have been of interest to a minority of artists, Plato 
nevertheless conceded the possibility that painters could transcend representation through the mixing 
and blending of base materials, yet only when guided by the divine. Today, it could be argued that the 
divine is in scarce supply. 
332 Tom Lawson, “Last Exit Painting”, Artforum, 2 (1981): 40-47. 
333 Ibid. Faith, in this context, refers to a belief in the potential of the image to carry meaning regardless. 
Alternatively, or additionally, the contemporary artist is able to find comfort in his connectedness to the 
notion of vocation (Hermann Leicht, History of the World’s Art (Germany: Spring Books, 1965), 316). 
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Lawson’s comment by two years.334 However, in painting (in its retreat from 
formalism), the smaller narratives that grew to replace them	lacked not only the unity 
of a position, but also a sense of position per se.335 To be mediumless was to be a 
consumer or facilitator of images alone.336 At stake is the extent to which a painting 
embodies, stands apart from, or points towards its subject (referent). The move away 
from the notion of a painting that points to nothing save itself (or which points back to 
rather than away from) is a move towards the dissolution of the medium of painting. 
From only paint to always of is a sequential shift of emphasis – something that is done 
to painting – by those who position the work on the maker’s behalf (Table 8).337  
 
1 A painting is only paint 
2 A painting is paint and something else 
3 A painting is something else and paint 
4 A painting is always of  
 
Table 8: Dissolution of Medium/Inauguration of Image 
 
2.2.1: The Hidden Screen 
This of is what hides painting, disguising the function of its medium (much like an 
image on a TV screen hides the screen itself, where reflections, dust or signal failure 
allow for a break in the illusion). Only when the text is interrupted is the viewer 
brought back to his own space (in proximity to the work’s space). The reminder of the 
vehicle through which the moving image travels is not part of the film, though it 
permits the film to become operable. The screen on, behind or through which film is 
visible attains the position of carrier (distinguishable from that which is carried). 																																																								
334 In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 1979, Lyotard contended that knowledge, in 
the post-war period, had become a commodity, to be redistributed in discrete form as pockets of 
information by a legislator or authority figure/organisation. Through the language-game, meaning is 
generated. However, it is meaning determined by, and operable through, the structures that serve to 
underpin it. Legitimation is, therefore, dependent on a conductor. To Lyotard, the restructuring of 
Western Europe in the post-war period had been responsible for a decentering of cultural production, 
and thus contributed substantially to the precipitation of a loss of belief in grand narratives. 
335 In the 1980s and beyond. Evident in the divergent and shifting trajectories of artists connected with 
Fluxus, Post-Minimalism, Stuckism, Neo-Pop, Body Art, Computer Art, Institutional Critique, New 
Subjectivity, Arte Povera, Video Installation, Graffiti, Neo-Conceptualism, YBA, YGA, Stuckism, 
Photorealism, Projection Art, Classical Realism, Transavanguardia, and Figuration Libre. 
336 See: Jean Baudrillard’s Simulations, 1983, for a consideration of the demise of the real as a result of 
the proliferation of images and the exponential expansion of new media (and by the means and 
mechanisms of distribution).  
337 Including: theorists, historians, critics, curators and educators. 
	 105	
When playing, the screen exists through resolution alone. As Krauss pointed out, in 
“Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism”, only when applying crude generalisations is it 
feasible to consider the monitor or projection screen to be the medium of film or video 
art.338 This points to a different relationship between surface and subject in a painting 
than that which exists between the screen and the film/video. To seek to differentiate 
between the functioning of these two relationships is to consider the nature of time. 
 
2.3: The Times of Painting 
Time – in painting – has several applications, some specific to the practice, others to 
the object of painting. Others oscillate indeterminately between the two. Statement-
questions like, how long did the work take and what was the artist trying to do point in 
opposing directions, towards object or practice, invoking processes of endeavour and 
intention respectively. The time of a painting is thus positioned as either a sequence of 
things that have happened in the lead up to the manifestation of an object of painting 
(Graw’s absent other), or else as that which happens post facto (Joselit’s scored 
spectatorship), and which can be classified as a mode of interpretation. That which 
this happening happens to happen to – what, in Joselit’s analysis, amounts to the 
marked object of painting – sits seemingly stilled, as something akin to an absent 
middle, between the scored time of the maker and the response time of the viewer.339 
 
Notions of time tend to coalesce around concerns indicative of one’s perspective or 
vantage. Both the maker’s time and the viewer’s time identify as lived, insofar as our 
notion of time in respect of works is of an identification with the activity of the artist, 
or with the immediacy of our own interpretive, experiential facility as viewer (Table 
9). Therefore, both times orient themselves in relation to – and emanate outwards from 
– the material object that sits between, namely: the painting.340 They are always of. 																																																								
338 Rosalind Krauss’s “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism”, 1976, emerged within a few years of the 
birth of video art, as media boundaries were beginning to blur and conceptual practices became more 
mainstream. In her search for what it was that, in media terms, grounded video art and made it specific, 
Krauss put forward the notion that the psychological state of narcissism was, for video, its condition, 
and defined it in terms of self-discovery.  
339 An interest in that which happened prior to the manifestation of the object of painting (as anything 
other than of technical interest) originated within modernist criticism in Harold Rosenberg’s “The 
American Action Painters”, 1952, which was heavily indebted to the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
340 No doubt, these statements could be reworded and the activities reclassified so as to refine them or to 
conceive of other groupings. Also, from the perspective of the maker there might well be simultaneity 
in terms of understanding statements one and two, and, from the perspective of the viewer, the second 
conception of time would come to be understood through the first. Additionally, the maker and the 
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1 The time taken to conceive, plan, carry out and display a work 
2 The time taken to recognise, decode, understand, appreciate and value a work 
 
Table 9: The Two Times of Painting 
 
2.3.1: Paintingtime 
Whilst a modern conception of the physics of time is rooted in Einstein’s spacetime, a 
notion of time in respect of works of art eludes a comparable origin.341 There is no 
universal grammar of painting that might comfortably encompass it, and no concept of 
paintingtime within artistic theoretical discourses with which to cement the 
relationship between maker’s and viewer’s times. These times comprise not of the 
interaction of universal forces – the building blocks of existence – but of an 
impulse.342 The times of painting are thus psychological times, which become visible 
and knowable in respect of our intentions—of what we seek to do with them. 
 
Difficulties arise when one attempts to strip painting of its maker’s time (what Joselit 
refers to as an unregulated form of marking) and also its viewer’s time, so as to 
establish a third manifestation of temporality specific to, and dependent on, the 
painting.343 This would appear to be impossible, if only because we conceive time as a 
mode of perception—the result of a sensory directedness towards the object of 
painting (and towards things generally). The maker’s time and the viewer’s time reside 
within this formulation. How, then, might we be able to construe a time that owes 
nothing to that which leads towards the painted object, or that which stems from it 
(Table 10)? It is worth pointing out that this has not been the pursuit of recent art 
historical inquiry. The social history of art, feminist art criticism, and structuralist and 																																																																																																																																																																
viewer might, in some instances, be the same person. Nevertheless, the central point here is that when 
time is contemplated in respect of the painted object, one can conceive of a separation of vantages on 
which differing understandings rely. 
341 The notion of combining space and time into a single theoretical model preceded the work of 
Einstein, but its common usage derives from his paper of 1905, entitled “On the Electrodynamics of 
Moving Bodies”. 
342 Hermeneutics originated in response to scripture. Through the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), hermeneutics developed as a modern discipline with 
concerns for general ideas. In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger, and his pupil, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1900-2002), shifted the emphasis from knowing to being with (or reconstruction), in order to 
circumvent presumptions as to the content of works, and thereby deny the possibility of unequivocal 
excavation and the revelation of essence. This can be seen in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 1936, 
and Gadamer’s Truth and Method, 1960. 
343 David Joselit, “Marking, Scoring, Storing, and Speculating (on Time)”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 17. 
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deconstructive approaches position the object of painting, though in varying manners, 
as a cipher through which one might come to consider the personal, social, political 
and historical. Thus, within these formulations, there is nothing left to examine.344 
 
1 The time taken to conceive, plan, carry out and display a work 
2 Paintingtime? 
3 The time taken to recognise, decode, understand, appreciate and value a work 
 
Table 10: Paintingtime 
 
2.4: Towards: The Social History of Art 
Those engaged in the social history of art, and its feminist extension, sought to remove 
the brackets that, to formalists at least, acted to maintain a separation between the 
work of art and its situatedness in the world—what Caroline Jones referred to (in 
relation to Clark’s work on Jackson Pollock) as, “the largest possible modernist 
frame”.345 Their efforts, though well-intentioned and, at times, monumental in scope, 																																																								
344 Nothing communicable—in line with Wittgenstein’s claim that: “[t]he limits of language mean the 
limits of my world” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 74). 
345 Caroline Jones, Eyesight Alone, 275. Edmund Husserl’s concept of a bracketing of ideas (epoché), or 
the phenomenological reduction – the suspension of judgments about the natural world in favour of 
judgments as to one’s experience of it – developed out of Kant’s distinction between the noumenon and 
the phenomenon (the thing itself and the thing as it appears). Though the methods and strategies of the 
social history of art predated the emergence of Arnold Hauser’s seminal work The Social History of Art, 
1951, it was Hauser (1892-1978) who redefined art historical enquiry as the pursuit of an understanding 
of the influence of social structures on objects of cultural production, and from an overtly Marxist 
orientation. Hauser’s overarching trajectory decreed that art shifted from an intuitive naturalism to a 
formalised symbolism, which encompassed abstraction, then again, to a hierarchical realism, as society 
became increasingly bourgeois from the Enlightenment onwards. This became known as vulgar 
Marxism, from which later historians of a social persuasion moved away. In Image of the People: 
Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution, 1973, T. J. Clark (1943-) elucidates a series of theoretical 
problems by tying them to concrete situations, not in order to provide an account of practice in and of 
itself, in the manner of Fry or Greenberg, but to attempt to gauge to what extent societal specificities 
impact on practices that result from them (and how these practices could be seen to embody or relate to 
such concerns). Clark, influenced by what he termed the ambition of the art historians of the first half of 
the century, including Panofsky, sought to investigate the effects of revolution on modern painting: 
binding art (object, style and content) to the conditions of life. The best example of Clark’s early 
method is perhaps his treatment of A Burial at Ornans, 1949-50 (Fig. 3A), by Gustave Courbet (1819-
1877), in which the painting can be seen to evidence the increased sophistication of peasant politics and 
a sense of burgeoning class-consciousness. In Old Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology, Griselda 
Pollock (1949-), with Rozsika Parker (1945-2010), 1981, in building on earlier works in which she 
examined the paintings and the context of the paintings of Jean Francois Millet (1818-1875), Vincent 
van Gogh (1853-1890) and Mary Cassatt (1844-1926), challenges a host of culturally embedded myths 
and assumptions about women artists, while, in the process, demonstrating the constructedness of male 
reputations during the early modernist period. Here, practice becomes rooted firmly in a vast network of 
interconnected forces from which the object emerges as confirmation. The Subversive Stitch: 
Embroidery and the Making of the Feminine, 1984, by Rozsika Parker (1945-2010), charted, through a 
detailed analysis of a wide range of domestic items and practices, the separation of the arts and crafts, 
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acted to doubly situate the work of art: within the macrocosm of socio-political forces 
and the microcosm of psychological determinates—within a world of artists and others 
(of politics and its subjects).346 This advanced the now-naturalised idea that material 
forms of cultural production operate both as panes of glass and as reflective surfaces—
as transparent mirrors.347 In positing the object of painting as evidence of conditions 
that reside outside of the object of painting, such analyses took the form of extended 
personal anthropologies, wherein an abundance of biographical, psychological and 
societal drivers were siphoned through works whose arrangements and linguistic 
particularities revealed only that which they stood in place of.348 Works became 
informing of. To adopt this position unmodified is to declare the match modernist 
painting finished, yet, as Bois has pointed out, this does not in itself denote that the 
game painting is now over.349 
 
 
 
Fig. 3A 
 
																																																																																																																																																																
exposing the basis of hierarchical distinctions between masculine arts and feminine crafts. For the most 
part, the social history of art drew from Marxist and neo-Marxist criticism, including that of the 
Frankfurt School thinkers. More recently, in The Sight of Death: An Experiment in Art Writing, 2006 
(through an extended analysis of two paintings by Poussin), T. J. Clark has employed phenomenological 
analysis in support of the personal and the socio-political. Raymond Williams fused aspects of 
humanism and Marxism, to ground the social and the ideological (and Cultural Studies) in history. 
346 What, to Roger Fry, would amount to a world of story. 
347 That the work could be seen through (to its originating forces), and yet serve to reflect use and 
intention also. 
348 Adrian Forty, Objects of Desire: Design and Society Since 1750, 8. In “The Age of World Picture”, 
1938, Heidegger provides an account of the anthropological, which I will consider in Chapter 4. 
349 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 242. 
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Here, paintings endured so long as they pointed towards other (and away from paint-
thing).350 Within this framework, a work’s success relies on the readability of socially 
constructed systems of signification: presented, decoded and re-interpreted in the 
object’s wake—staking claims as to the object’s reach. What, then, of the role of the 
vehicle of painting – outside of its function as a translator of modern experience – and 
of the legitimacy of a methodology that construes the work as evidence of something 
whose identity resides elsewhere?351 To adopt a social approach in respect of painting 
is to consider the work as that which signposts a historical or personal moment 
inscribed on – and operational through – a thing/work of wholly indeterminate nature.  
 
2.4.1: Choice: Image Begets Image 
A painting is the product of manipulations that, in tandem with the processes that 
determine its resting form, act to fix the paint to which these concerns attest. To 
account for the social in this narrower sense requires a consideration of what it is that 
binds the maker to the painting.352 Such a concern – an experiential one on the part of 
the maker, as well as an ontological one (in that it helps determine the being of the 
painting) – sits closer to Rosenberg’s arena than it does to Greenberg’s picture plane, 
as a first order line of inquiry.353 As a painter, aware of the role played by choice, an 
appeal to a more empirical scrutiny of behaviour seems particularly useful. To gauge 
the extent to which an action is the result of choice is to extend Riegl’s formalist 
considerations so as to include the processes of forming (in place and time), and to 
circumscribe the social through an emphasis on that which impacts most directly on 
the founding of the painting – the hand – whose enabler is the very stuff of painting.354  
 
 
 																																																								
350 Bill Readings, New Art History, Musée d'Art Contemporain de Montréal, 1994, accessed September 
13, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=danAEcnlS-o. 
351 Which includes its medium and fashioning. 
352 To address the factors which regulate the form that an object takes. 
353 Fundamental ontology, to Heidegger, is a shift from traditional ontology, evidenced in the works of 
Leibniz and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), which sought to ask: Why there is what 
there is? Heidegger, however, set out to ask: What is it to be? This move towards the fundamental 
pushes ontology from the ontic (a concern for entities) towards the ontological (a concern for being as 
such). Such speculation is fundamental, in so far as an understanding of being must take into account 
how it is that entities arrive as entities in the first instance (in order to become sources of speculation). 
Language is thus situated as a second-order response (in that it works to discover knowledge of) to a 
first order condition, namely: the condition from which language operates to discover knowledge of. 
354 Including extensions to the hand. 
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2.4.2: Dawkins and the Behaviour of Chicks 
In “A Threshold Model of Choice Behaviour”, Richard Dawkins considers the 
behaviour patterns of chicks.355 Of particular interest here is the notion of decision-
making, and also that of instigation. The mechanism of choice (what it is that permits 
a decision to do one thing and not another) is considered, by Dawkins, to be difficult 
to determine from random observation alone, and so, in his paper, he sets out to study 
the stimuli required in order for a chick to choose one of two alternatives when faced 
with a moment of decision (the chicks are offered a choice of blue, red and green 
spots, presented alternately). He subsequently proposes a choice threshold model.356 
 
Behaviours, he concludes, derive impetus from more than direct stimuli; and, in earlier 
ethnological experiments, fluctuating behaviours had been identified as having been 
activated by the same drive or excitation, but at different thresholds. In other words, 
behaviour patterns were tied to situations, with some behaviours visible only under 
specific conditions (higher thresholds), and more common behaviours evident at other 
times (lower thresholds). Therefore, behaviour fluctuated in respect of variable 
thresholds, which determined type. And so, when faced with a moment of choice: “an 
animal either chooses the preferred one or chooses completely indiscriminately; the 
less preferred stimulus […] only […] chosen during periods of non-discrimination”.357 
 
In other experiments, Dawkins concludes that the movements of a chick’s head and 
beak during feeding time form cyclical patterns. Once a chick had engaged in this or 
that feeding procedure or series of movements, there was little or no chance of the 
sequence becoming broken prior to its having completed the cycle. During a particular 
routine, the chick acted as if having no freedom to choose to stop, redirect attention, or 
modify its comportment. Having started, it would surely finish, and, on finishing, 
pause and begin again. Between cycles, the chick’s behaviour was unpredictable. 																																																								
355 Richard Dawkins, “A Threshold Model of Choice Behaviour”, 1969, accessed February 27, 2015, 
https://richarddawkins.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/The-attention-threshold-model.pdf. Before his 
pioneering work in evolutionary biology – and his more recent advocacy of fundamentalist atheism –
Dawkins undertook an extended series of experiments on chicks in order to determine response times 
and patterns to repeated stimuli, so as to understand the relationship between cause and effect within a 
specified context. 
356 Behaviorism has been criticised, notably by Noam Chomsky (1928-), on the grounds that it does not 
examine mental processes. Therefore, it has nothing to say about internal causality, emotion, selfhood 
and the employment of language. Here, such concerns are either peripheral or redundant. 
357 Richard Dawkins, “A Threshold Model of Choice Behaviour”, 1969, 131. 
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Though these insights illuminate the behaviours of chicks under test conditions, the 
conclusions drawn from Dawkins’s research might prove to be helpful in shedding 
light on the workings of what Harold Rosenberg termed, the act of painting: informed 
by what Merleau-Ponty referred to as, Cézanne’s doubt. An understanding of the 
constitution of an image: of what the painter chooses to paint, of why he chooses to 
paint it in respect of what he has already painted, and of the likelihood of him 
choosing, offers a chance to gauge the extent to which images generate images.358 The 
choice of mark (and its realisation) bears upon the distribution of paint. This is useful 
when considering forms of painting in which the paint takes the lead—where 
behaviours with regard to material usage have a say in the image’s formation.   
 
2.4.3: Working off 
Paint is the constant restriction in painting. Other things come and go, and yet the 
paint of painting stays. To work through it is to work off it, with choices as to how to 
modify (or when not to modify) made throughout the process of constructing a work. 
The fluidity of paint plays a central role in the determination of that which paint 
becomes. This has something to do with forming speed and with reaction speed—the 
time it takes for the paint to form shapes and for those shapes to be recognised as 
images. The more fluid the paint, the quicker the line or area extends to cover the 
ground, and in the process conceal or highlight areas of the surface, establishing new 
surfaces from which to begin again. Once recognised as an image, the choice of what 
to do next is modified in accordance with what is now the case. Image begets image. 
 
Within painting, the notion of a threshold appears problematic, in part a result of the 
difficulty in identifying the parameters of the painter’s environment (a consequence of 
the plurality of painting practices)—what would serve to constitute useful data and 
help to determine a limit to choice within respective practices? And, could such 
findings be applied to discover a general law? If so, to what end? Besides, what, one 
might ask, would the painter be required to exceed in order that a particular reaction 
might take place, and how is this to be quantified?359 Also, at what point (or points) in 																																																								
358 My own, for instance. 
359 To painters, the conditions of practice vary considerably, and considerations of difference must 
address the following: the setting in which the work takes place (en plein air or studio), the method of 
image generation (transcription from life; working-up from photographs or else finding the image in the 
paint), and the method of application employed (brush, stick, knife, etc.). 
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the construction of a work might a threshold be determinable? And finally, what of 
modes of painting where the material of paint appears not to take the lead?360  
 
2.5: Looking and Reading 
Art & Language, the most rigorous of the conceptual projects of the 1960s and 1970s, 
questioned the critical assumptions of recent arts practice and all that supported it—
value, reception, taste, methods of production, even criticism itself became the subject 
of extended critique.361 Drawing on linguistics, the singular presumption, in following  
Wittgenstein’s assertion that: “the limits of my language means the limits of my 
world”, was that that visual practices are reducible to language.362 As such, Art & 
Language refuted the notion that a work can be looked at and read at the same time.363 
The stakes of this antithesis can seen in Buchloh’s comment in respect of Sol LeWitt, 
that: “LeWitt’s work (in its dialogue with [Jasper] Johns’s legacy of paradox) insisted 
on forcing the inherent contradictions of […] two spheres (that of the perceptual 
experience and that of the linguistic experience) into the highest possible relief”.364 Art 
& Language helped to lay the foundation for what Bois would later redeploy as the 
morphological and the structural. However, an important question remains, namely: 
what happens when/if language breaks down—when pictures no longer picture?365 																																																								
360 Modes of painting rather unlike my own. 
361 Art & Language was an English conceptual art group that emerged in the late 1960s in Coventry. 
Members included: Terry Atkinson (1939-), Michael Baldwin (1945-), Mel Ramsden (1944-), David 
Bainbridge (1941-1913), Charles Harrison (1942-2009), and Harold Hurrell (1940-). The group set out 
to question the foundations and assumptions of recent practice, in particular the legacies of 
Greenbergian formalism, aesthetics more generally, and the role of the market. Operating mostly 
through text and diagrammatic information, through their eponymous journal, the group expanded into 
the 1970s, crossing the Atlantic. By the 1980s, painting was re-incorporated into the scope of the 
project, through not without irony. 
362 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 74. Even if sense data precedes language, its 
resonance (and its sense) requires language in order that it might become communicable to others. The 
argument is analogous to that levelled at the notion of beauty prior to Kant. Then, reason provided a 
brake and an order to sense data, and thereby permitted it a role as knowledge. From the late nineteenth 
century, philosophy – in the works of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) – 
lurched decisively away from metaphysics and fashionable German Idealism towards the study of 
language (Russell began as a young Hegelian, until a closer reading of his works revealed to him the 
fallaciousness of all Hegel had to say about mathematics), in what became known as the linguistic turn. 
At approximately the same time, Edmund Husserl published Logical Investigations, in two volumes, in 
1900 and 1901.   
363 Elena Crippen has noted that, to Charles Harrison, the artwork was a form of expansive location, 
which brought about its own theoretical frame. Costello contends that, to Kant, artworks denote 
expressions of aesthetic ideas, which encompass both content and the presentation of content 
(“Greenberg’s Kant and the Fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art Theory”, 12). He presents 
Greenberg’s reading of Kant as partial, in its prioritisation of form. 
364 Benjamin Buchloh, “Conceptual Art 1962-1969”, 113. 
365 The corollary being: what might looking and not reading be? 
	 113	
The negation of the idea of a vehicle on which language is carried provided legitimacy 
for the consideration of text-based works, and for the acceptance of notions of 
intermedia and interdisciplinarity practices – from the late 1960s onwards – whilst 
sidestepping questions of medium in respect of discrete practices and processes. This – 
along with a broader rejection of stuff – is made explicit in Douglas Huebler’s 
comment on the Conceptual enterprise that: “The world is full of objects, more or less 
interesting; I do not wish to add any more”.366 Terry Smith has argued that the 
widespread use of the term postconceptual within recent and contemporary practice 
serves to position conceptual art within a late modernist trajectory, re-legitimising its 
tenets through the notion of a continuum.367 Moreover, postconceptual becomes 
indicative, too, of a shift from immeasurable idea back to material measurability. 
 
Outside of the laws of quantum physics, idea is considered immaterial.368 It opposes 
the somatic, occupying the world as iteration without substance. Within the 
scaffolding of conceptual practice, painting becomes operable in/as language: and 
language establishes rather than reveals.369 And so, that which is not yet established 
cannot be revealed. The medium of paint, and the work which it forms, become simply 
that which can be seen to operate through/in/as language. However, when we are 
confronted by a linguistic formulation that we do not understand, a problem arises, and 
it would appear not to be a problem of interpretation.370 To illustrate this, let us take 
the example of comparable words drawn from two irrefutably disparate languages. 
 
I choose English and Mandarin for their lack of similarity (visual and spoken), and 
also for the fact of my understanding only one of them.371 Within groupings of 
																																																								
366 Frances Colpitt, Minimal Art: The Critical Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1990), 133. 
367 Terry Smith, “One and Three Ideas: Conceptualism Before, During, and After Conceptual Art,” e-
flux journal, vol. 29, 2011, accessed April 24, 2015, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/one-and-three-
ideas-conceptualism-before-during-and-after-conceptual-art/. 
368 Within philosophy, idea is perhaps most materially manifest in Leibniz’s notion of indivisible 
monads, in The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, 1714. 
369 According to structuralism and poststructuralism. 
370 In “Against Interpretation”, 1966, Susan Sontag argues that it is the practice of approaching works of 
art in order to interpret them that sustains the notion that there is such a thing as content. It is worth 
noting Sontag’s support of photographers such as Alfred Stieglitz, who thought that to be taken 
seriously photography must operate in accordance with its own particularities (and thus free itself from 
its connection to painting).  
371 Mandarin is a grouping of Chinese languages. Written characters can denote individual words or 
syllables within words. Mandarin utilises both pictographic and ideographic forms. Thus, sometimes 
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European languages, resemblances of sound or form would likely become apparent 
sooner rather than later, leading related words to related objects or concepts. We can 
safely assume that English is not, in this sense, visible in Mandarin, by which I mean 
that that which an English word refers to – its referent – is not accessible through the 
written mandarin equivalent, and vice versa. From now on, in order to avoid 
repetition, I will use only the example of an English reader approaching Mandarin, 
though the converse – a Mandarin reader approaching English – is implied also.  
 
2.5.1: Chair and 椅子: In and of Itself 
The English word for the object-image chair is chair, and the Mandarin equivalent is
椅子. If both languages are understood by the subject, then the signifiers chair and  
椅子 produce the signified chair (the image/concept of a chair). Within practice, 
linguistic equivalence – and the semiological loop – is most clearly seen in Joseph 
Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs (Fig. 3B).372 Through placing a definition of the word 
chair, a photograph of a chair, and the chair itself in close proximity, word and image 
were shown to be equivalent signifiers for the common signified—the chair itself.373 
What is particularly interesting, here, is the interchangeability within Kosuth’s closed 
system. All instances of chair stand as both signifier and signified within the work 
itself, none having to draw from an outside. However, there is clearly an outside – that 
which is not the work – which establishes the work as a work, and which, in turn, 
permits the setting up of the work’s microcosm of signification. Kosuth’s chairs attain 
equivalence collectively – as a unit – and only in comparison with what the unit is not.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																
elements within characters represent objects through visual likeness. More often than not, however, they 
point to abstract ideas or methods of pronunciation. 
372 Assembled in 1965, Kosuth (Joseph, 1945-) claimed this moment in conceptual practice as evidence 
that art makes meaning: in this instance, the meaning of equivalence, and with it a platform for the 
discussion as to the nature of meaning. To Kosuth, this piece served as an orderly demonstration of the 
successful conflation of work, context and idea, to become newly operable as concept. 
373 Here, chair itself serves to denote the object to which the concept corresponds. For the sake of the 
example, when I use chair without qualification, I mean simply the concept of chair as a mental 
construct, as opposed to the sign for chair (that which invokes the mental concept of a chair). 
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Fig. 3B 
 
Notwithstanding, let us return to the primary example. An English-only reader would, 
as it were, see through the signifying word chair to the signified behind it (to what it is 
that the word chair stands for). If behind is too loaded a term – carrying with it the 
implication of something hidden – then perhaps instead is better. Another way of 
putting this is to see as. The chair – as constituted in the mind – would come to replace 
the word as written. However, when the English reader approached the Mandarin word 
椅子, he would see not a chair but a series of shaped things, perhaps comprehendible 
(if a language user) as a symbol for something not yet knowable and, in following an 
inference of Wittgenstein’s, not yet sayable.374 Incidentally, the employment of a 
shape as a symbol amounts simply to the positing of one thing as another.375 
 
If it is a given that the English reader would have no access to the image or concept 
chair through the symbol 椅子, then it must follow that either he would formulate 
something else to stand in for chair (as associative signified), or else be confronted by 
椅子. Take the first possibility: as one confronted by椅子 without knowledge of 																																																								
374 The notion of the thing (and thinglyness) will be explored in Chapter 4, with regard to the ontology 
of painting and, in particular, to Heidegger’s conception of an origin. Here, things might be an 
inappropriate or unsatisfactory term, but I use it in this instance simply as a commonplace term to 
designate a non-designated entity, or, more accurately, an entity whose designation amounts to a generic 
and unspecified indistinction.  
375 Gombrich, in Art and Illusion: The Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 1960; Nelson Goodman 
(1906-1998), in Languages of Art, 1968; W. J. T. Mitchell, in Iconology, 1987; and Norman Bryson 
(1949-), in Vision and Painting, 1983, reach a consensus here, and I will consider their ideas in Part 3 
of this chapter. 
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Mandarin, I conjure something like a slashed 7, or a rectilinear form of the letter O, or 
aerials perhaps, or branches in winter, or even a Zodiac sign? I grasp for a resolution, 
by which I mean for something instead of that which I am confronted by—something 
resolvable in language. In assuming the question to be something like what can I see, I 
force a reading and drag forth an image or concept to replace椅子. Take the second: 
to be confronted by椅子 without reference (the conjured associative signified), would 
be to permit a hermeneutic hiatus within which to perhaps glimpse椅子 for what it is. 
 
If, having forced a reading, and asked myself what is it that I see, is it then possible to 
return to an unforced position of encounter with 椅子 (with that which could not be 
identified in place of that which displaced it)? This example proposes that when 
confronted by shapes that we assume to have linguistic content, but which we cannot 
read (accessible to our sensory apparatus…to what Laura Marks has termed haptic 
visuality), we proceed to search: to strive for meaning through formal association.376 
This striving for is a pursuit of that which lies beyond—we distort, edit and fill in the 
gaps (likening this to that). In short: we invent. When this proves difficult, or when we 
no longer believe in the veracity of our interpretations, we confront the notion of a 
some(thing) else, whose identity is non-communicable along linguistic channels. 
Whatever this something might be, its life is precarious and its opacity fugitive: for we 
grope our way gradually back towards the safety of language—the safety of the text.377 
 
2.6: Barthes: From Work to Text 
In “From Work to Text”, Roland Barthes built on “The Death of the Author”, in order 
to determine the mechanism by which, newly liberated, the reader might inscribe the 
																																																								
376 Here, formal association attests merely to a pre or post-linguistic presence. Laura Marks, The Skin of 
the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2000). 
377 To Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, the text served as a disruption to naturalised notions of authorship, 
history and the fixity of locations of meaning. Thus conceived, the text dissembles meaning, acting as a 
critique of unification and presence. Picking up Heidegger’s assertion that, “language speaks”, 1950, 
and, in following Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Derrida developed deconstruction as a formal 
demonstration of how it is that language acquires meaning. The result of a play of binary oppositions, 
language is, Derrida contends, never an unmediated expression of the non-linguistic. And so, meaning 
is never wholly present, in that it is always deferred (reliant on that which, within this oppositional 
framework, constructs and informs the particularity of its expression). Derrida’s target is logocentrism 
within Western thought (the belief that words express an unmediated reality or presence), which he 
expounds in Of Grammatology, 1967, Speech and Phenomena, 1967, and Writing and Difference, 1967. 
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work.378 He asserts that: “over the past several years, a change has been taking place in 
our ideas about language and about the (literary work)”.379 This is not a real break, but, 
rather, an epistemological shift. Barthes writes of: “the relativization of the scriptor’s, 
the reader’s and the observer’s […] relationships”.380 In so doing, he distinguishes 
between work and text.381 “The work is concrete, occupying a portion of a book space, 
[whilst the text is] a methodological field, [existing] only in discourse, [to be] 
experienced only as an activity, a production”.382 This form of production orients itself 
towards representation…towards image. In Section 3 of the essay, Barthes states that: 
“[a] work whose integrally symbolic nature one conceives, perceives, and receives is a 
text”.383 
 
Symbolism is common to both work and text, and Barthes’s analysis is thus intended 
to determine type.384 As Hal Foster points out in The Return of the Real, Barthes 
wanted Pop Art to, desymbolize the object.385 Thus, text is required to achieve a form 
of irreducible plurality, answering: “not to an interpretation, liberal though it may be, 
but to an explosion, a dissemination. Every text being itself the intertext of another 
text belongs to the intertextual”.386 Intertextuality denotes a type of relationship – of a 
something to a something – yet Barthes stops short of speculation as to the text’s 
constitution outside of its use as that from which one might derive great pleasure—
what Saunders termed the nuts and bolts of the signifier, namely: the medium.387 
 
 
 
 																																																								
378 1968 and 1971 respectively. 
379 Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text”, 1971, in Aesthetics, ed. Susan Feagin and Partick Maynard 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 270. Barthes attributes this change to developments in literary 
anthropology, Marxism and psychoanalysis. 
380 Ibid., 271. 
381 Barthes erects a scaffolding of seven tiers. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Ibid. 
384 In Symbolism, Monroe C. Beardsley (1915-1985) considers the three bases of symbolism: the natural 
or actual (sharing properties with), the conventional (based on shared decision), and the vital (how it is 
that the image has functioned in history). 
385 Hal Foster, The Return of the Real (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 128. 
386 Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text”, 272. 
387 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 175. Saunders retains the sense of 
material distinction—of a physical vehicle that carries language with it. Intertextual analyses, according 
to Gérard Genette (1930-) (Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, 1997), are those concerned with 
pastiche, allusion, plagiarism, translation and quotation. 
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2.7: The Ontology of the Text 
Let us consider the text and its entanglements. The following analogy might prove 
helpful.388 Imagine a form of super software: a multi-functioning, cutting edge 
package, inside of which all potential bugs have been ironed out and any propensity to 
malfunction eradicated completely. To become operable, this software requires an 
equally high performance piece of hardware—a powerful system that will allow the 
software to operate at full capacity and to fulfil its unarguable potential. Behind the 
notion of the text is a built-in assumption that, to continue the analogy, we (the 
reader/viewer/writer of the text) are the vehicle into/onto which such software is 
loaded (Barthes’s referred to this as jouissance or, “a pleasure without separation”).389  
 
This dualism is useful in permitting a visualisation of the functioning of the text and, 
moreover, in allowing for a distinction to be made between inscriber and inscribed.390 
The hardware is inscribed, the software inscribes.391 And yet, this in itself fails to 
dispense with a sense of that which lies between, either in the form of the thing of the 
inscriber or, indeed, the thing of the inscribed. This lying between software and 
hardware – inscriber and inscribed – is in fact central to understanding the problematic 
relationship between medium and language in painting. There are two points to 
consider: first, if, to function, the software requires the hardware – and if the being of 
the software (the inscription/text) evades ontological consideration – can we safely 
dispense with the being of the hardware (the inscriber) too? One would assume that 
textual inscription could not, as it were, reciprocate the favour, inscribe the inscriber 
and thus remove its being. Secondly, hardware and software are requiring of a third 
manifestation, namely: electricity, which works to fire the system. Is this a second act 
of inscription, or perhaps something else? What of its being, and of its meetings? 																																																								
388 Thomas S. Palin, “Something and Nothing: A Consideration of the Ontology of Painting” (MA diss., 
University of Manchester, 2006), 33-34. This analogy, in two paragraphs, is, for the most part, a re-
editing of an analogy that I originally devised for my Masters dissertation, yet which, in revised form, is 
central to this exposition also, and has been formative in my thinking about a key aspect of the project. 
389 Ibid., 74. 
390 Hubert Dreyfus (1929-2017), in “Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence”, 1965, and What Computers 
Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason, 1972, in following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, considers 
the whole artificial intelligence problem to be based on a false assumption, namely: that the brain and 
mind are mappable onto the dualistic framework of hardware and software. To Dreyfus, human beings 
are not rule-followers, but, instead, piece a (their) world together in fragmentary fashion, from the 
processes of coping, modifying, accepting, refuting—in short: from living…from being-in-the-world 
and, more importantly, from being-with-the-world. 
391 Epigraphic scrutiny pays attention to the inscription, the inscriber’s tools and the inscription bed, in 
order to shed light on the meanings of material and linguistic particularities, as well as context, purpose 
and age. 
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Part 3: Mimesis and Medium 
 
 
3.1: Being Like Something: Gombrich and Goodman 
Intertextuality relieves representation of its determinism whilst shifting the burden 
towards the interpreter/maker of meaning.392 The impulse to read is the impulse to 
relate reading to that to which reading attests, and, in attesting, to test its claim to 
verisimilitude. The question of mimesis (posited by Plato) forms part of an ontological 
question, with implications for hermeneutics.393 Post-photography (and post-
abstraction), it remains key to understanding assumptions that lie behind the capacity 
of one thing to hide or subvert the identity of another. To what extent a painting is like 
something else is of significance with regard to matters of construction. Within 
modernism, abstraction lessened the importance of mimesis. The point of revisiting it, 
here, is to show how mimetic frameworks operate in respect of painting’s medium.394  
 
3.1.1: Schemata 
To open this out is to confront what Ernst Gombrich termed the psychology of 
pictorial representation.395 In his concept of schemata, Gombrich posits an involved 
process of individual and, by extension, societal and epochal trial and error, whereby 
the artist seeks – through a manipulation of materials – to correct (and thus improve) 
his work in accordance with what amounts to a three-pronged positioning of 																																																								
392 See: Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author”, in Image, Music, Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath 
(New York: Hill, 1977). 
393 Prior to the late 18th century, meaning in the arts was, in effect, taken for granted. Literature and art 
tended to concern themselves with evaluation and principles (moral and aesthetic truisms). Good art 
was deemed to be transparent, and, therefore, to be requiring of interpretation meant to be unclear. The 
Romantic period, and the foregrounding of great and obscure literature, legitimised hermeneutics, and it 
subsequently developed as a discipline and method in its own right. The question of mimesis formed a 
central part of debates in the period after Abstract Expressionism, reinvigorated no doubt by 
Greenberg’s emphasis on opticality and flatness – on methods of resisting mimesis – and on his dislike 
of narrative. Authenticity became important. To Plato, there are two realities. First, there is the reality 
that we perceive through the five senses (the world of things). Secondly, there is the realm of forms, to 
which things correspond. This realm occupies the position of another dimension, accessible through 
reason (thinking), and is therefore approachable, yet lies outside of direct experience. And yet, intuition 
is reliant, in Plato’s analysis, on such outside absolutes, or else how might one comprehend the truth or 
falsehood of statements? How, for instance, could one distinguish between a lion and a lamb, if lionness 
and lambness did not first inform one’s understanding of what one intuits through one’s sensory 
apparatus, and in advance of the alternately ferocious or cuddly particularities of encounter?   
394 Refer to W. J. T. Mitchell’s comment, in an interview with Asbjørn Grønstad and Øyvind Vågnes, 
that: “images do not belong exclusively to any single discipline”, accessed March 29, 2016, http://www. 
visual-studies.com/interviews/mitchell.html. 
395 Psychology, in the non-oedipal sense of having the processes of mind acquire knowledge of things 
(images, nature, the World, art). Art and Illusion was first published in 1960. Moreover, Caroline Jones 
details Greenberg’s relationship to Gombrich, and, moreover, to the positivism to which both he and 
Gombrich remained indebted (Eyesight Alone, 108-119). 
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approximations.396 These approximations draw, in the first instance, from what it is 
that he expects to see (from prior experience); in the second, from what it is that he 
actually sees; and, in the third, from what he could possibly see (the result of societal 
conventions, known artistic advances and embedded cultural norms).397  
 
3.1.2: Agreeing Use 
In Languages of Art, and in opposition to Gombrich, Nelson Goodman points to the 
absurdity of an idea of representation built on resemblance. To him, likeness is 
determined in its entirety by systems of symbols, established in spite of an external 
world not in conjunction with it—all such systems are, therefore, systems of 
convention, including the system of perspective drawing, where truth is to be validated 
not by how accurate the drawing renders reality, but by how successful the particular 
framework is in terms of sanctioning meaning.398 And so, a one-point perspective 
drawing cannot be like the world, in part because the conditions could not be 
replicated whereby one could experience the drawing as the world.399 In Goodman’s 
analysis, then, a painted flower would represent only how a flower could be within a 
local system. Determination encompasses both ideas and material considerations.400  
 
To Gombrich, the particular seeing that resulted in, for example, Giotto’s Ognissanti 
Madonna (Fig. 3C) was no less acute than that which resulted in Michelangelo’s The 
Delphic Sybil (Fig. 3D).401 Merely, Giotto’s inherited schemata served to determine 
the nature and limit of the Madonna’s verisimilitude, as, two centuries later, did 
Michelangelo’s in respect of the Sybil. To Goodman, however, both of these paintings 
would operate on a symbolic level only, acquiring currency within their respective 
systems of epistemological exchange, and the schemata, then, would serve as a means 																																																								
396 Ernst, H. Gombrich, Art & Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (London: 
Phaidon Press), 1960.  
397 Perceptions born of a biological inclination, ability or propensity. For more on this, consider Paul 
Richter’s essay “On Professor Gombrich’s Model of Schema and Correction”, 1976.  
398 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Hacket, 
1968). 
399 Scientific tests have revealed that the eye becomes blind when forced by artificial means to stop 
moving. Incidentally, a two-point or three-point perspective drawing would be equally unlike the world. 
400 External criteria are framed by language, in the sense that language brings appearance to. Kant’s 
distinction between the noumenon and phemomenon is perhaps of interest also (providing a parallel, 
though of a contrasting nature), in so far as the subject’s sensory apparatus is seen to restrict access to 
what is, instead providing only likeness, resemblance or impression. 
401 Giotto’s is a later work, originally painted for the Ognissanti Franciscan Church in Florence. 
Michelangelo’s is from the Sistine Chapel ceiling, the Vatican, Rome. 
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to hide a fictitious perceptual join between the world and that which represents the 
world, supported by the notion of a medium in which the world is found. Impositions 
on one’s ability to see, whether culturally determined or the result of physical 
differences – formed one way or another – were not the point. Goodman concerns 
himself entirely with the construction of the world in/as art—not with how art reflects 
a world out there to varying degrees of mimetic accuracy or approached resemblance.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3C 
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Fig. 3D 
 
To Donald Judd, being like something was by definition not being the something in 
question. An essential problem posed by painting (and the reason for his 
dissatisfaction with it) lay, first, in it being a composite of discrete elements, and, 
secondly, in it drawing inescapably on the logic of picturing (seeing through).402 Even 
at its most reduced or abstracted, picturing allows for a painting to be, in part, 
elsewhere.403 Staff sees this as at the root of painting’s (late modernist) identity – a 
desire to retain and yet free itself from the past – which serves to position it as a, 
“conflicted medium”.404 Nevertheless, Judd’s objection to painting’s illusionism 
																																																								
402 Determined for the visual arts, since the Renaissance, by perspective drawing. Alberti’s window 
(developed by Leon Battista Alberti, 1404-1472) provided a method of understanding—of 
conceptualising the presentation of distance on a flat surface (finestra aperta—window to the outside). 
Using a grid of threads, Alberti’s method foregrounded the geometry of the world itself as something to 
be looked at, which brought with it a consideration of one’s relation to what was being seen. The 
window – whether implicit, as in the case of Bellini, or explicit, as in Caspar David Friedrich (1774-
1840) – permitted one the sense of being elsewhere (sometimes in several places simultaneously). 
Within modernist painting, Matisse returned to the window throughout his career, notably in The Open 
Window, 1905, The Window at Collioure, 1914, and The Open Window, 1918. 
403 Judd’s objection is rooted, also, according to John Yau (1950-), in a rejection of metaphor. The 
aftermath of the Holocaust and the atomic bomb necessitated a rethinking of the structures of meaning. 
Donald Judd on Ovation TV, accessed June 26, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0stpkzsND 
U. 
404 Craig Staff, After Modernist Painting, 51. 
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remains an endorsment of symbolism.405 In the hermetically sealed work of the 
Minimalist practitioner, reference had no place, unless, as in the case of Carl Andre’s 
Equivalent VIII (Fig. 3E) or Judd’s Untitled (Fig. 3F), as a form of self-reference, 
through the use of multiple units—as if in referencing itself through the repetition of a 
basic unit, the minimal object forced out the possibility of referencing something 
else.406 This, however, is illusory (in that it is wholly ideological), and returns the 
debate to the ruminations of Fried, and to presentness and the presence of a world 
outside.407 
 
 
 
Fig. 3E 
 																																																								
405 In that Minimalism is symbolic of the idea of a refutation of picturing. Hal Foster, in The Return of 
the Real, 1996, makes an interesting point that Pop Art represented an antithetical genealogy in respect 
of Minimalism, in that it committed to illusionism and forms of visual realism (with images attached to 
referents), culminating in the photorealism of the 1970s. 
406 Andre’s work consists of 120 firebricks (2 high x 6 x 10). Judd’s work consists of 10 rectilinear steel 
boxes of blue anodised aluminum, with acrylic sheeting, and equal space to form ratios. Reference, 
here, means only pointing towards. Thus, difficulties in distinguishing between reference and 
resemblance can be bypassed. It is feasible to state that an individual brick in Andre’s work resembles 
another brick in the same work, and yet, at the same time, deny that the first brick represents the second. 
Reference, on the other hand, sits closer to resemblance, with brick A able to point towards brick B, and 
thus to not stand in its place. Peter Osborne (Anywhere or Not at All, 82) presents Thierry de Duve’s 
notion of Judd’s absolute purification of painting – leaving only its object-character behind – as a form 
of positivism, to which those objecting must seek to locate a post-Duchampian negation. 
407 Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe has written of the difficulty (even the impossibility) of staring at a blank 
surface and not turning into depth, accessed December 19, 2017,	http://nonsite.org/article/a-marginal-
note-on-art-and-objecthood. 
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Fig. 3F 
 
3.2: Perceptualism and Signification: Bryson and Mitchell 
In the 1980s, Goodman’s critique of Gombrich was re-considered from a structuralist 
angle by W. J. T. Mitchell and Norman Bryson.408 If Gombrich was mistaken (as 
Bryson asserts in Vision and Painting), and painting is not a record of perception, then 
why is it that paintings – from ancient Egypt to Greece and Rome: from Giotto to 
Cézanne: from Picasso to Richter – present worlds of remarkable visual similarity? 
Perceptive difference seems circumscribed by possibility, or else a shared biological 
inclination to see as. Rothko stressed that his work contained no landscape.409 When 
confronted, however, by one of his brooding works, such as Rust and Blue (Fig. 3G), 
only the most fervent anti-perceptualist would disavow the sense of immersion within 
an unmediated place of air and space akin to that with which we are familiar.410 
 
																																																								
408 Bryson, in more recent years, has cast his net wider, exploring both phenomenological and analytical 
approaches. See: Visual Theory: Painting & Interpretation, 1990. 
409 Rothko conceived the shapes in his painting as animate and not representational—perhaps akin to 
archetypes. 
410 First exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, in 1961. Several times, Rothko described 
the layering of colour in his works from this time as creating an effect of inner light. 
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Fig. 3G 
 
Here, paint dissolves. In looking at, to look like, or to see as, is to engender a 
disappearance. Bryson acknowledges the danger of a closed system of reference 
within Saussure’s scheme, in which: “the sign is defined by formal means, as the 
product of oppositions among signs within”.411 In so doing, he asks how it is that signs 
interact with the world.412 Had Gombrich been correct, the sign would amount to 
duplication only, and would have little claim to being a sign at all (according to 
Umberto Echo, a sign is a form that refers to something it is not).413 Gombrich’s 
difficulty arose from an attempt to account for differences between representations—
why and how could perception differ from person to person and period to period?414 
Freed of the need to account for these differences, Bryson’s difficulty amounts to a 
search for that which connects the sign to the world. An attempt to free his analysis of 
works from the perceptualism of Gombrich, whilst loosening a rigid structuralist 																																																								
411 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983), iiv. 
412 Ibid., iiv-xiii. Saussure distinguishes between the signifier and the signified as dual components of 
the sign. His structuralist framework foregrounds the sign as constructed (operational within the 
specificity of a given context). The signified is thus formed through the signifier, which imparts 
knowledge of things only as meaning disseminated through the processes of signification. 
413 Umberto Echo, Einführung in die Semiotik (Introduction to Semiotics) (Munich, Wilhelm Fink 
Verlag, 1972), 30.  
414 Gombrich has been criticised, too, for not addressing the various workings of abstract (non-
representation) art. From c. 1935 (with the drafting of “The Origin of the work of Art”), epochal shifts 
in the nature of being became Heidegger’s concern. 
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approach unable to escape its own system, leads to a discussion of: “signifying forces 
outside of the painting itself”.415 In a painting, these forces become visible—for 
visibility itself promotes the notion of signifying forces. In what serves as an 
endorsement of Bryson’s phenomenological approach, Alan Paskow believes that:  
 
 
Many of the aestheticians who have written about symbolism, such as Monroe 
Beardsley, Richard Wollheim, Nelson Goodman, Erich Fromm, and Erwin 
Panofsky, have made the same basic mistake; that is, they have failed to 
understand the relationship between symbols and their worldly referents.416 
 
 
3.2.1: There and Not There 
Mitchell contends that the notion of an image depends on consciousness of the artifice 
of images, suggesting that humans have the ability to see something as both there and 
not there.417 
 
 
When a duck responds to a decoy, or when birds peck at grapes in the legendary 
paintings of Zeuxis, they are not seeing images: they are seeing other ducks, or 
real grapes—the things themselves, and not images of the things.418 
 
 
Mitchell considers this in relation to a common and, to him, misleading distinction 
between real and mental images, which, in effect, partitions picture from medium. 
Nevertheless, the notion of an ability to say there and not there at the same time has an 
implication in respect of Greenberg’s notion of flatness, and in regard of Krauss’s 
rejection of pointing, and of Fried’s circumscription of the conditions of encounter. In 
all three cases, what is there attests to that which is not there, and vice versa. In 
Greenberg’s case, a mark on a surface acts to break the picture plane, thus awarding 
itself a dual identity as in and out. This arises from a familiarity with the conventions 
of perspective drawing.419 To see as image one must not see that which permits one to 																																																								
415 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze, 1983. 
416Alan Paskow, The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 162. This bears comparison with Bois’s suspicion of the dialectic’s suitability 
as a tool to tie painting to the world (see: Chapter 2: 4.1).  
417 It is useful to reflect on Mitchell’s example in connection with Art & Language’s contention that a 
work cannot be looked at and read at the same time. 
418 W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 17. 
419 The human animal has the capacity to assemble likeness. For instance, the ancient Greeks assembled 
a host of characters with accessories from the alignment of the stars. 
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see as. This paradox, when applied, for instance, to Pollock’s Number 1: Lavender 
Mist (Fig. 3H), would play out in sequential stages, as follows (Table 11): 
 
 
 
Fig. 3H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Image 
 
To see Pollock’s drips as drips 
 
 
To see Pollock’s drips as other than drips 
 
 
Image 
 
 
To see Pollock’s painting as drips and anything other than drips, 
and to hide the latter beneath the former 
 
Table 11: Not Image and Image 
 
2.3.2: Thought Experiment: More than Material—Leonardo’s Stains (Appendix 3) 
When Leonardo da Vinci saw a battle scene in the stains on his studio wall, were those 
stains material or medium? 420 The answer rests on whether one takes the stains to be a 
work: if a non-work, they remain stains. As a work, they operate through the stainness 																																																								
420 Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) advised young artists to use dirt and stain-covered walls to find 
inspiration (to overcome painter’s block). In the twentieth century, the Surrealists developed automatic 
processes, such as grattage, frottage, decalcomania and exquisite corpse, to release the artist from 
deterministic modes of creativity and to, in following Freud, open the processes of making to the 
unconscious. 
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of the stains. Thus conceived – what Saunders would deem to be a new possibility for 
material – stains become medium, having enabled the work (now rooted to the 
particularity of its confluence with the wall).421 A work doesn't relinquish stains, but 
remains of stains, and thus of material. Moreover, the medium appears as an effect of 
the social world, and not a literal thing, in so far as it is dependent on symbol, image 
and sign—on escapes from material.422 Medium is not, then, dependent on a sense of 
intention having taken place (the spectator does not need to intuit prior intention): a 
pareidolia will suffice—faces in in the wallpaper or, for that matter, a face on Mars 
(Fig. 3I), the result of shaded rock formations photographed from the correct height.423  
 
 
 
Fig. 3I 
 
Seeing as brings with it a question of primary intention. To be art, there must be a 
sensed prior intention (whether there is intention or not, the spectator must act as if 
there is). Can medium be present, but not art? Yes, in this very face on Mars, where 
rocks become medium through the formulation of an image in spite of a lack of 
presumed prior intention (assuming that there is facial recognition along with a 
scepticism over the likelihood of alien design). Thus, it seems that one could misread 																																																								
421 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 175. 
422 On what Greenberg and Fried would call picture. To have language is, to Wittgenstein, to be a social 
being. 
423 Pareidolia is a psychological phenomenon whereby one perceives a pattern to exist where there isn’t 
an intentional pattern. Faces in the wallpaper would serve as the most commonplace example, or seeing 
the house as a face, with the first floor windows becoming the eyes, and the door a nose. Correct, here, 
means permitting the said illusion operability. 
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Picasso’s Guernica (Fig. 3J), yet still impute intention and, therefore, deem it to be 
art. In the very act of considering an object to be other than material, paint becomes 
medium.424 To sum up: an image seen presupposes medium, and art presupposes 
intention, or else image would have only spatial effect—a Newman monochrome 
deploys the medium of paint, and a Rauschenberg blank canvas only material.425 
 
 
 
Fig. 3J 
 
3.3: Krauss: A Note on Resemblance and Proximity 
As part of her exposition, in “Michel, Bataille et Moi”, Krauss, in arguing for a 
Bataillean reading of Miro’s early work (and modernism more generally), considers 
the functioning of different categories of sign.426 Drawing from her work on the index, 
																																																								
424 Consider Saunders’s distinction between medium and material (Chapter 2: 4.2.3). 
425 Michael Belshaw, email, 2017. Of relevance here, too, is whether discussions of medium (and form) 
can exists outside of discussions of art. Kosuth, writing under the pseudonym Arthur R. Rose, wrote 
that: “Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of 
painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture), he is 
accepting the tradition that goes with it. That is because the word art is general and the word painting is 
specific. Painting is a kind of art. If you make paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the 
nature of art. “Four Interviews”, Arts Magazine (February, 1969), in Kristine Stiles, ed., Theories and 
Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artist’s Writings (Berkeley, Los Angeles, New 
York: University of California Press, 2012), 978. 
426 In Formless: A User’s Guide, 1996 (to accompany an exhibition at the Centre Pompidou, Paris), 
Bois and Krauss consider the Bataillean concept of formlessness, 1929, applying it to visual practices of 
relatively recent times: including works by Jackson Pollock, Andy Warhol, Cindy Sherman and Robert 
Smithson (1938-1973). The authors contend that the formless (l’informe) has been subsumed beneath 
the Western privileging of skill (including forming and designing). In keeping with the ideas of George 
Bataille (1897-1962), the formless becomes a method (to be maintained) rather than a site or internal 
relationship. Thus, the incorporation or retention of dirt, pollution and detritus – as well as of varying 
forms of destructive modes of practice – are resurrected as productive strategies in the realisation of 
formless works. 
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she claims that photography evidences a type of sign that is the result of a physical 
cause.427 She continues: 
 
 
Unlike the icon, a sign that relates to its referent through the axis of 
resemblance, or the symbol, where the relationship between sign and referent is 
arbitrary and conventional, the index has an existential connection to its 
meaning, with the result that it can only take place on the spot.428 
 
 
The photochemical processes that result in the casting of a form of shadow (registering 
a trace of the object photographed), position the photograph as index.429 Of particular 
interest is the notion of resemblance, which seemingly requires, in Krauss’s analysis, 
and unlike either symbol or index, a degree of approximation—to be like something is 
clearly not to be the something in question.430 All three designations share the property 
of unlikeness in this sense, and subsequently resemble differentially. Furthermore, is 
the proximal relationship of the index to the something that takes place on the spot an 
absolute distinction, and, if so, to what end? Whilst Krauss’s intention is clearly to 
establish an indexical primacy, nearness is not quite near enough to ensure one a 
familiarity with the displaced site to which all manner of sign systems (not)point. 
  
																																																								
427 Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 169. In this work, Krauss draws heavily from the work of 
Peirce, who, in the 1860s, distinguished between the iconic, symbolic and indexical aspects of the sign. 
The iconic refers to resemblance, the symbolic denotes an object by virtue of agreement, and the 
indexical invokes actual (physical) connection. 
428 Ibid. 
429 Ibid. 
430 In respect of Gombrich, Goodman and Mitchell’s formulations, and of earlier considerations too. 
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Chapter 4: Origins and Ends: Understanding Medium According to Heidegger’s 
Truth  
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
To formalists, the artwork owes its meaning to nothing save the validity of its discrete 
formal properties.431 The dominant conceptual frameworks – from Duchamp, via Art 
& Language to the looser neo-conceptualism of today – position the work of art as 
idea (bringing with it the problem of a possible sliding scale).432 The social history of 
art locates the work as a historical cipher—a message without a messenger. Though 
aesthetics has muddied the waters, the problematics of medium arise from doubts as to 
what it is that is present when a work of art is encountered, and also from an 
uncertainty as to the mechanism permitting one to read, interpret and know things.433 
To re-consider the operability of the medium is to work within a family of thought.434  
Here, it is also to seek to locate the whereabouts of the varying absents (and of the 
part-absents too) identified in Chapter 3, which include: painting’s time, its picture, 
and its material.435 If it is a mistake, then, to address a work as wholly physical – or 
else the product of incorporeal ideation – how might one hope to arrive at a sense of 
medium that locks-in the primary concerns of aforementioned models, and where 
might it be appropriate to draw a line between the language and thing of painting? 
 
This chapter will consider the idea of truth (aletheia) – and of an origin of the work of 
art – developed by Martin Heidegger in his essay of 1936, and ponder its implications 
in respect of notions of material, language (picture) and medium.436 Behind discourses 																																																								
431 With Greenberg, form became inextricably linked to medium. I exclude Riegl from this, as his 
concept of Kunstwollen brings in a notion of external force – collective will – and is thus, in part, 
societal: and also Fried, who envisaged “Art and Objecthood” as a radical re-framing of the formalist 
debate (through the incorporation of desirable – aesthetic-inducing – conditions of encounter). Fry’s 
classic quality, Bell’s significant form and Greenberg’s flatness and medium specificity all serve as 
attempts to denote properties or conditions internal to art objects, which free up an outside in which the 
art object can become non-art. 
432 If conceptualism is an orientation of thinking – as opposed to a methodology – then it follows that 
one might draw from this a given orientation. To be oriented towards is to be oriented away from…yet 
from what? Also, can form become idea, and vice versa, and, if so, how so and at what point? 
433 Matters of beauty became conflated with those of medium in the writings of Clement Greenberg, as 
Costello has pointed out (Chapter 2). Heidegger doesn’t deal with taste per se, though, in one passage 
of “The Origin of the Work of Art”, he presumes his notion of truth in art to be conditional on the art’s 
greatness. The mechanisms permitting greatness seem to derive from the operability of the object to 
hand. Thus, only when truth is disclosed through art does the art become great, and only when great 
does art offer the possibility of a disclosure of truth. 
434 Hal Foster notes, in The Return of the Real, 1996, 219, how Heidegger viewed distance and 
closeness as folded into uniformity, so that everything is neither near nor far. 
435 An outside, or that which is not the painting. 
436 In Greek, aletheia approximates to unconcealedness or disclosure, and was revived by Heidegger. 
“The Origin of the Work of Art” was worked on between 1935 and 1937, and reworked for publication 
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that concern themselves with medium sit other questions, of an ontological nature; and 
Heidegger has done most to shift an understanding of the world away from the static 
and deterministic, and towards the fluid and experiential. Although, as Peter Osborne 
has pointed out, Heidegger’s project pertains not to art [let alone to painting], but to 
Dasein, art nevertheless falls within the purview of Heidegger’s analysis of the 
projective structure of human existence.437 Moreover, the phenomenological tone of 
much recent criticism – including that of Joselit and Graw – would suggest, perhaps, 
that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (and, through them, Husserl) have become central 
to writings about contemporary art, and, as such, that they have replaced Hegel and 
Marx as the philosophers best suited to illuminate the condition of painting, at a time 
when there is a discernable keenness to couch progress in more localised terms.438  
 
To open this out will be to examine the principal themes of the artwork essay. In 
particular, this will involve a clarification of Heidegger’s classification of being, so as 
to enable the ontological character and function of a medium to attain visibility (and 
knowabilty). I will position the central paradoxes of Heidegger’s exposition, and 
address his re-situation of the prerequisite of truth as a challenge to the primacy of 
aesthetics, reflecting on his attempts to provide solutions to metaphysical intricacies 
with regard to the artwork’s constitution. I will re-consider the comportment of Van 
Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes and the Greek temple, seeking to extend the scope of 
Heidegger’s concepts of concealment and disclosure and world and earth respectively. 
 
Part 3 will comprise of a re-consideration of the basis of aesthetics as a mode of 
modern thinking.439 I will foreground Heidegger’s employment of picture – from “The 																																																																																																																																																																
in 1950, and again in 1960. Initially based on lectures delivered in the early-mid 1930s in Frankfurt and 
Zurich. 
437 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 170. In Being and Time, the word art is never used. In Being 
and Time, 1927, the concept of Dasein (existence, sometimes translated as being there or being the 
there/situation) permitted Heidegger to avoid falling back on prior philosophical assumptions: as to the 
existence of objects and subjects, or bodies and minds. To Heidegger, Dasein operates against a 
background (the world), in which encountering takes place, and into which it is thrown. This 
thrownness (Geworfenheit) serves to connect Dasein with the present and the past, whilst pushing into 
the future. 
438 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 8. Fried, Krauss and Bois have all deployed Heidegger’s 
ideas in erecting their own frameworks. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit was published in 1807, 
becoming hugely influential for the remainder of the nineteenth century. It laid the groundwork for the 
young Karl Marx (1818-1883), whose Communist Manifesto, 1848, with Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), 
put forward a conception of dialectical materialism, which, in effect, replaced Hegel’s Geist with a 
concrete notion of material evolution based on a series of social relations. 
439 In the sense of post-ancient and, also, of post-Enlightenment formulations. 
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Age of World Picture” – as key to understanding the relationship between science 
(rational, object-oriented thought) and representation (image) within the modern 
epoch, which has assisted in hiding the materiality of the work beneath the non-
material idea of idea.440 I will reflect on the practice of Paul Klee – perhaps unique 
among the moderns – as offering something approaching a painterly visualisation of 
Heidegger’s thinking. With Hegel’s end of art thesis providing the backdrop to this 
inquiry (in the dual sense of it having to contend with both the death of painting and 
the death of the medium of painting), I will engage with Heidegger’s reading of 
Hölderlin’s river poems, and reflect on Eva Geulen’s analysis of Heidegger’s 
Hölderlin Lectures. I will address the idea of a preservational modality prior to 
providing an account of the necessity of poetising the end of art as a means of 
circumnavigation, with implications for the beginning too. The point is to permit the 
medium specificity of painting to attain centrality in respect of the work’s meaning. 
 
I will consider Hölderlin’s reliance on rumour and double-directedness, approached 
through his poem The Ister, which signals in the direction of a new ontological model 
for painting.441 The medium will be presented as equipment: with the stages of its 
operability revealed sequentially. I will foreground the mechanism of the caesura as, 
in essence, a dual-purpose holding bay in which picture and material find themselves 
suspended. The result: that the medium-aspect of a painting might, within a 
Heideggerian and Hölderlinean framework, become resurrected and re-situated—its 
functionality made visible through its embeddedness in both language and history.  
 
If Heidegger’s understanding of being is correct – in respect of what can be said about 
painting and the function of a medium – then it must be something we can see: that is 
commensurate with one’s experience of works. We might think this amounts to an 
aesthetic approach to painting, but, as we will see, Heidegger’s argument presents 
painting as a form of truth (Heidegger takes Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes as an 																																																								
440 Consider in relation to Panofsky’s Idea: A Concept in Art Theory, 1924, in which the idea of art as 
evidencing idea per se is considered within a broad art historical trajectory, from the ancients to the 
moderns. Here, Panofsky points to the illusion of oppositions, such as idealism and naturalism, and 
subject and object, and to the futility of any pursuit of discrete meaning (of objects, for example), in 
light of Kant’s disavowal of the idea of the possibility of access to the thing-in-itself. Panofsky positions 
himself as a chronicler and cataloguer of, in effect, that which has shown up to be chronicled and 
catalogued. Thus, to Panofsky, the panoply of ideas thrown up by culture is to be taken as indicative of 
simply that. No external truth is locatable or, in fact, necessary to his central thesis.        
441 The ancient Greek name for the Danube. 
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exemplary instance of the truth of painting). I will address his claims as they bear on 
the concept of medium, as discussed previously. In order to stay afloat and steer a way 
through Heideggerese we must be circumspect about some key terms, whilst at the 
same time granting Heidegger a necessary inventiveness in the pitch of his thought.442 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
442 Heideggerese denotes the abundance of new and complex terminology developed by Heidegger to 
present his ideas. His desire to centre being (not objects) resulted in the compounding of space and time. 
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Part 2: The Origin of the Work of Art 
 
 
In the artwork, the truth of beings has set itself to work. Art is the setting-itself-
to-work of truth.443 
 
 
2.1: A Hermeneutic Circle 
In “The Origin of the Work of Art” – Heidegger deploys the notion of a hermeneutic 
circle (Table 12), the interdependence of whose parts rests on a paradox.444 To 
illustrate: consider that the Vienna School, pragmatic though its inclinations were, had 
assumed knowledge of (past and object).445 How, Heidegger contends, can one know 
of relations among things without knowing the identities of the entities that relate? 
Conversely, how can one know of the identity of related entities in isolation from their 
relations to one another? For Heidegger: “[n]ot only is the main step from work to art, 
like the step from art to work, a circle, but every individual step that we attempt circles 
within this circle”.446 How, then, is a work of art to become knowable as a work at all?  
 
																																																								
443 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 1936, in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. 
Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1950), 19. 
444 This essay is a redirection of his thinking towards the ontological condition of the work of art. 
Furthermore, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, as one of the founders of modern hermeneutics, 
first employed the notion of a hermeneutic circle. Dilthey also used the circle in his work. Later, Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and Paul de Man (1919-1993) extended Heidegger’s application. 
Heidegger’s model involves drawing the idea of the artist, the artwork, and the concept of art towards 
one another in the course of demonstrating the peculiar interdependence of their relationship. For more 
on hermeneutic circles (and their possible instability), see: David Gamez, Positive Scepticism and the 
Collapsing Hermeneutic Circle (Colchester: University of Essex, 2002). 
445 Form, work, period, etc. The Vienna School – from the the creation of the first teaching position in 
Art History, in 1847, to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 – laid the foundations 
for art historical enquiry that would underpin the discipline thereafter. A series of brilliant scholars, 
including: Rudolf Eitelberger (1817-1885), Moritz Thausing (1838-1884), Max Dvořák (1874-1921), 
Julius von Schlosser (1866-1938), Josef Strzygowski (1862-1941), and Alois Riegl were responsible for 
the pragmatic, the idealist, the structuralist, the ideological, and the formalist schools of thought. 
Though each professor brought with him an approach specific to his favoured method, all nevertheless 
shared a belief in the empirically grounded as a bulwark against unharnessed subjectivity. Many who 
taught at the School worked with prominent museum collections as curators or advisors, and developed 
ideas in direct response to a localised connection to the objects within their purview. 
446 Ibid., 2. 
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Table 12: The Hermeneutic Circle 
 
2.2: Classification and Thinglyness 
The succession of isms prior to the emergence of the artwork essay – and the futuristic 
tone of modernism more generally – provided the conditions that legitimised a re-
examination of the work of art.447 To distinguish the work involved a classification of 
states of being.448 Heidegger begins with an indistinction born of ubiquity: what he 
terms the thingly character of works, for: “works are as naturally present as things. 
The picture hangs on the wall like a hunting weapon or a hat”.449 There is a reflection 
here of Saunders’s assertion that: [i]f we dig deeply enough into any endeavour – into 
any medium – there is often a gooey world lurking”.450 Thinglyness is, therefore, 
omnipresent—it is little more than a property that things have. Heidegger writes: 
 
 
Yet even this much-vaunted aesthetic experience cannot evade the thinglyness 
of the artwork. The stony is in the work of architecture, the wooden in the 
woodcarving, the coloured in the painting, the vocal in the linguistic work, the 
sounding the work of music. The thingly is so salient in the artwork that we 
ought rather to say the opposite: the architectural work is in the stone, the 
woodcarving in the wood, the painting in the colour, the linguistic work in the 
sound, the work of music in the note.451 																																																								
447 Including: Impressionism (1860s/1890s), Neo-Impressionism (1870s/1880s), Post-Impressionism 
(1880s/1900s), Fauvism (1900s), Cubism (1900s/1910s), Futurism (1910s), Expressionism (1920s), and 
Surrealism (1920s/1930s). Also, for the most part, “The Origin of the Work of Art” attests to a tightly 
knotted rumination on the nature of the work of art and, in particular, on its source and possible 
composition in respect of the world in which it finds itself. 
448 Though reliant on order and structure, this is not formalism: nor is it a social reading, for it lacks 
both an appeal to the aesthetic and a direct invocation of the political or the individual. If iconographic 
concerns become manifest, they do so as a means of designation: as second order effects of an already 
determined ontological cause.  
449 Ibid., 2-3. To Heidegger, this thingly character is what a painting shares with a book of poems, a 
sculpture, a building or a piece of sheet music. 
450 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 172. 
451 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 3. 
Artwork 
Art 
Artist 
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Thinglyness, then, provides an experiential stage from which to begin contemplating 
beginning.452 It could be likened to what Graw calls painting’s, “residual 
specificity”.453 To move beyond this point is to consider the attachment of language in 
the process of becoming a work, for: “[a]llegory and symbol provide the conceptual 
framework from within whose perspective the artwork has long been characterised”.454 
Though the artist does not determine this thingly element, he permits it greater 
visibility through the particularity of its framing.455 This is akin to Michelangelo 
bringing forth the thinglyness of marble through his chiselling of the statue of David 
(Fig. 4A), rather than the marble allowing for the thingly aspect of the David.456  
 
 
 
Fig. 4A 																																																								
452 To consider the nature of this thingly character/substructure is, in the first instance, to present a 
common platform from which the artistic nature of the work might come to be understood, or its origin 
gleaned. 
453 Isabelle Graw, “The Value of Liveliness”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 89. 
454 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 3. Throughness is perhaps a more accurate term. 
However, attachment provides a clearer visual model of difference. 
455 Framing becomes central to Jacques Derrida, in The Truth in Painting, 1987, in respect of his 
consideration of the relationship between the parergon (that which is supplementary to the work) and 
the ergon (the work). In seeking to critique Kant’s framing of truth as inside, in relation to an outside, 
Derrida points to the binary relationship that exists between the frame and the work. Thus, framing (in 
all its guises—from the physically immediate to the socio-political) becomes limitless and rhizomatic. 
Therefore, the work’s meaning (and the frame’s) is maintained in an infinite series of shifting dialogues. 
For a good summary of Derrida’s analysis – in The Truth in Painting – of the ground contested by 
Heidegger and Schapiro with regard to the status of the shoes, see: The Methodologies of Art: An 
Introduction, by Laurie Schneider Adams, 1996.   
456 Consider in light of an assertion by Michelangelo (di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni, 1475-1564), that 
every block of marble has a statue inside it. As such, it was his job simply to reveal it. 
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2.2.1: Mere, Equipmental and Work 
 
How is the art thing to be defined? To Heidegger, things can be divided into mere 
things – elemental (non-manipulated) – and manipulated things—things to which 
Heidegger assigns the label equipment. Art things straddle two camps, being 
manipulated – and therefore equipmental – yet constructed of mere materials. Things 
can also be self-contained (complete within themselves) or otherwise (requiring of 
completion). To use his example: whilst a pair of shoes has been fashioned, and is thus 
equipmental (their being resides in their usefulness), they share with the mere thing, 
once complete, the property of self-containment. This is complicated further by a 
presumption of self-sufficiency on the part of the art thing and the mere thing, but not 
the equipmental thing, whose being requires a form of use. To clarify a subtle 
distinction: self-containment is to have maintained or else arrived at completeness, 
whereas self-sufficiency is the quality of being without the requirement of use.457 
 
If both art thing and mere thing share the property of self-sufficiency, and both 
equipmental thing and art thing are shaped by human hands, one must conclude the 
following: that the equipmental thing is both self-contained and mere (though not self-
sufficient): that the mere thing is, in being mere, self-contained (and in its mereness, 
self-sufficient): and that the art thing is mere (derived of base materials), self-
contained (complete within itself), equipmental (manipulated and useful) and self-
sufficient (not requiring of use) (Table 13).458  
 
Mere Thing Equipmental Thing Work 
Self-contained Mere Mere 
Self-sufficient Self-contained Self-contained 
  Equipmental 
  Self-sufficient 
 
Table 13: Heidegger’s Ontological Classification of Things 
 
 
 																																																								
457 Thomas S. Palin, “Something and Nothing: A Consideration of the Ontology of Painting”, 26. 
458 Ibid.	
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Heidegger writes: 
 
 
So the piece of equipment is half thing since it is characterised by thinglyness. 
Yet it is more, since, at the same time, it is half artwork. On the other hand, it is 
less, since it lacks the self-sufficiency of the artwork. Equipment occupies a 
curious position intermediate between thing and work—if we may be permitted 
such a calculated ordering.459 
 
 
To Heidegger: “the thing is not merely a collection of characteristics, and neither is it 
the aggregate of those properties through which the collection arises”.460 This serves 
as a challenge to Greenberg’s optical primacy, and to the assumed integrity of the art 
object in respect of its component parts—parts that alone and together constitute what 
Fried termed shape.461 However, it sits more comfortably with Krauss’s notion of the 
work as apparatus, and with Bois’s backing of process as technical model. In both of 
these cases there is a degree of ambivalence as to whether the work’s function is a 
result of its constitution, or else that its constitution is a result of its function.462 
 
2.3: The Presumption of Presence 
Heidegger places presence within a tradition that emerged out of the ancient Greek 
conception of the, “being of beings”.463 An orientation towards core is responsible, so 
Heidegger contends, for the search for essence in the form of substance.464 Bois’s 
assertion as to modernism’s search for, “pure parousia” would serve as an example.465 																																																								
459 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 10. 
460 Ibid., 5. 
461 Consider Fried’s notion of presentness as that which is mobilised by shape (Chapter 2: 3.3.2). 
Consider, also, Greenberg’s invocation of Kant. Fried, in his later work, engages with Heidegger, 
arguing that the photograph deals primarily with the present-at-hand (usually taken to be the subject 
aspect of the photograph), unable as it is to deal with one’s practical absorption in the world (the ready-
to-hand): the result of the laboured object of painting. Jeff Wall (1946-), however, through methods of 
staging and re-enactment is, in Fried’s analysis, able to have photography aspire to the condition of 
painting (Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, 2008). 
462 Which would appear to be in keeping with the logic of the hermeneutic circle. 
463 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 6. A conjecture that there exists a base around 
which properties accumulate, with the result that things emerge as discrete units with apparent truths of 
their own. 
464 Core is that which sits at the heart of things. This supplied an underpinning for the subject-object 
dualism of René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes is most commonly considered to be the father of 
modern Western philosophy, for his Meditations, 1641. Dualism refers to the notion of physical and 
mental extension—in short: that the body is material and the mind (and/or soul) is immaterial, and thus 
the mind is seen to operate by different laws to the body. Conversation between these spheres is 
supposed to take place through the pineal gland. Although this has been thoroughly refuted by later 
testing, the mind-body problem has occupied a large part of philosophical thinking since Descartes. 
465 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model, 230. 
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Thus, things exist, and in their relational mode of being their origins can be inferred—
works with things: neither the cause of a cause, nor the effect of one, the work is 
shackled to and, at the same time, free of other things.466 So where does being reside? 
To Heidegger, asking where serves only to deny the threefold structure of the time, 
established in Being and Time, and reinstates presence as location.467 Heidegger 
frames the question thus: How it is? This how is interminably temporal. It is the 
temporal, non-objectual nature of being that permits a conflation of thing and event—
they are as one. A thing’s thinglyness is forever a situated thinglyness.468 George 
Steiner, in addressing the foundational nature of Heidegger’s thought, writes that: “[t]o 
inquire into Being is not to ask: What is this or that? It is to ask: What is is […]?”469  
 
2.4: The Comportment of the Work: Van Gogh’s Shoes 
Comportment is specific to the thing in question.470 The art thing comports itself 
differently to the non-art thing. In respect of A Pair of Shoes (Fig. 4B), how is it that 
the painting of the shoes functions differently to the shoes themselves? One must 
consider what the shoes themselves do, and to whom? To the peasant who wears them, 
the being of the shoes – their usefulness as equipment – is known through wearing. 
The peasant knows this, “without observation or reflection”.471 The equipmental 
character of the shoes becomes known in actu. They are reliable: they wear and decay. 
In the process, they reveal their mode of being.472 This activity of shoes serves not Van 
Gogh, in his painterly labours – as Hugh Silverman points out – but the peasant-
wearer.473 Heidegger recounts the gruelling slog of this life in evocative detail.474 																																																								
466 Consequently, Heidegger’s vocation is one of redirecting the search for essence (as substance) 
towards the search for being (as formed existence). Attempts to locate the meaning of the art thing are 
thus misguided – such as: Fry’s principles of design, Greenberg’s picture plane, Rosenberg’s subject, or 
Fried’s conditions of encounter. 
467 Already-in, amidst-things and pressing-towards. 
468 In situ, as art thing, the thing comports itself as itself and in so doing bears witness to itself. 
469 George Steiner, Heidegger (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1978), 153. Consider the difference between 
Fried’s notion of time and Krauss’s (Chapter 2: 3.4.1). 
470 To how it is that being shows itself in the particularity of its being (as occurrence). 
471 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 14. 
472 Being is not necessarily seeing, though seeing is of being. In short: for the peasant, they are, for the 
most part, invisible. 
473 Hugh J. Silverman, Textualities: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1994), 136.	
474 A world he knew very well, from his early years in Messkirch (Baden), and also from his later times 
in Todtnauberg. Silverman (Textualities, 137), in revisiting the Heidegger-Schapiro-Derrida debate, is 
nevertheless skeptical of Van Gogh’s knowledge of peasants, at a time when the painter was living in 
Paris. He had, however, by this time, experienced the extreme poverty of miners on the Borinage, in 
Belgium. Therefore, he certainly knew of the realities of toil.  
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Fig. 4B 
 
The life of the shoes – the antithesis of what Graw calls liveliness – attains visibility in 
the painting of the shoes. Heidegger knows this not from living with peasants, or from 
re-staging the wearing of the shoes, or else from scrutinising their decay.475 The 
scientific method is, to Heidegger, a taking oneself away – adopting a position of 
objectivity – which obscures being.476 To know is to have what is knowable become 
knowable in spite of the deliberation of one’s address. What is known, here, is known 
through the work, and could not be known – as it is known – otherwise.477 The being 
of the shoes – their equipmentality – has become visible.478 To Heidegger: “[t]his 
painting spoke. In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we 
usually tend to be, […so the] artwork let us know what the shoes, in truth are”.479  																																																								
475 The painter’s life veiled beneath the life of the subject of the painting. 
476 It would be correct to assert that Heidegger shows a degree of ambivalence to science (as it came to 
be understood within the modern period), which becomes modified and more nuanced in The Question 
Concerning Technology, 1954. Here, Heidegger writes of Man’s role in revealing what it is that science 
and technology become, as, in effect, forms of activity. Earlier, in his infamous rectoral address 
(Freiburg, 1933), titled: “The Self-Assertion of the German People”, Heidegger spoke of the power of 
science to shape the German university. This, however, was the essence of science (its sense drawn 
from its ancient manifestation), commensurate with the entirety of Man’s knowledge and spiritual 
endeavours in unison. 
477 Heidegger refutes the notion of self-projection, as this would require the formulation of a projection 
independent of that upon which one wished to project (presumably, subject to its own determination of 
being)—one would have to, in effect, conjure an origin outside of the work itself, then bring it to the 
work from whence it came. 
478 Equipmentality is what sits beside utility, and utility is that which we know of the shoes from 
bearing witness to them. 
479 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 15. For a detailed consideration of the 
relationship between aesthetics and truth, see: J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation 
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2.5: Disclosure and Concealment 
The painting permitted a disclosure of being, though not its own. Mere and 
equipmental beings, having no recourse to conceal, have no recourse to disclose. The   
work, though never less than this, is also something more.480 In disclosing the being of 
that which it is not (the shoes), the work foregrounds the particularity of its being as an 
absence of being—its own. The ontological determinacy of the work presents itself as 
a lack of ontological determinacy (its being is concealed as it discloses the truth of the 
shoes). In disclosing, the work comports itself as other. Paskow describes how: “each 
revealing […] involves at the same time a concealing”.481 For Osborne, Heidegger’s 
ontological model: “whilst philosophically anti-aesthetic, is so in the name of a 
Romanticism of Being, to which art is appended as an original appearing”.482 
 
2.5.1: Double-Edgedness 
In disclosing the equpimental nature of the shoes, the painting’s concealment is 
double-edged. Both process and object become subsumed in the process of disclosing 
the truth of the shoes. The medium has become equipmental in its transition to 
manipulated thing.483 As paint and canvas it is manipulated, having once been mere.484 
In operating as visual language it becomes equipment. No longer is it a malleable, 
coloured substance able to adhere to other substances: it is now a latent activity: both a 
picture and a thing—in the world as meeting, and in surface. To Heidegger, the mere 
is something close to a stopping short of the character of serviceability. To become 
operable, disclosure and concealment are requiring of what amounts to a form of 
ontological weighting. The painting as a work of art can reveal the truth of the shoes, 																																																																																																																																																																
from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
Heidegger writes evocatively about the dark opening of the shoes, the stiff heaviness and the slow 
trudge (Laurie Schneider Adams, The Methodologies of Art, 170). There is a reflection of this in T. J. 
Clark’s description of Courbet’s Stonebreakers, in Image of the People, 79, where he employs terms 
such as: pressure, thickness and gravity. 
480 By invisible, Heidegger means something approximating non-active, as opposed to inactive, which 
carries with it a latency: in the sense of seemingly being about to act, or of presenting the possibility of 
action. By something more, he means something like not less than the base conditions from which base 
conditions are understood. 
481Alan Paskow, The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation, 30. 
482 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 116. 
483 Paint is a composite of pigments (as granular solids), a binder (to allow the paint to cohere and to 
form a film) and usually an extender (to increase, dilute and/or modify properties). In isolation, all are 
mere. Assembled, the paint occupies a position between mere and equipmental, as pre-equipmental 
(having the propensity to become equipmental in the painting). The individual substances in isolation 
(prior to becoming paint) have pre-equipmental potential, too, though of a non-painterly orientation. As 
the vehicle of painting (in/as painting) paint becomes fully equipmental/ontologically capped. 
484 Natural materials that become paint and canvas. 
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yet the shoes cannot reveal the truth of the painting. Unlike the painting of the shoes, 
the shoes themselves, though they share with the painting the qualities of mereness 
(and therefore self-containment), are not, as equipmental thing, self-sufficient. And so, 
what is it that the work of art concerns itself with? Heidegger’s answers position the 
essay as an attempt to move beyond the limitations of Kantian aesthetics.485 For 
Heidegger, truth had hitherto belonged only to logic, leaving beauty to aesthetics.486 
 
Heidegger is not advocating social realism.487 This would be to align approximation 
with truth (as Krauss did in her analysis of the index), to determine that the closer 
something comes to something else, the more like it it is, and the more it can lay claim 
to being able to disclose its being. In painterly terms, this would amount to being 
sceptical as to photorealism’s propensity to arrive at the truth of a bottle of ketchup 
through processes that allow the artist a high degree of verisimilitude.488 Disclosure 
has nothing to do with reproduction, or with techniques that allow for a superficial 
proximity to a given source. He ends Part 1 of the essay with an appeal to consider 
what it is to which a Greek temple must correspond in order for it to disclose its truth.   
 
2.6: Earth; World; Medium 
 
 
The origin of the artwork is art. But what is art?489 
 
 
Part 2 moves away from painting towards the Greek temple (Fig. 4C) and its status as 
a work, yet nevertheless provides support for the notion of the work as a positioned 
																																																								
485 Eva Geulen (1962-), in The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel, considers Heidegger to 
have assumed a reciprocal relationship to exist between art and truth, and thus the artwork essay 
becomes an attempt to escape the pull of a singular aesthetics. Costello, in “Greenberg’s Kant and the 
Fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art Theory” deems Kant to have required of the artwork only that 
it, “expand ideas in imaginatively complex ways”. Truth, then, to Kant, would amount to something 
approximating the sensory retrieval of the possible. 
486 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 15. 
487 Not to be confused with Stalin’s Socialist Realism. Social realism was a far broader international 
movement, spanning much of the twentieth century (with earlier and later examples too), wherein the 
plight of the working poor is depicted in great detail and with varying emphases on hardship, humility 
and authenticity. 
488 Photorealism (hyper-realism), in painting, refers collectively to the works, from the 1970s, of Chuck 
Close (1940-), Robert Bechtle (1932-), Audrey Flack (1931-), Richard Estes (1932-), Ralph Goings 
(1928-), and others, and concerned itself (technically at least) with methods of obtaining microscopic 
detail and extreme levels of verisimilitude. Goings depicted Californian diners and ketchup bottles. 
489 Ibid., 19. 
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thing whose meaning is rooted in its alongsideness.490 Heidegger presents the paradox 
of a work of art opening up the space to which it will subsequently belong, yet at the 
same time having to accommodate its varied relations to other things. The shift in 
emphasis – from the painting of the shoes to the temple – appears designed to cement 
an understanding of how it is that truth can show up and also provide a context for the 
work. According to Michael Inwood, Heidegger does so: “partly to distinguish his 
own view from the view that art is imitation: the temple is not representational”.491  
 
 
 
Fig. 4C 
 
Moreover, in the case of Van Gogh’s painting, this showing up evaded – in his earlier 
analysis – such a detailed consideration, and we find that: “[a]s long as we supposed 
the reality of the work to lie primarily in its thingly substructure, we went astray”.492 
To demonstrate how a work both produces and gathers truth to it, Heidegger engages 
in an analysis of that which, in normal conditions, cannot move—namely: the Greek 
temple.493 The temple, in: “hold[ing] its place against the storm raging above it, […] 
first makes the storm visible in its violence”.494 It is clear, here, that Heidegger is 
reversing the terms whereby we come to know, in a manner akin to my earlier 
example of Michelangelo’s David.495 Thus, light is brought to light through reflecting 																																																								
490 It is helpful to consider that Heidegger distinguishes between object-being and work-being, and, in 
so doing, provides a foundation for the notion of a medium with physical extension and linguistic 
possibility. Object-being denotes objectification – the result of a bringing about of various forms of 
dislocation – and work-being points to the work’s potential to disclose (in language).  
491 Michael Inwood, Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
118. 
492 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 18. This is something close to material. 
493 Ibid., 20. 
494 Ibid., 21.  
495 Again, so as not to presume presence in advance of knowing (the truth of work and world). 
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stone, and air through the towering of the building.496 Heidegger calls this earth, and 
the process of coming forth: “lights up that on which Man bases his dwelling”.497 
 
 
Standing there the temple work opens up a world while, at the same time, setting 
this world back onto the earth which itself first comes forth as homeland. […] 
We will get closer to what is if we think everything in reverse.498 
 
 
In the case of the temple, as a work, it functions to make God visible—not to paint a 
portrait of God, but to allow for his presence. As such, the work of the temple and God 
become synonymous. God is not in the work, but the work is God.499 To demonstrate 
his conception of what he terms world, Heidegger uses the example of the setting up 
of a painting for exhibition.500 Setting up, he contends, brings with it a, “sense of 
dedication or praise”.501 This dedication or praise is what is earth, and, in the instance 
of the work, has been set forth by the work-being of the work. In so doing the work 
sets up a world (wherein objects are never there merely to be looked at); for world is, 
consequently, to Heidegger: “that always non-objectual to which we are subject”.502  
 
This, Heidegger asserts, is, “what a work does”.503 World, newly established, has thus 
been constituted through earth.504 World encompasses all of human relations, and 
circumvents an objectification to which earth, alone, attests. Only when the work 																																																								
496 In displacing meaning in this manner (light known through reflecting stone), Heidegger appears to 
chase his tail, warranting the question: What of reflecting stone? The dissolution of the distinction 
between noun and verb – the result of a phenomenological conflation of space and time – serves to 
dispel such a criticism, in so far as reflecting stone is to be understood as a process only, not a thing as 
such.  
497 Ibid. 
498 Ibid. 
499 In the sense that the meaning of God is framed by the conditions pertaining of God. More broadly, to 
invoke the magical is, in part, to subdue the rational impulse in favour of the irrational. In a post-
industrial information age, that which opposes or seeks to short-circuit an over-determined, mechanistic 
message seems desirable. Yet to seek out unknowing (to bring forth the supernatural) is not, in itself, a 
denial of Enlightenment thinking. In its appeal to possibility, process and ritual, magic becomes a 
strategy to rethink anew one’s connectedness to material, technology, language and change. 
500 World is not a collection of things that are-present-at-hand (within the purview of one’s compass—to 
be examined). 
501 Ibid., 22. 
502 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 23. Paskow (The Paradoxes of Art, 28) presents 
earth as unknowable, and world as a cultural and temporal term. It could be said of Heidegger’s 
philosophy that he turns nouns into verbs. 
503 Ibid., 22. 
504 Michael Inwood, Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction, 119. This state of affairs resembles the 
relationship between the mere and equipmental in respect of the earlier example of Van Gogh’s 
painting. 
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becomes dislocated from its surroundings by time or misunderstanding (or actual 
relocation) does it lose its power to disclose and become a passive object—to be 
pointed at.505 To point at earth without world could be likened to pointing at an object 
without a subject – a form without content – yet not because one happened to conceal 
the other, but because, in the instance of pointing, there wasn’t another to conceal.  
 
2.6.1: Dual-Disclosure 
Heidegger establishes a situation whereby the work discloses the truth of what it is as 
a dual disclosure (it sets forth the earth and sets up a world). This disclosure is a form 
of knowing, which makes it phenomenological and subjective.506 Moreover, 
Heidegger’s supposition points towards a complex notion of medium that is bound-in 
to the work of art as it is in and of the world, whilst at the same time foregrounding its 
constituted identity as distinct from it. This comes close to Bois’s notion of painting as 
technical model, in so far as the being of painting amounts to more that its resting 
form. Paradoxically, this would be akin to having a painting’s surface visible alone, 
without or alongside its subject.507 In philosophical terms, it could be thought of as 
having Wittgenstein’s duck and rabbit (Fig. 4D) co-exist peacefully in the knowledge 
that each is dependent on the other for its form, even when hidden from view.508 
 
 
																																																								
505 Consider in relation to Krauss’s objection to Greenberg’s insistence on pointing (Chapter 2: 3.4). 
506 Here, subjective does not mean having or forming an opinion. On the contrary, subjective refers to 
the condition of being only subject to one’s experience. 
507 To show the surface as a distinct aspect alongside the subject is surely impossible in any practical 
sense (of brush marks that do or do not depict). But the look of separation between them can be brought 
off by a clever manipulation of effects and the right choice of subject, so as to have the appearance of a 
tactile surface floating above the subject – as if looking at a screen – leaving the subject to appear 
surface-less, i.e., photographic. See: “Depiction and the Golden Calf”, 1987, by Michael Podro (1931-
2008), where he examines the painting The Adoration of the Golden Calf, 1633/4, by Nicolas Poussin 
(1594-1665), and also the work of Frank Auerbach (1931-).  
508 Wittgenstein was certain that the seeing of one at the expense of the other was not the result of an 
interpretive deficit on the part of the viewer/reader. In other words, here is an example of a visual 
language (the picture) offering multiple meanings without the viewer engaging in interpretation—
nothing is concealed. In his critique of representation, in The Ister Lectures, 1942, Heidegger 
questioned the legitimacy of metaphor and allegory. If the Greeks were, through their surviving texts, 
present to Hölderlin, then they were so as a result of a form of resistance to a representational or 
allegorical impulse. Such tropes, according to Heidegger, maintain an unwelcome gap between the text 
and that which the text represents. In addition, there is a correlation between Heidegger’s notion of 
inauthentic interpretation as non-intrusion and Joselit’s notion of the indescribability of works. Also, 
compare to the socio-Christian assertion of Tolstoy (Count Lev Nikolayevich, 1828-1910), that, “artistic 
works cannot be interpreted”. Leo Tolstoy, What is Art? (London, New York, Toronto, Ringwood, 
Auckland: Penguin, 1995), 94. 
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Fig. 4D 
 
Within Heidegger’s hypothesis the medium becomes foregrounded as that which can 
be mapped onto the spaces or joins between a well-trodden series of dualisms: word 
and image, object and subject, means and message, conceptual and non-conceptual, 
nature and convention, drawing and painting, time and space, etc. Being neither object 
or subject nor form or content: medium eludes position. Thus, in situating itself 
indeterminately between object and subject, form and content, the medium draws fire 
from both sides. In its inbetweeness it establishes the being of that which either side 
positions it. Its equipmental being is, therefore, to be inferred from that which 
becomes positioned, through the particularity of the form of its disclosure. 
 
2.7: Worlding: Holding and Shaping 
 “By the opening of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their 
distance and proximity, their breadth and their limits”.509 Worlding is a finding of 
space within the already spacious, and the work is that which: “holds open the open of 
the world”.510 Worlding denotes dwelling—the way in which inhabiting the world 
takes shape. It is a human world of houses, tools and all that permits living.511 Melville 
draws attention to Heidegger’s use of light and shadow as a metaphor for 
concealment.512 In respect of painting, this can be understood as akin to the dwelling 
of a subject within a surface, or else a surface within a subject.513  Heidegger points to 																																																								
509 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 19. 
510 Ibid. 
511 Michael Inwood, Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction, 119. 
512 Stephen Melville, Becoming Medium, 2013. That, in sense, the visible is present as an absence. 
513 The implications of worlding are explored in greater detail in the third section of Heidegger’s essay. 
In A short History of Modern Philosophy, Roger Scruton (1944-) describes Heidegger’s work, 
somewhat unflatteringly, as: “like spectral visions in the realm of thought; vast, intangible shadows cast 
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how it is that the work becomes operable within the context of Dasein, aesthetics, 
poetry, history, and in respect of Hegel’s notion of an end to art.514 This period marked 
the beginning of a shift in Heidegger’s thinking, later referred to as die kehre.515  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																
by language”, though he also acknowledges the formidable difficulties of his thought. Roger Scruton, A 
Short History of Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 274. 
514 Hegel first lectured on aesthetics in 1818. His manuscripts, on which the lectures were based, are 
now lost. Transcripts of the lectures were made by students in 1820/21, 23 and 26, and have been 
published, though, as yet, only the 23 series in English. 
515 The turn: a re-tiring of modernity. Distinctions between early and later Heidegger draw on 
perceptions as to the extent to which, in the later works, he abandons the vestiges of the human subject, 
to be replaced by a historicised notion of being. Thinking – as activity – becomes of central importance 
from the time of die kehre. The turn marked a shift towards a consideration of ordinary experience and 
away from subjectivity, which, by his own admission, the concept of Dasein, as outlined in Being and 
Time, had failed to fully dispel. Moreover, in his later thinking, Heidegger resituates the concept of 
dwelling—a poetic habitation offers the path to knowledge and truth, and thinking poetically becomes a 
means of finding access. In “The Origin of the Work of Art”, such disclosure is the obverse of 
concealment. Later still, Heidegger reversed the terms of the debate, see: On Time and Being (New 
York, San Francisco and London: Harper & Row, 1972). Nevertheless, Heidegger remained steadfast in 
his belief in the central question of Being and Time, namely: to understand the sense of being—his 
method of thinking in reverse about reversal necessitated beginning at the end, but not stopping there. 
This is a short summary of Heidegger’s later thinking, dealing with, as Peter McCormick (birth date 
unknown) puts it: “the paradoxical relationships between philosophical reflection as a necessary 
historical phenomenon and philosophical reflection as a historical attempt to set necessary limits on the 
phenomenon of contingency” (“Heidegger, Politics and the Philosophy of History”, 1980). 
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Part 3: Heidegger and Hölderlin: Forestalling Ends 
 
 
But he seems almost 
Reversing and 
Must come, I think, 
From the East 
And much 
Might be said about that. And why 
Does he cling to the hills so? The other, 
The Rhine, went off 
Sideways. Never for nothing 
         Do rivers run in the drylands. […]516 
 
 
3.1: Aesthetics and World Picture 
Two years after the artwork essay, Heidegger clarified his position on aesthetics 
within a broader consideration of the relationship of the activity of science to an 
understanding of being. Heidegger presents aesthetics as the third of five distinctions 
in respect of the modern world. Within the framework of aesthetics, the work becomes 
an object of subjective experience, and art becomes an expression of human life.517 
Subjectivisation, Heidegger argues, is responsible for an objectification of that which 
sits outside of the subject (as other), namely: the object. Heidegger roots the being of 
the modern – by which he means a grouping of discernable preoccupations – in Plato’s 
positing of idea as separate from the object to which it attests. This, in turn, provided a 
shape and legitimacy for Cartesian dualism. Finally, the Enlightenment loosened a 
societal commitment to the gods, and the age of industry subsequently commenced.518 
 
This epistemological shift brought with it the scientific method. With the subject now 
the ground of being, speculation took the form of considerations as to what the subject 
might represent. Science begins, from the eighteenth century, to engage in extended 
anthropologies—studies of Man’s studying of objects, rather than a study of objects. 
Within the visual arts this reached its zenith in the period from the late nineteenth 
century to the middle of the twentieth, during a period when placement became 																																																								
516 Friedrich Hölderlin, The Ister, lines 41-50, trans., David Constantine, in Friedrich Hölderlin: 
Selected Poems (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1997), 63. 
517 Reflection, science, aesthetics, culture, the loss of the gods, etc. Martin Heidegger, “The Age of 
World Picture”, in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1950), 116. Consider in respect of socially oriented critique. 
518 Ibid., 116-135. 
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central.519 Science brings with it methods that serve to establish its legitimacy and to 
frame it accordingly.520 Heidegger calls this world picture—a systematisation of 
representations thrown up by positing idea in opposition to thing—not a picture of the 
word, but the world as picture; though he allows for adjustments, stating that: “[t]he 
fact that whatever is comes into being in and through representedness transforms the 
age in which this occurs into a new age in contrast with the preceding one”.521 
 
3.1.1: Paul Klee: Seeing Being 
To conceive of the being of the modern in painting meant to attend to the concerns of 
modern painting as it is in the world—the world of mechanisation and industry, mass 
communication and a burgeoning of global capitalism. Though modernism oriented 
itself towards the future – seeking to establish itself in opposition to the past – there 
were, nevertheless, several important contemporary painters whose work shared a 
concern for foundations, and for history.522 Within writing, too, there is a surprising 
forerunner to Heidegger’s notion of groundedness and worlding, and it comes in the 
form of Klee’s celebrated Pedagogical Sketchbook of 1925, in a brief note towards the 
end of the book, where Klee considers the directedness of drawn arrows. He writes: 
 
 
Thought is the mediary between earth and world. The broader the magnitude of 
his reach, the more painful man’s tragic limitation. To be impelled towards 
motion and to not be motor. Action bears this out.523 
 
 
To Klee, who stressed directedness in schematic form, drawing was a thing in flux, 
always commensurate with action.524 In the 1930s Heidegger was known to have 
expressed a keen interest in writing about Klee’s later works, in what would have been 
																																																								
519 As evidenced by the works of Riegl and Wölfflin, in respect of object/work within period/place. 
520 Consider Foucault’s notion of discourse, outlined in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1972, and 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1975. Here, Foucault contends that discourse brings 
about disciplinary structures, which subsequently serve to legitimise societal practices. 
521 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of World Picture”, 130. 
522 Marc Chagall (1888-1985), in Russian folk tales; Chaim Soutine (1893-1943), in Rembrandt; 
Maurice Utrillo (1883-1955), in the streets of Montmartre; de Staël, in the trace of place, and the 
possibilities of abstraction; and Paul Klee, in music, myth and machine. 
523 Paul Klee, Pedagogical Sketchbook (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), 54. 
524 Consider in respect of Klee’s well-known dictum, in which he defined drawing as taking a line for a 
walk. This idea of action is not to be confused with Rosenberg’s exegesis. Rosenberg’s action draws 
from the artist in the studio, whereas Klee’s denotes an internalised relationship among elements in the 
work—a dynamic of internality. 
	 152	
a second part to the artwork essay.525 Unfortunately, however, this did not come to 
pass. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Klee was one of the few contemporary artists 
to whom the philosopher paid attention (George Braque being the notable other, 
though in Braque’s case this surely rested on Heidegger’s perception of Braque’s deep 
embeddedness in the manual processes of painting).526 One can only speculate as to 
the source of Heidegger’s attachment, although Klee’s paintings do present varying 
manners of inbetweenness, and are difficult to position.527 Dennis Schmidt claims that 
Klee offered Heidegger the hope of a visual form to his thinking—thinking that, in its 
archaic animation and inter-directedness, began with the painting, and ended of it.528  
  
3.2: Preservation and Poetry 
In The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour after Hegel, Eva Geulen, in considering five 
key incarnations of endist debate – in Hegel, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Adorno and 
Heidegger – pays attention, in the last two chapters of the book, to Heidegger’s 
understanding of the form and language of Hölderlin’s verse in respect of what is 
taken to be its content.529 In Heidegger’s analysis, as with the works of Klee, this 
form, so Geulen argues, functions to compel a method of knowing that arises from 
rather than being imposed upon the work. Heidegger lectured extensively on Hölderlin 
in the middle period of his career, at a time of ultimate strife, and Geulen addresses the 
impact of his encounters with the German poet of rivers on the course of his thinking, 																																																								
525 This would have addressed current artworks and the advent of modernism in the visual arts. Klee’s 
work interested prominent German thinkers of this time, including Walter Benjamin. In his “Thesis on 
Philosophical Thought”, 1940, Benjamin wrote: “A Klee painting named Angelus Novus (Fig. 4E) 
shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures 
the angel of history. His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees 
one single catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The 
angel would like to stay, awaken the dead and make whole again what has been mashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer 
close them. The storm irresistibly compels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile 
of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress”, 249.  
526 Braque (George, 1882-1963) developed the process of collage, using it earlier than Pablo Picasso 
(1881-1973). Throughout his life, Braque was a great experimenter with surfaces. With regard to Klee, 
Derek H. Whitehead (birth date unknown) has written about Heidegger’s encounters with Klee’s work. 
See: “Martin Heidegger's Technites, Paul Klee's Gestalt and starting from the very beginning”, n.d., 
accessed March 22, 2017, http://castle.e iu.edu/~modernity /whitehead.htm. 
527 These small paintings – sometimes illustrative, humorous, learned and of the past, at other times 
radically abstract, intuitive, savage and of the future – retain mysteriousness: almost an animistic desire 
to keep hold of the source of their secrets. 
528 Dennis J. Schmidt, “Between Word and Image: Heidegger, Klee, and Gadamer on Gesture and 
Genesis” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 187. 
529 Ezra Pound (1885-1972) considered content and music to be to two roads of poetry—to subject 
matter and versification respectively.  
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and on his theory of origins.530 Coming either side of “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 
these lectures frame the point at which, for Heidegger, having learned the lessons of 
Hölderlin’s inspired unreason: “philosophy abdicates in favour of poetry”.531  
 
 
 
Fig. 4E 
 
With Heidegger’s poetising of philosophy comes the: “demotion of the production of 
art […] in favour of its preservation”.532 Demotion amounts to an extension of the 
possibility of art—a form of insurance that, to borrow a phrase from Robert Browning, 
its, “reach will exceed its grasp”.533 In Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister, Heidegger attends 
to what is a rather short poem.534 To David Nichols, these lectures mark a significant 																																																								
530 Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1850) was born the same year as Wordsworth. He studied theology at the 
Tübinger Stift, where his fellow students included fellow Swabians, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
(1770-1831) and Schelling (Schelling he had known from school). It has been suggested that it was 
Hölderlin who brought to Hegel’s attention the work of Heraclitus (c. 535 – c. 475 BC), and the union 
of opposites, which would form the basis of the dialectic. Heidegger lectured on Hölderlin in 1934/5, 
1941/2 and 1942. The first series was titled Hölderlin's Hymns Germania and the Rhine. Hölderlin 
offers Heidegger a means of displaying his ontological hypothesis (almost of seeing it in action), and, 
from the mid-1930s, an understanding of poetry becomes, to Heidegger, the primary route to a fuller 
understanding of being. Heidegger’s Nazism is not the subject of this work. 
531 Eva Geulen. The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel, (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 136. Paskow (The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation, 31) sees 
Heidegger’s later writing as akin to the poetic essays of Rainer Maria Rilke (1975-1926). Inspired 
Unreason is a phrase used by George Steiner, Heidegger, 142. 
532 Eva Geulen. The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel, 124. 
533 Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto (The Faultless Painter), from Men and Women, 1855. 
534 Seventy-two lines. Heidegger also addresses Sophocles’ Antigone and the mechanisms of Greek 
tragedy. Hölderlin’s Hymn was Heidegger’s second Hölderlin lecture series. 
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shift in the orientation of his thought, from a Nietzschean interest in the will to power, 
to a pastoral consideration of how poets can provide dwellings.535 Nichols writes: 
 
 
In the Ister lectures, Heidegger focuses upon the different ways in which Dasein 
takes residence within its historical situation. Greek tragedy demonstrates how 
human beings are always trying to make themselves at home without ever fully 
accomplishing this goal. They occupy the uncanny (unheimlich) status of 
extraordinary beings among ordinary appearances, always estranged from the 
larger framework of beings, never able to completely fit into its structure. The 
Greeks recognized this strangeness in other beings as well, through the 
extraordinary revealing made possible by the gods.536  
 
 
To be German, for both Hölderlin and Heidegger, meant to be rooted in what it meant 
to be Greek, and Nichols points to Hölderlin’s understanding of poetry as a process of 
uncovering truth. To poetise is, therefore, to challenge the prevailing gods, and to seek 
to make unity with them through a tragic alignment—to maintain the particularities of 
difference (conflictedness) within the very fabric of that which permits it visibility.537 
 
3.2.1: Calling forth and Attending to 
Heidegger opens the analysis with an etymological scrutiny of the word hymn, which 
he derives from the Greek hýmnos (from hydeō), meaning song of praise for the gods. 
By praise, Heidegger is referring to a calling forth rather than a calling to: and that 
which is called forth – the work/poem/temple – remains, in its openness, to be 
attended to. The lecture proceeds to attend to Hölderlin’s poem The Ister and, in 
attending, to preserve its being. In determining the conditions into which the work 
becomes operable as a work (and thus countering the scientific, deterministic 
implications of production), the work also serves to inaugur the means of its own form 
of preservation, as, to Heidegger: “a work is only a work when held in preserving”.538  																																																								
535 For being to occupy. The will to power first appeared in The Wanderer in his Shadow, 1880, and then 
in Daybreak, 1881. 
536 David Nichols, “Antigone’s Autochthonous Voice: Echoes in Sophocles, Hölderlin, and Heidegger”, 
2009, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-
conferences/vol-xxv/antigones-autochthonous-voice/#_edn 4.  
537 Heidegger sometimes uses the terms gods to represent what he referred to as macro-paradigmatic 
works of art. To him, fundamentally transformative works, like the Greek temple, or tragic drama, 
would sit in this category. Paintings or poems would constitute paradigmatic works. The micro-
paradigmatic classification denotes something approximating a coming to awareness of things that 
matter to us. 
538 Eva Geulen, The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel, 124. 
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Preserving, in this context, means to take note of – a noticing in attending – rather 
than to look after. What Geulen appears to imply, is that Heidegger’s origin – in all its 
layered complexity – is designed to point not to the truth of the work of art, but to the 
truth of the preservation of the work of art (that the work’s truth, as outlined in Part 1, 
is a second-order effect realised alongside a more fundamental preservational 
primacy). Preservation, here, can be thought of as a mode of being operable through 
the medium of art (though not necessarily through the particular art form’s medium), 
whose function serves to support the perpetuation of works and, therefore, of truths. 
Having been called forth, the medium, then, ensures that the work is attended to. 
 
3.2.2: Modes of Preservation 
Modes of preservation vary as they take on different forms, to the point where even 
neglect is couched in the affirmative.539 All that attests to the work is, to Heidegger, in 
the service of preservation. Aside from the more obvious forms of institutional 
enframing, language offers a means whereby the work’s truth might be conserved and 
held.540 Why, then, does Heidegger go to such lengths to foreground the preservational 
aspect of the work? The answer, to Geulen, is in order to expose modernity’s 
ontological modality – something that modernism is/does (in an epochal sense), and in 
distinction from the past – from which the work draws, and to which it returns.541 
 
 
The problem with all conceptions of modernity so far, including any reflexive, 
second modernity, is that in the face of their inevitable disillusion about their 
own powers of innovation, they seem condemned either to confess in 
melancholy or embarrassed tones their own derivativeness or […] to invoke that 
derivativeness as restoration.542 
 
 
The central paradox of the artwork essay, to Geulen, is that whenever Heidegger 
commits himself to a beginning, he invokes an end.543 To counter this is to conceive of 																																																								
539 Modes of preservation that arrive as a result of the disclosure of the truth of the work, Heidegger 
considers ownmost. Neglect, too, derives its understanding from (in relation to) the being of the work. 
540 Heidegger developed the concept of enframing (Gestell) in The Question concerning Technology, 
1954, to denote a framework or structure that lies beneath technology. Heidegger’s use differs from the 
more common use of framing, in that Gestell implies an active component that is integral and perpetual 
to technology’s being.   
541 Ibid., 126. The detail of this modality is outlined more fully in Heidegger’s “The Age of World 
Picture”. 
542 Ibid. There is a reflection here of Bois’s notion of mourning (see: Chapter 2: 4.1.1). 
543 An origin. 
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an origin as something that is retained. And so, preservation is requiring of a means of 
maintenance: as not to preserve is to relinquish being—to have Nietzsche’s abyss stare 
back at you.544 To retain an origin through the work is to affirm (to ensure that origin 
is established by the work). This would be as if a reader of a book were to come in at 
Chapter 2 and infer the events of Chapter 1. In retracting the origin, through 
preservation, Heidegger relinquishes the end. To continue the analogy: the reader 
would approach the final chapter to discover it missing, only to realise that in the 
course of the work he had uncovered the necessary clues as to how to write it.  
 
In sum: preservation is the preserve of poetry. Metaphysics is that which is to be 
overcome in order to discover the truth of what is. What is is, in a sense, what is 
possible—a conflation of what has been and what is to come. From this position – 
here, loosely sketched – Heidegger, in the Hölderlin Lectures, sets out to demonstrate 
the means whereby the truth of the ancient Greeks might become visible in Hölderlin’s 
poetry. Heidegger is resistant to that which allows a gap (temporal, spatial or 
linguistic) to emerge between what the Greeks were and what they are in/with 
Hölderlin (and, by extension, himself), and posits a form of mutual kinship: for the 
reason that a space allows room for the imposition of inauthentic interpretation.545 To 
Heidegger, for Hölderlin to licence access to the truth of the Greeks requires language 
to relinquish its more familiar tropes and habits—to desist, or simply take a rest.546  
 
Therefore, distancing devices – simile, metaphor and allegory – are held to be 
synthetic, and serve as symbolic stand-ins (in seeming to get close they push away). 
This acts as an assault on the fundamental presumption of representation—the belief, 
underpinning all linguistic models, that one thing can approximate or stand in place of 
another. Steiner describes it as an attempt to have: “simple, naked words enter into, 
generate a construct, a music of thought, of insight into the meaning of life which are, 
literally and demonstrably, inexhaustible”.547 And so, if the Greeks are, through 																																																								
544 From “Aphorism 146”, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886. 
545 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin's Hymn: The Ister, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). Inauthenticity equates, here, to external imposition 
(wish-fulfilment). 
546 The idea of resting has important implications for painting, particularly in respect of the 
Rosenbergian notion of painting as action, in that the work’s static form bears the stigmata of its active 
establishment.  
547 George Steiner, Heidegger, 144. 
	 157	
surviving texts, present to Hölderlin (and both Hölderlin and the Greeks to Heidegger), 
then they are so as a result of a correspondence that remains, at least in Heidegger’s 
works of this time, unspecified.548 This, ultimately, amounts to a sustained mode of 
resistance to a hermeneutic impulse arising from metaphysical speculation that, to 
Heidegger, serves only to open an unwelcome and widening gap between the text and 
that which the text is seen to represent. Thus, it is the very distance of the mechanism 
permitting access to the ancient Greeks that serves to ensure their nearness.549 
 
3.3: Double-Directedness  
Hölderlin’s understanding of the river is key. When Geulen writes that Heidegger’s 
interest in the river in Hölderlin’s poem stems from its double-directedness, she does 
not mean to imply that it flows both ways. Hölderlin’s account of the Ister does not 
emphasise direction as such (or a directedness that points to the meaning of the river 
being determined by its final resting place).550 Instead, the meaning/being of the river 
in/as the present draws from both its source (far away) and its destination (seaward), 
which, in turn (and assisted by its tributaries), establishes it as river (Figs. 4F, 4G).551 
In drawing from both source and destination, Hölderlin maintains the river as, in 
essence, a static thing in perpetual flux—the river can never reach its end, nor can we 
witness its beginning. In Geulen’s analysis, the river parallels history (and history the 
river), but in reverse—“he seems almost reversing”.552 To Hölderlin, events, too, seem 
held between, and defined by, the particularity of their destination and their origin.553 
																																																								
548 As might be expected, if one is to follow the logic of Heidegger’s thinking: in particular, his critique 
of presence, which the resolution of a given solution would contravene.  
549 Eva Geulen, The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel, 126. 
550 Ibid. 
551 Including: the Indus, the East, the Alphaeus, the other side, down there, and the Isthmus. 
552 Friedrich Hölderlin, The Ister, lines 41-41. 
553 This alignment or double projection appears close to Heidegger’s clearing (lichtung), and illuminates 
the being of the medium also. After all, medium is but a thing in flux: positioned as equipment between 
its source as thing (formerly mere material) and its destination as work—between object and image, 
means and message, form and content, and subject and surface. 
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Fig. 4F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4G 
 
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between subject and surface within 
modernist criticism, which assigned an autonomous, atemporal identity to both 
language and material, and serves to confine each to a position of periodic absence 
through a posited engagement with the other. In short, and in following Mitchell, to be 
a painting is to know something of the artifice of painting, within whose confines both 
language and material subsist. In following Heidegger’s logic, the medium’s 
equipmentality amounts to its propensity to act as a horizon of being—a meeting place 
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where surface and subject rendezvous. Here, both are maintained in situ—as the work. 
In the work’s subsequent disclosure, the medium is thus concealed as work.554  
 
3.3.1: Language and Event 
But how does it accomplish this? In respect of both the end of art thesis and the 
medium of painting, the intrusion of language generates a layer of complexity—the 
end of art is a written thesis, and painting, too, operates within linguistic structures. 
Geulen’s alludes to a problem that arises out of a sense of distance between event and 
language of event. The assumption that language refers to or arises out of permits 
language to follow or trail, and to trace what will become – in language – a series of 
sequential, ordered events—in short: language plots history. Or, to see it another way, 
history structures the language that follows it and establishes it as history. Thus, the 
relationship is reciprocal. Language comports itself in and as history, and vice versa. 
So, if language is of or with the medium, then where does the imbrication lie? 
 
3.3.2: Rumour: Non-Event 
Hegel naturalised the linkage of language and event: To him, there was only totality: a 
composite of regulating moments, which, in respect of medium, played itself out – one 
thing after another – with distinct mediums driving the shape that the individual arts 
came to assume.555 The end of art thesis is not, in fact, a moment as such (in that it 
amounts to something that has happened…in the world), but attests to a theoretical 
possibility—it thus appears in performative guise, as language of a non-existent event: 
one that cannot exist if the thesis is to maintain its meaning as end of art thesis.556 This 
paradox relieves language of historicism and points to Hölderlin’s employment of 
rumour.557 To Heidegger, rumour amounts to that which permits an irresolvable 																																																								
554 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 204. 
555 Hegel, in Becoming Medium (Stephen Melville, 2013). Event produces language that, in turn, 
situates event in language as thesis. The partiality of times is only partial in respect of what is to come, 
not in the sense of something being missing. 
556 J. L. Austin (1911-1960), in How to do things with Words, 1962, distinguishes between performative 
and constative utterances. Performative utterances can be neither true nor false. Constative utterances 
describe an action, object or event, and can be true or false, as there is the possibility to disprove them. 
For example, Emily says: “I promise to do my homework”, and, in so doing, performs the promise 
irrespective of whether Emily in fact completes her homework. This is, therefore, a performative 
utterance, as even the non-completion of the homework will not contradict the utterance itself. Austin 
uses the example: “I now pronounce you man and wife”, spoken in the course of a wedding ceremony, 
as a common example of a performative utterance. 
557 Geulen reminds us that Hegel’s lectures were transcribed by his students. Therefore, from the off, 
they were determined by rumour.  
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dislocation between actual event and language of event. As Michael Belshaw puts it: 
“a rumour is reliant on a simulacrum—it has no recognisable origin, and its repetition 
is always a repetition of a repetition; which is to say it is always out of joint”.558  
 
3.4: And Medium 
Here, it is useful to distinguish between medium as material and medium as something 
else. As material, medium’s meaning is paint (a designation that takes into account 
extensions to the material, that serve with/as paint to establish the composite nature of 
the work), which provides a means of location—the work can be pointed to as of the 
material of paint.559 In painting, also, language appears to trail, though behind paint, 
which it follows and establishes as medium. Paint assembles and – as medium – is 
assembled by the image that shadows it. As we have seen with Newman and 
Rauschenberg: Newman’s work deploys the medium of paint – through the confluence 
of material and language – whereas Rauschenberg deploys only material.560 As 
medium, paint re-deploys its materiality, but in the process of becoming a work. 
 
3.4.1: The Equipmentality of Medium 
Medium’s concealment behind the work’s subject (by/through the surface of the work) 
is partial—amounting to one half of the dual course of disclosure. The medium’s 
equipmentality must also become visible, and through the reciprocity of the process—
that of the medium’s concealment behind the work’s surface (by/through the subject of 
the work). By this, I mean to suggest that the subject, thus construed (from out of the 
surface), and having been disclosed through the work, acts to disclose the hidden 
hemisphere of being from which its disclosure has been constituted (initially 
concealed within its primary act of disclosure—that of the equipmentality of the 
shoes).561 Thus, the disclosure of the equipmentality of the shoes is also the disclosure 																																																								
558 Michael Belshaw, Readings in a Rumour of the End of Art (Leeds: Workshop Press, 2012), 11. 
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new 
international (New York and London: Routledge, 1993). Derrida invented the term hauntology, to 
describe a lack of origin or presence (and of an end too), as a state of perpetual ontological 
disjunction—a ghost, neither present or absent, dead nor alive. Serving as a response to Fukuyama’s 
assertion of the end of history and the triumph of capitalism, Derrida redeploys a line from Hamlet 
(William Shakespeare, 1564-1616): “the time is out of joint”. 
559 Common extenders include: wax, plaster, sawdust, sand, cement, glass, ceramic and paper. 
560 Michael Belshaw, email, 2017. 
561 The truth of the equimentality of the shoes takes precedence over the truth of the equipmentality of 
the medium, as a result of the work’s higher ontological ordering. As work, and to stay with 
Heidegger’s example, it bears on both the equipmentality of the shoes and the equipmentality of the 
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of the equipmentality of the medium of paint, in accordance with the established 
ontological structuring of the work (Table 14). If, according to Heidegger: in the 
artwork, the truth of what is has set itself to work, then it is perhaps applicable to 
suggest that in painting, truth is work and medium of work setting themselves to work. 
 
 
Disclosed as surface through subject—MEDIUM—Disclosed as subject through surface 
 
 
Table 14: Disclosure of Medium’s Equipmentality 
 
The dual disclosure of the work’s truth and the equipmentality of the paint amounts to: 
being at work in the service of truth(s)—doing what it is that work and paint do. What 
it is that paint as medium does comprises of little more than being a painting. I don’t 
mean to suggest partiality or lack: merely that paint, as medium’s vehicle, is also its 
limitation.562 Paint is not worn or eaten, providing neither warmth nor sustenance.563 
Its usefulness is to be found in its malleability and movability—in its mercurial 
fittedness for transformation: its vehicular characteristics and chimeric potentialities. 
Medium becomes operable as/through paint, in its move from the mere to the 
equipmental, and again in its move from the equipmental to becoming bound up in/as 
a work. In this light, the medium of painting, as Saunders’s suggests, arises out of the 
redeployment or mobilisation of material.564 If language speaks, then painting paints. 
 
To clarify: the equipmentality of the shoes is disclosed through the painting (the 
work). However, to assert that the equipmentality of the paint is disclosed through the 
work of painting feels like both a tautology (a painting is a painting) and an assertion 
of painting’s autonomy (in that a painting seems, here, not to require an outside). 
																																																																																																																																																																
medium in its transformation from mere material. Unburdened of the weight of the shoes, it must divest 
itself of the medium in order to retain a neutral charge—a prerequisite if one is to present an active 
ontological model free of the presumption of presence.     
562 As with Heidegger’s example of the peasant – who simply knows of the usefulness of the shoes from 
wearing them – an equivalent must be found for the truth of the medium (a specificity particular to the 
medium’s form of equipmentality) in order to legitimise the truth/knowledge to which the subject of the 
work’s disclosure attests. 
563 In painting, that is. And, if/when it is, then the possibility of painting is extended to include such 
situatedness, and new limits might be drawn up. However, novelty, alone, is not an extender of 
painting’s possibilities. 
564 Matt Saunders, “Thread, Pixel, Grain”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 174. 
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Nevertheless, this is inaccurate; as such a supposition fails to account for a 
fundamental division within the work. For A Pair of Shoes, there is clearly an 
outside—the peasant working in the field.565 And for the painting, a division also 
exists, but it is a division between the processes of painting and the stasis of its object. 
The stasis of the work’s object belies its processes, serving, in the process, to activate 
the paint’s latent equipmentality. Once activated, the paint (as material) sublimates 
itself through the work and becomes invisible (concealed) in the course of positioning 
the work as work. The equipmentality of the paint itself is then disclosed through/as 
the painting, for the simple reason that there is nowhere else for it to be disclosed. 
 
3.5: Caesura: The End of the End—Painting in the Contracted Field 
 
 
This one contents himself; 
But rock needs gashes  
And the earth furrows 
Or how should we plant and dwell?566 
 
 
Transformation and malleability comprise only the more materially manifest facets of 
the medium’s equipmentality: of interest chiefly to the maker of the work, or to one 
concerned with the work’s construction. There is something more. What of the 
receiver of the work? In Latin, the term caesura denotes a pause or break between 
words in musical or poetic composition; marked out in written notation, or evident in 
performance.567 Integral to the work, the caesura acts to structure the line, and so 
provides the verse with its formal particularlies. Hölderlin employs this device, as did 
the Greeks, investing metrical and rhythmical cadence with its specificity and sense, in 
order to, “name[…] what is holy”.568 The caesura serves as an enabler, too, as, within 
the structure of Greek tragedy, it redirects and reminds.569 Thus, the caesura occupies 
an odd position within writing and speech—being both absent and passive (a gap) and 
present and active (integral to what has been and what is to come). In permitting the 																																																								
565 That which is outside, and whose truth the work services. 
566 Friedrich Hölderlin, The Ister, lines 67-70. 
567 Meaning to cut. 
568	George Steiner, Heidegger, 146. One example of which is the chorus in Antigone: The chorus acts as 
narrator, determining how the audience can/should react. Additionally, the chorus can interact with the 
players and assist in the determination of occurrences.	
569 The chorus also functions to underscore past events, and to point to those still to come.  
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positivisation of nothingness (a holding open), the caesura negates the possibility of 
absence and resolution.  
 
In Hölderlin’s work, as with Greek tragedy, the caesura, in suspending the action, 
suspends the abyssal void. On the necessity of the retention of disruption in tragic 
poetry, Nichols writes: 
 
 
Tragic poetry houses and sustains the essential negation of human experience in 
a way that funnels that emptiness, as a tragic transport, toward the direction of a 
particular fate. Poetry serves as the measure of an encompassing whole—the 
place where the poet envisages the entirety of an experience.570 
 
 
And so, Hölderlin, in both his theoretical work and his verse, seeks to maintain the 
prospect of wholeness, though in contradiction to Hegel. Hegel’s wholeness arises 
from the restorative resolution of difference, through the synthesis of thesis and 
antithesis.571 Hölderlin, on the other hand, seeks to preserve differences – the discrete 
graininess of things – through the formal mechanism of the caesura—in the work. 
Such maintenance serves to ensure the sense and particularity of occurrence.  
 
What, then, of the notion of an end…of art, and of medium? If event – in Hölderlin’s 
case, the course of the Ister – is requiring of an origin and a destination (the Black 
Forest and the Black Sea) to establish it as river, then the end of art thesis, too, is 
requiring of an origin and a destination, which it must maintain if it is to retain its 
meaning as end of art thesis.572 Within German metaphysics (and art historical 
discourse) the end of art draws from Hegel as its source, and the fabled end of art as its 
destination. With both ends buffered by rumour (Hegel, by means of his rumoured 
pronouncement, and the end by virtue of its rumoured expectancy), the thesis is 
uncoupled from the events it is ordinarily taken to chart. Here, rumour acts as caesura. 																																																								
570 David Nichols, “Antigone’s Autochthonous Voice: Echoes in Sophocles, Hölderlin, and Heidegger”, 
2009. 
571 This formulation of the dialectic in fact came from Johann Fichte (1762-1814). 
572 The Ister, directed by David Barrison and Daniel Ross, 2004. The film journeys upstream to the 
source of the river. Bernhard Stiegler (1952-), Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
(1940-2007), and others reflect on: time, war, poetry, home, technology and National Socialism. 
Stiegler argues that Man and technics are indissociable (hominisation…technical living), and that, for 
most of what amounts to human time, there was no awareness or sense of the technicisation of being 
(2004). 
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In so doing, the end of art attains freedom and endlessness (through its bondedness to 
that which frames it) and, in the process, becomes a rumour of itself. 
 
3.5.1: And Painting 
Within this formulation the medium carefully cushions its captives: at one end, the 
mere thing (as origin), and, at the other, the work’s functionality in language (as 
destination). Thus, in disclosing the equipmentality of paint as medium, the medium 
discloses a second tier of equipmentality—as a double caesura.573 The caesura’s 
equipmentality functions as partition, connecting the work’s mereness to its station as 
work, and doing likewise with its language—with what Heidegger calls its, “allegory 
and symbol”.574 Harnessed against the backdrop of a reversal of history (a history that 
Melville has likened to a stirring up of sediment), the medium harnesses its harnessers 
– mere thing and language – in a three-fold embrace, as artwork.575 As caesura, the 
medium is retained as two absent presences: neither wholly material nor wholly 
linguistic. As the gashes and furrows of painting, the medium repudiates assimilation 
(into either language or material) and permits planting and dwelling (as both language 
and material).576 In resisting resolution, the medium – in the stasis of its mobilisation – 
acts to safeguard nothing less than the perpetual preservation of painting (Table 15). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
573 To be thought of as two positivised suspensions, or gaps. 
574 This gets around the false differentiation, identified by Richard Wollheim in On formalism and its 
Kinds, 1995, between the syntactic (formal) structure of a painting and any linguistic counterpart (a 
vocabulary of language that refers to the world). Wollheim, here, deals with Bois’s comment, at a 
seminar organised by The Museum of Modern Art in New York, 1989 (in the aftermath of the Picasso-
Braque exhibition), that painting sometimes functions like a language and sometimes functions not like 
a language.  
575 Stephen Melville, Becoming Medium, 2013. In this, he follows the lead of Heinrich Wölfflin. 
Remember, to Heidegger, the past becomes knowable as/through the artwork, not in advance of it. 
576 Friedrich Hölderlin, The Ister, from lines 68-69. 
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Thing   
Origin 
Medium 
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Equipment 
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Mere Equipment Work 
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Hegel 
Rumour 
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Equipment 
 
End of Art Thesis 
Rumour 
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Table 15: Ontological Positioning of Medium as Caesura 
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Chapter 5: On/Of Recent Practice 
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
Between September 2016 and August 2017 I painted from the RCA research studio in 
Battersea.577 Initially, I continued to work on oak panels – under 25 cm in any 
direction – that were begun elsewhere (Figs. 5A, 5B). Additionally, I stretched several 
canvases of varying sizes. These works appeared, at this time, to mark an end to the 
body of works referred to in Chapter 1: one reached, perhaps, by the logic of painterly 
possibility. What I was attempting and what I could do in the manner of attempting it 
had, to me, become mutually excluding (Fig. 5C).578 Either the works were forced and 
unconvincing, or else they roamed freely without censure. I grew too aware of what 
the paintings could be – and of the steps taken to get them there – and yet seemingly 
not conscious enough of the needs of individual works (of what the work appeared to 
do and how that doing shifted). I decided on a different approach.579 In March 2017, I 
began to paint on aluminium, suspended from the wall with a gap of 2 cm (Fig. 5D). 
These are sheets of picturing paint.580 Also, with the works on wood now numbering 
more than one hundred, my attention shifted to reconsidering methods of display.581  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
577 The seventh studio I have occupied since this project began. 
578 The result of too deliberate and clean a polarisation of material and language. 
579 The registration of mark on surface is the baseline of painting. To change it is to change all else. 
580 Sheets have thickness too. With the ratio between paint and support changed, the surface’s presence 
alters. See: Mick Finch, on thickness, from “Supports/Surfaces: Contexts and Issues”, 1999 (considered 
in Chapter 2: 3.3.2). 
581 The idea of the French Salon (in miniature) interests me, in that this method of hanging offers 
distraction (all-overness) through the employment of close grouping. It also positivises the wall as a 
form of irregular grid, and positions each work as both complete and incomplete, in that it becomes 
impossible not to make connections either side (or else above and below) an individual work. This links 
to the idea discussed in Chapter 1, Sections 2.3 & 2.10. No single work is burdened by being the work, 
and so completion is deferred (though I hope, at the same time, that many of the works have an 
absorptive quality that defines them individually within the group). Also, edges, sides and joins (the 
material aspects of the paintings in opposition to their pictures) become a bigger deal visually. A sense 
of connectedness and apartness, of absent middles and things unseen, of action off stage left and right, 
and of representations dissolving and forming becomes central to the works. 	
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Fig. 5A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5B 
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Fig. 5C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5D 
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I toyed with the possibility of ending this thesis with a conclusion that would follow 
on from Chapter 4, leaving the paintings to, as it were, speak for themselves.  
Ultimately, this appeared unsatisfactory. Not only did it seem increasingly necessary 
to, in some form or other, attempt an account of the recent work in writing, but also, it 
felt inadequate to leave a theoretical hypothesis ungrounded: by which I mean untested 
in respect of the practice which brought about this study in the first instance, and on 
which its success, in large part, rests.582 Additionally, the conditions of my practice 
had changed, and in a number of ways. The solution: a bridge between Heidegger and 
the end (of this thesis), and one that tackles some of the difficulties in addressing the 
medium outside of the particularities of encounters with paintings. This chapter thus 
attests to a desire to read between the lines of painting, or to write around its material 
and linguistic particularities—to remain open enough to say what remains to be said 
about painting’s medium – within the parameters of this inquiry, and without stepping 
on the conclusion’s toes – and yet refrain from extending beyond the perhaps more 
obvious limitations of what a writing about medium specificity is required to be.583 
 
Part 2 begins by introducing the processes involved in the recent works on aluminium, 
seeking to extend the positioning of my practice – that began in Chapter 1 – in respect 
of the activities of the past year. I will consider differences that arise between the 
experience of writing in painting and painting in writing, through an account of the 
use of word and picture in painting.584 Here, I wish to further explore the 
interrelationship of language and form—of reading and seeing, and to extend – 
practically, as writing – the investigation into the connectedness of medium to picture 
undertaken in Chapter 3. To be with a painting is to ascribe to painting its medium 
aspect—to see that which is not shown in the showing of what is. Part 3 attempts to 
play out the relationship of formal particularity to meaning through a simple written 
exercise. Hence, Part 2 is subsequently retold, and offers a written correspondence of 
its content, shaped otherwise. I seek to demonstrate a sense of equivalence and 
difference.585 Form and content are non-divisible. Formed differently tells differently, 
																																																								
582 See: Chapter 4, Introduction, regarding the necessity of mapping ideas against the experience of 
works. 
583 Which also encompass that which it cannot be, namely: a demonstration of painting’s medium. 
584 Which more typically involves the incorporation of reproductions of paintings. 
585 In regard of the difference from one telling to the next, and equivalence in respect of the addressing 
of mutual subject matter. 
	 171	
and inversely. Thus, in offering a retelling of what has been told, the particularities of 
Part 2 are thrown into relief. Part 3, then, functions in respect of Part 2, as associate. 
 
Finally, Part 4 presents my recent practice. However, this presentation lacks any 
descriptive commentary, and consists only of headed labels that link to photographic 
reproductions of selected paintings. The model of medium constructed in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 determines that works attain their specificity as equipment – through a 
confluence of picture and material – and in accordance with the particularity of 
discrete conditions of encounter.586 As such (especially with this as the very subject to 
hand), a writing about would sit outside of the action, adding story only: or else stand 
as writing-picture (not painting-picture).587 By this I mean to suggest that, at this 
juncture (having explored an art historical and theoretical positioning of the medium 
across three of the four previous chapters, building a case in support of the conclusions 
I have arrived at), to seek to account for the medium aspect of individual or collective 
works through descriptive or analytical prose sits counter to the thrust of the argument 
I wish to make, namely: that the medium aspect of paintings is dependent on one’s 
encountering the linguistic and material particularities of painted works in situ.588  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
586 With the polarity of language and material read backwards; one result of the work’s multiple 
disclosures. Here, the terms picture and material are more appropriate than Podro’s preferred terms – 
subject and surface – in that they allude to fundamental painterly concerns, allowing for both thickness 
(of surface) and forming (of picture). 
587 Thereby demonstrating its own form of medium specificity. The specificity of story – in writing – 
opens another line of enquiry: one that seeks to examine the particularities of linguistic convention and 
various figures of speech.    
588 If the medium of a painting is at all to be understood through photographic reproduction, then it must 
be the case that one possesses an awareness of painting prior to encountering its reproduction.  
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Part 2: Writing Medium 
 
 
To paint, to push, to draw, to smear, to press, 
Before, behind, prolong, impede, caress. 
Enlist, resist, desist; on picture rest, 
Begin again, from whence it came, redressed. 
Grey-green, grey-blue, blue-blue, drew through anew, 
In landscape, seascape, dreamscape, still life too. 
Moved on from, gone, there-still, there-where implied, 
A surface-image, image-surface dried. 
 
 
2.1: Works on Aluminium 
My method of painting involves planning and intuition. I paint, and use what it is that I 
paint to advance the painting.589 In concerning myself with material and language, I 
seek to bring about meetings on surfaces: pictures are unavoidable and must, therefore, 
be welcomed. I apply paint directly, and without too much concern about rightness, 
placement or resolution. As a pictorial structure emerges, I begin to make sense of 
spatial relationships, tonal values and the play of shapes and marks. I come into 
contact with the surface of a work and take account of what it does and how it informs 
the movement of material. I work off a ground of zinc white, in part to re-introduce a 
slipperiness lost during the priming of the metal surface with acid etch primer (which 
roughens the metal for greater cohesion), but also to ensure that colour is lifted—zinc 
is a low intensity white, creating heavier tints more slowly than titanium white.590  
 
2.2: Exposing Medium 
The shift to working on an aluminium support has been indicative of more than a 
desire to exchange one surface for another (for the sake of it, and irrespective of likely 
changes that such a shift might bring about in respect of questions of medium). In 
painting – and very practically (not theoretically), to disclose the nature of a surface is 
to conceal it—a support’s surface becomes surface in painting by being covered in 
paint.591 Moreover, there have been consequences, notably: the shift in palette, from 
cooler greys to more luminous and vibrant arrangements containing a variety of pinks, 																																																								
589 To advance, here, is to change for the purpose of making more of. 
590 Lifting, in this context, means pulling through (material pigment through material pigment). 
591 Or by its adjacency to surfaces covered with paint (consider in respect of Johns and Rauschenberg, 
and, in particular, their incorporation of non-painted objects). 
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purples, greens and oranges—colours more immediately realised and at greater risk 
from prolonged reworking. My rationale in this regard was simple: to showcase the 
fundamentals of painting – the formal, the material, and the linguistic (Fig. 5E) – 
unadorned: resolved or else resolving.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5E 
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I have addressed the following areas of practice: The edge: in small works, the edge is 
prominent. I wanted, here, to re-think the relationship of surface to edge in light of my 
exploration of the material constituents of the painted object. Joining wooden supports 
had raised my awareness of the edge’s significance. To downplay the edge – or at least 
to negate its propensity to distract – is to foreground the surface, and vice versa.592 
The surface: in being newly foregrounded (in having its usual counterpart restricted to 
2 mm), the surface is thus permitted a more singular mode of being, allowing the skin 
of the painted film to attain a primacy. Paint in and of itself: impossible, owing to the 
intrusiveness of pareidolic possibility.593 However, in so far as I can cutback on 
distractions, the reduction of layers of painted material to one – established wet-in-wet 
– permits me to consider paint (in its transference from a liquid to a solid state) at its 
most immediate. The elimination of subsequent skins, common in my works 
(especially those on wood) up to this point, is a strategy to expose surface, or to 
contend with its limits. Medium has no form of expression. Medium is the expression 
of form. Form mediums. 
 
2.3: Writing in Painting 
My interest in painting stems from how it is that paint serves to construct language, 
not how language opposes a concern for pictorial space. This seems like a small 
distinction, and yet on it hinges a large part of this investigation. To write is to picture, 
and picturing in painting is constructed from painterly structures that sit on/as surface. 
I am not addressing qualitative matters here, for this is not an inquiry into aesthetic 
and/or ethical judgements in and of themselves. A more pressing concern has been the 
extent to which medium is pictured. I have incorporated all or part of the words paint 
and painting in some recent works, with these words chosen for their proximity to 
painting: as words, they designate the work’s constitution: as letters they sit spatially 
within the schema of the work—as pictures (Fig. 5F). Writing can be used to 
overcome painter’s block. It can bridge the work’s space and sit atop of its image, 
foregrounding the underneathness of surface. It has material and optical extension. 
 
																																																								
592 Though edge is also surface, owing to relative thickness, I define it, for this purpose, as all that is not 
the front face of the work. See: Mick Finch, “Supports/Surfaces: Contexts and Issues”, 1999. 
593 For a definition of pareidolia, see: footnote 423. 
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Fig. 5F 
 
Specificity denotes belonging uniquely to a particular subject or thing. Is medium a 
subject or thing? Here, it is. It is conceptually frameable, relatable to other subjects, 
and able to be historicised within artistic and philosophical discourses. It connects to 
what I do in the studio, but is not what I do. As a noun it designates the malleable 
material from which paintings are constructed. It denotes other substances, too, but 
appears not to cover the tools for making paintings, nor the supports on which the 
material of paint rests (at least not as a painted work). This is what medium as material 
means. I have sought, in this work, to present medium as something else. Here, I am 
writing about medium and its positioning, and, in so doing, I hope to test my claim 
that medium is structurally bound up in the confluence of language and material: the 
former knowable through the latter, and the latter through the former. In following 
Heidegger’s lead, separations come after the fact: thus, language names its locality.                                                                                                                                                    
 
2.4: Painting in Writing  
For writing to distract from painting is for it to oppose painting’s picture. As image, it 
sits within. As opposition to image, it breaks with the pictorial and the material and 
opens up its own abstract space, which, according to Lessing’s famous hypothesis, is 
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nevertheless temporal.594 To see medium, is to have medium become operable as a 
result of linguistic functionality in situ. Grounded – based – beached—the structure of 
words serves to structure the structure of words. In painting, writing operates as other. 
It is made concrete. In writing, painting operates as another, in so far as it is added to 
writing. Painted passages with words cloak language, making themselves present as 
distraction. They hint enough at picture to picturise the words: to situate the word as 
form. Thus, the painting showcases the word as word—its wordiness and wordedness. 
 
It is possible to re-write Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle to accommodate these ideas, 
and to position them as constitutive in respect of medium’s formulation. In sum: the 
work-world of a painting sits in relation to a painting’s surface-subject, which, in turn, 
sits in relation to it, and also to a painting’s probable activities, namely: painting and/ 
or writing. All three designations depend on the other two for their sense (Table 16). 
 
 
Table 16: The Medium Circle 
 
To be medium is to be other than language. To be medium is to be other than activity. 
To be medium is to be other than that which language names as material, or which 
names painting as endeavour. It is to be this unsatisfactorily named thing (please don’t 
take this use of thing to designate an entity with material properties/physical extension 
that waits in the world to be named) and language.  
 
 
 																																																								
594 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting, trans. 
Edward Allen McCormick (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press), 1962. 
Surface-
Subject 
Work-World 
Paint-Write 
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Part 3: Writing Part 2: Writing Medium 
 
 
Prior to the first numbered heading there is an eight-line verse in rhyming couplets, 
structured as iambic pentameter. The verse relates the making of a painting – its 
activities and thought processes – and refers to the genres of painting that serve, 
subsequently, to circumscribe it. It attests to the temporal and spatial aspects of a work 
– including material and cognitive shifts – and to its status as a wet and dry object. 
 
3.1: Works on Aluminium 
The text begins by describing a working method and how it is that the painter uses 
painting to promote the making of a painting. The writing presents its key concerns – 
language and material – and the entanglement of these within painted works. There is 
a section that deals with structure and placement, before foregrounding a lack of 
authorial concern for an initial rightness. The employment of an acid etch primer – and 
the roughness it gives rise to – is held responsible for to the use of a zinc ground—to 
overcome the rough texture and re-introduce a slippery surface. The helpful properties 
of zinc white are subsequently contrasted with the unsuitability of titanium white. 
 
3.2: Exposing Medium 
The text states that the move to aluminium amounts to more than a desire to exchange 
one surface for another, though a reason is not given, other than it not being the result 
of a whim. Subsequently, painting is seen to reveal surface, and vice versa. Changes in 
colour use and tonality are deemed to have been an outcome of this shift, and there is 
ambiguity as to whether this was part of the rationale or else a fortuitous result. Then, 
it is discovered that there is indeed a rationale for change, and it links to the impact of 
repeated reworking on the brighter colours, but is, in fact, centred on the desire to 
showcase the medium stripped of its earlier artifices. This paragraph concludes by 
offering three areas of practice for particular consideration. These are: the edge, the 
surface, and the idea of painting in and of itself. The key words are emboldened. 
 
Subsequent to the list, a new paragraph begins. Point 1 describes the relationship of 
the surface to the edge, and the reduction of thickness brought about by the 
aluminium: thus changing the ratio and reducing distraction. Point 2 relates the 
newfound immediacy of the skin of the painting: the result of its relationship to the 
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thickness of the edge. Point 3 informs the reader of the impossibility of non-linguistic 
painting: owing to pareidolias. Distractions can, it appears, be downplayed through the 
employment of more immediate processes – wet-in-wet and the reduction of layers – 
which expose the surface in drawing attention to its role in grounding the paint. This is 
considered a limit to painting. Three sentences declaim the relationship between form 
and expression; between medium and expression; and between form and medium.  
 
3.3: Writing in Painting  
The first paragraph details the construction of language in paint, and voices how it is 
that language opposes pictorial space. This is deemed central to the subsequent 
investigation. Writing is described as picturing in painterly structures that constitute a 
surface. Qualitative matters are taken, here, to be an aside—which include ethical and 
aesthetic concerns. At stake is whether language serves to picture the medium. The 
words paint and painting have been used in the paintings themselves, for both formal 
and linguistic reasons. There is a reminder, also, that words – as letters – have spatial 
extension and, consequently, sit as pictures too. Writing is described as a solution to 
painterly difficulties – painter’s block – in so far as words can sit on top of images. 
This shows off the image as a surface and, therefore, as both material and optical.  
 
Specificity is defined as belonging to. The writing offers commentary on the nature of 
medium specificity, and on the frameability of the subject itself: medium can thus be 
approached and discussed within discourse. Medium connects with what the painter 
does, but is not what he does. Medium is paint and other things too. However, as a 
label, it is not the tools of painting, or the surfaces to which paint is applied. Medium 
is something else, and, in writing about medium, the author hopes to test his claim that 
medium is bound to linguistic possibility and structural form: operable reciprocally. 
The division of form and content comes after the fact: in language. In following 
Heidegger, languages names its placement in the world. Placement permits its naming.  
 
3.4: Painting in Writing 
This tells of the relationship between distraction and image in painting. Lessing’s 
opposition of space to time points towards a temporality of writing, as it occupies an 
abstract space between the material and the optical. Medium draws in words, 
according to the logic of Heidegger’s hypothesis. Grounded in painting, words are 
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additive—adding to picture. Paint’s alongsidedness distracts. In pointing to pictures, 
painting makes pictures of words. Therefore, the word’s equipmentality is shown.595  
 
Next is a circular diagram, of 7-8 cm diameter, labelled Table 16: The Medium Circle. 
This contains three equal sections, separated by small gaps. Three pale blue arrows 
circle their exterior. The sections are coloured: Red, blue and yellow. Red is at the top 
left. Blue is at the top right. Yellow is at the bottom. The red section contains the 
words Paint-Write, in yellow. The blue section contains the words Surface-Subject, in 
red. The Yellow section contains the words Work-World, in blue. The final section 
asserts that medium is more than language, and more than that which language names 
as material. That which it named is not revealed. To be medium is repeated. The author 
expresses a wish not to have the word thing taken to mean an entity with properties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
595 Consider Wittgenstein’s sense of the difference between showing and saying. In the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, he set clear limits on the latter in respect of the functionality of language. In the 
only recorded comment he made about Heidegger (1929), Wittgenstein acknowledged that he knew 
what Heidegger meant when he spoke of being and angst, against the boundaries of language. 
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Part 4: The Paintings 
 
 
The period of working from a studio at the RCA lasted one year. All of the works on 
aluminium come from this time. Unlike those on wood, and, owing to the need to 
maintain the paint’s wetness, I worked on individual paintings in sequence. None of 
the works were rotated in the making (all had their up and down determined in 
advance). Also of note, in consideration of differences, was the fact that I did not use 
extremely thinned paint, the result of having to work on the panels vertically rather 
than horizontally: a logistical consideration and also an attempt to promote opacity.596 
The following are a selection from the works produced during this period of time. 
Figs. 5K, 5L show groupings of works on hardwood, from the period 2010-2017.597 
 
4.1: (Fig. 5G) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5G 																																																								
596 A small limitation to the possibilities of illusionism, brought about by a denial of transparency.  
597 See: Chapter 1 for details the context and approach to this body of work. 
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4.2: (Fig. 5H) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5H 
 
4.3: (Fig. 5I) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5I 
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4.4: (Fig. 5J) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5J 
 
4.5: (Figs. 5K, 5L) 
 
 
 
Fig. K 
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Fig. 5L 
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Conclusion 
 
 
I set out to explore medium specificity with regard to the practice of painting. To 
circumscribe the enquiry meant to position my practice in respect of material and 
linguistic particularities, and also to chart a path through the dominant theoretical 
discourse from which the notion of medium specificity emerged, and to consider the 
implications and effects of new concepts, but also of amendments to older ideas.598 
The process of grouping and sequencing has necessitated omissions. As such, this 
work makes no claim to provide an overview of formalist-oriented thinking.599 Nor is 
there an attempt to moor Greenbergian discourse within a broader cultural expanse.600 
If formalism has provided a systematic method of advance – in the form of a host of 
concepts and phrases – then its usefulness, now, is wedded to its propensity to 
comment on the condition of painting(s) today, and to thereby test its claims. 
 
The central aim has been to identify what is meant by medium – in painting – and to 
consider, too, the workings of theoretical models that either dispense with medium as 
a discrete concept, or else downgrade its significance. I would like, moreover, to have 
shed light on my own work, and on painting practices more generally: and, in the 
process, to have problematised announcements as to painting’s end. This has not been 
an effort to demarcate a privileged space for painting. My objective was simply to 
demonstrate the deceptive ease with which painting is partially positioned, with the 
particularity of its bearing becoming lost to generalisation.601 I have sought, also, to 
provide a ground on which to understand painting’s object and processes, and, in so 
doing, to differentiate useful contextual frameworks from those that sanction stories. 
 
The problem of materiality troubled formalist thinkers, from Riegl to Greenberg (that 
flatness is never flat, and surface is always of). Fried’s sidestep – the entrenchment of 																																																								
598 Intervals include those at important historical moments, but also take into consideration intervals in 
practice (in the act of practising), when the alignment of an idea with a moment of painting means more 
than at another time.  
599 With the exception, perhaps, of Fry and Bell, none of the writers whose works have been addressed 
in this study would have classified themselves as wholly formalist. Indeed, many openly and repeatedly 
opposed what might be taken to be formalism’s narrowest approaches to understanding the meaning of 
works. 
600 Something Caroline Jones has already done, and recently, in Eyesight Alone. 
601 Subject, that is, to the vagaries of the post-medium condition, where all distinctions dissolve into 
nothingness. 
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the conditions of encounter (determined by the work) – served to reframe the debate. 
However, if that which is required to compel conviction is wholly of the work –
through its denial of audience (the result of presentness) – then the reverse must be the 
case, namely: that the presence (objecthood) of the non-work (in its embrace of 
audience) is wholly of the non-work. If to be of opposes not being of, then to not be of 
is a recognition of connectedness too—to the not of, and to the non-shape. Therefore, 
it follows that Fried’s deployment of shape – as something that belongs to the work – 
stands in opposition to an idea of non-belonging shape as belonging to the non-work. 
This, however, is contradictory.602 Also, the conflation of site and encounter (sites are 
locations, encounters are dialogues) does not address the central issue of causality—
the link between belonging to and grace. In other words, how do belonging-shapes 
promote a belonged-to mode of address, other than through belonging? Without a 
physical notion of medium to hang on to, Fried languishes in Plato’s Cave, in need of 
a temporal glue to cement the particularity of one’s comportment to its presumed 
cause.  
 
The reimagining of the medium – by Krauss and, later, Bois – is also burdened, yet by 
its refutation of Fried’s idealist space.603 In seeking to disconnect the artwork from its 
utopian conjectures, Krauss wrests it from its hiding place and drags it headlong into 
the world of things. In her attempts to protect the work – whilst still affording it 
distinctions – she erects a holding bay—a serviceable space between work and world 
that functions to shield the former from the latter through what amounts to dialogic 
buffer across a contiguous border. In disavowing the dislocation of form from content, 
through the notion of apparatus – a confluence of structural tributaries – Krauss is 
compelled find an alternative method of resisting the dissolution of the work into the 
mundanity of the everyday (apparatus is no more protected than flatness is from 
dissolution, yet it takes longer to dissolve). This she does by positing a form of 
																																																								
602 This appears as if it can be countered with an assertion that non-belonging shape doesn’t belong. 
However, to assert this is to deny shape its connectedness not only to the work, but also to the world. 
603 Krauss’s initial objection to medium specificity, it is worth restating, lay in its taintedness within a 
Greenbergian framework that, to her, unjustifiably promoted purity and flatness as protectionist devices. 
See: James Meyer’s “The Writing of Art and Objecthood”, in Refracting Vision, eds. Jill Beaulieu, 
Mary Roberts and Toni Ross (Sydney: Power Publications, 2000), 83-85, for a detailed consideration of 
the difference between Fried’s and Krauss’s notions of time and space. 
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lubricated imbrication, with both spatial and temporal equivalence—in the aftermath 
of a meeting of a snail and a pane of glass, the glass leaves no trace of itself.604   
 
Medium specificity results from the desire to root meaning in internal particularities—
in the in of the work.605 The advent of modern media – with its exponentially 
expanding proliferation of forms of information – has cast doubts on assurances as to 
meaning’s location—of the role played by the ingredients of the work in respect of its 
import.606 More recent thinking about medium denies it a stable sense of substance 
(and/or essence), situating painting within networks of interconnecting ideas: some re-
tread a modernist past, while others speculate on the role of the maker; or on the 
impact of technology; or on the joins between a now and a then.607 My wish, then, is 
to have established practical and philosophical grounds for a reconsideration of the 
terms of these and related debates, and for the re-application of formalist and 
Heideggerian terminology. I propose that a phenomenological model avoids some of 
the difficulties of other approaches and affords an opportunity to ground an 
understanding of medium specificity – and the conditions from which judgments on 
the characteristics of a painting are made – in the immanent circumstances of one’s 
intentionality.608  
 
Philip Guston declared that: “we are image-makers and image-ridden”.609 In a 
painting, however, the means by which an image takes shape, the material from which 
it is fashioned, and the final form of its fashioning are all bound to showing.610 
Through a demonstration of the partiality of a wholly material or else wholly linguistic 
model of painting, I have shown – as painting and in writing – that the image-aspect of 
a painting is never free of its painterly constructedness, nor the material unburdened 
by its inclination to conjure an image. A painting’s subject is in and of its temporalised 																																																								
604 Here, the snail is the work. In reflecting on the achievements of Fried and Krauss (at least in this 
particular area), I feel compelled to comment on what I can only describe, in respect of Fried, as a deep 
sense of close-knitted yet ultimately magnificent failure, and, in respect of Krauss, of some dazzling – 
rhizomatic and overstretched – successes, achieved at the cost of a certain poetry of possibility. 
605 What Krauss refers to as, “a pointing to itself” (Under Blue Cup, 4). 
606 Photography, then radio, film, television, video and the Internet. 
607 Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Isabelle Graw, Painting Beyond Itself, 8.  
608 One’s directed-towardsness. Intentionality (from the Latin intentio and intendere, meaning: the state 
of being directed towards). It was used in philosophy by Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who greatly 
influenced Husserl. 
609 Transcript of a panel held in March 1960, at the Philadelphia Museum School of Art, in Abstract 
Expressionism Creators and Critics, ed., Clifford Ross (New York: Abrams Publishers, 1990), 61. 
610 The picture-process of painting…always novel, yet of the past…and pressing towards. 
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object, whose surfaces face outwards. Thus, as Finch implies, in his liminal 
positioning of the Supports/Surfaces group (in respect of Greenberg and Minimalism), 
language is not a bridge to the materially manifest: it is materially manifest.611 Imagine 
no depiction, and no materials too. Painting pictures pictures painting.  
 
In terms of my contribution to knowledge, I would hope – in practice and theory – to 
have shed light on the complex connectedness of medium specificity to notions of 
time, object-work, practice, history, picture, place and encounter. In mapping 
Heidegger’s ontological ordering – and the caesura – onto the materials and processes 
of painting, the equipmental structure of the medium can become visible as a form of 
functionality, which discloses and conceals in the course of shaping a painting’s 
present.612 That a painting is the result of concerns that predate it, need not, in itself, 
diminish the centrality of the object to which meaning is subsequently ascribed; yet it 
can stall the process of disclosure, at times when concerns are projected onto the 
work.613 At such times, the painting is, in its cloaked condition, a thing to be seen to 
be.614 Painting is too often talked around; burdened by the requirement of answering—
of pointing elsewhere. Such a demand misses the point, namely: that each occurrence 
of painting stands not as an invitation to ask of, but as an instance of affirmation.615 In 
its limitations, a painting acquires its identity as a performer of possibilities. 
Thinglyness is ubiquitous to the world, and painterliness is ubiquitous to painting.616  
 
																																																								
611 Mick Finch, “Supports/Surfaces: Contexts and Issues”, 1999. 
612 It is important to consider, at this juncture, that, to Hölderlin, the caesura amounted to nothing less 
than a tear in the fabric of representation itself. 
613 By projected concerns, I mean the intrusion of contextual impositions. These concerns include: the 
life and times of its author, and his intentions. Spectatorship invokes the post-dated too. See: Adrian 
Forty, Objects of Desire: Design and Society Since 1750, 8. To A. J. Ayer (1910-1989) – and the 
Logical Positivists – that which is true, is so only if a sense of what it would be to establish a 
proposition as false is also present (Language, Truth and Logic). However, this assumes truth to be 
measurable, quantifiable and ultimately verifiable. To Heidegger, verifiability comes after the fact, as 
something one might choose to pursue with one’s situatedness in the world, rather than something one 
requires in order to shore up one’s sense of truth. 
614 In effect, at the mercy – for good and ill – of one’s storytelling capabilities. With the Greek temple, 
Heidegger deems this state of affairs possible by, among other things, a physical dislocation from site. 
In painting, cloaking involves theoretical and/or historical marking, which serves to hide in revealing 
(explaining). 
615 Consider in relation to what Joselit calls staging meaning, in “Marking, Scoring, Storing, and 
Speculating (on Time)”, 2013, in Painting Beyond Itself, 11. 
616 Not a painterliness derived of gesture, handling or rich impastos, but simply a painterliness drawn 
from the sense of a work being a painting, and consequently not being that which is not a painting.  
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To become attentive to the painted object is to become receptive to its material and 
temporal extensions. It is to understand that content is, in fact, formed by, through and 
as media and processes. Therefore, medium is less a quantifiable property than it is a 
phenomenological foundation that licences moments of disclosure. To embrace 
uncertainty as to the medium’s designation is to remain open—to know a painting as 
both an is and an as.617 It is as medium that a painting attains its particularities and 
shortcomings: its distinctions and possibilities. To take both feet out of the river is to 
no longer be in the river—it is to rest outside of painting’s reach. To point to a work is 
to point to or at its residual material and ideological constraints. This pointing to is 
also, however, as Krauss stated in her critique of Greenberg, a pointing through or 
past: past that which is pointed to – past the presence of Graw’s absent author – to 
delineate a moment of iteration on the horizon of being.618 I end this with an appeal to 
connect with what painting can be, through extending one’s awareness of what it has 
been. For only in unknowing the stasis of a painting’s now is one able to mobilise its 
workings, to come to a fuller understanding of the truths of its medium specificity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
617 W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, 17. There is an interesting parallel to be made 
with Keats’s concept of Negative Capability (Man’s embrace of the Penetralium of mystery). Keats 
capitalises both negative capability and penetralium. In The Letters of John Keats: Volumes I & II, ed. 
H. H. Rollins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 193-4. 
618 Isabelle Graw, “The Value of Liveliness”, in Painting Beyond Itself, 81. In the closing sections of The 
Paradoxes of Art, 242-243, Paskow criticises the pervasive notion that theory is that which allows one 
to see through one’s untutored apprehensions in search of knowledge: on the grounds that, to see 
through, is to see through ourselves too…and to end, therefore, with/at nothing. 	
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Motifs used in my paintings since 2010. 
 
Aqueduct  
Arch 
Arm 
Asteroid 
Balloon  
Bark 
Basket 
Beach 
Bin 
Bird table  
Blind 
Blood 
Blossom 
Boat 
Bowl 
Bowling green 
Boxer  
Branch  
Breast 
Brook  
Bridge 
Bucket 
Bush 
Buttocks 
Cactus 
Canal 
Castle 
Cat 
Chimney 
Chrysalis 
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Cigar  
Claw 
Cliff 
Cloud  
Cockerel 
Container 
Cooling tower  
Cow  
Cowboy 
Crow 
Cup 
Curtain 
Dinosaur 
Diver 
Dog 
Dome 
Door  
Dress 
Eye 
Face 
Feather 
Fence 
Field 
Finger  
Fire 
Firework 
Fish 
Flower 
Foot 
Fort 
Frame  
Fruit 
Glass 
Gondola 
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Goose 
Gorge  
Greenhouse 
Hair 
Hand  
Handle  
Hat  
Head 
Hedge 
Helmet 
Heron  
Hill 
Horizon  
Horse  
House 
Hut  
Hydrant 
Insect 
Ladder 
Lake 
Land 
Lava 
Leaf  
Leg 
Letter 
Lighthouse 
Luggage 
Lunar rover 
Man 
Map 
Mask 
Monk 
Monster 
Monument 
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Moon 
Mountain  
Mushroom 
Necklace 
Number 
Organ 
Pail 
Palm 
Path 
Penguin 
Penis 
Pigeon  
Pipe  
Plant 
Poplar  
Post 
Pot 
Profile 
Punch bag 
Pylon  
Rail 
Ribbon 
Road 
Road sign 
Rock 
Rocket 
Roof 
Rope 
Rotunda 
Saddle 
Sea 
Sea horse 
Sea lion  
Shadow 
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Shed 
Ship 
Shoe 
Shrub  
Silver birch 
Sky  
Smoke signal  
Snow  
Soil 
Stile 
Street lamp 
Sunset  
Swan 
Table 
Tail 
Television 
Tent 
Toadstool 
Toilet  
Tornado  
Toucan 
Train 
Tree 
Tree stump 
Urn 
Van  
Vase 
Viaduct  
Volcano 
Wall  
Watering can 
Wave 
Web 
Whale 
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Wig 
Window 
Wire 
Woman 
Word 
Worm  
Zeppelin  
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Appendix 2 
 
 
This section provides two things. First, a glossary of four key terms – terms used by 
Clement Greenberg in the construction of his framework of thought – and, secondly, a 
short account of the emergence of medium specificity within formalist discourse.619 
The concerns of Chapter 2 of this thesis, and, moreover, of many of the theoretical 
positions that have arisen as responses to Greenberg’s thinking – as refutation, 
endorsement or extension – result, in part at least, from certain assumptions as to what 
it is that is meant by the following terms – Medium, Medium Specificity, Flatness and 
Opticality – offered here in the order in which they appear within Greenberg’s 
published writings.620 The lexicon for this area of discourse is especially important, 
and more recent additions to its body of terminology – terms devised by Yve-Alain 
Bois, Isabelle Graw, David Joselit, and others – require familiarity with earlier ideas to 
acquire their particular sense. 
 
 
1. Glossary of Greenbergian Terms 
 
Medium 
Generally, a medium describes an intervening substance through which forces are 
transmitted, or impressions left. It also denotes a means of doing something. It is in 
“Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 1940, that Greenberg first mentions the material of 
paint.621 He writes that, in the middle of the seventeenth century the physical medium 
of paint was cheap and mobile.622 By this time, artists had acquired enough of a 
command of the material to: “annihilate it seemingly in favour of illusion”.623 And so, 
an opposition thus emerges between the physical stuff of paint and all of the other 
																																																								
619 It is useful here to make a distinction between term and concept. Term is lexical, denoting the 
naming of, and concept is what is held to be an idea, and therefore brings with it a cognitive dimension. 
However, within Greenberg’s writings, this blurs, and what is named tends to denote a complex 
structure of thought. 
620 In the case of opticality, though the term itself is unused in his earliest writings, that which it 
designates – its sphere of operability – is nevertheless made clear. 
621 Yve-Alain Bois has commented on Greenberg’s increasing indifference to the actual stuff of which 
paintings are made. Yve-Alain Bois, “Whose Formalism”, 1996, accessed April 14, 2018, 
https://www.mu tualart.com/Article/Whose-formalism-/6B323BBF31A195F8. 
622 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and 
Criticism, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 24. 
623 Ibid. 
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things that a painting has or does.624 This, then, permits Greenberg to write of a 
transference of emphasis (in painting from this period up until the middle of the 
nineteenth century) – from medium to subject matter – with, correspondingly, a 
desired suppression of what he terms “the role of the medium”—of what it is that the 
medium might do or be, given the chance.625 
 
Medium Specificity 
A distinction between medium and medium specificity begins to emerge, in 
Greenberg’s writings, in Section V of “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, when he states 
that: “Painting and sculpture can become more completely nothing but what they do 
[…], they look what they do”.626 Here, what they do is provide a particular sensation. 
Moreover, painting is seen to emphasise not only its medium, but also its medium’s 
specific difficulties.627 In following Lessing’s example, these difficulties are 
seemingly spatial (as opposed to being temporal), which, in the case of Lessing, served 
to underpin his most famous distinction, between poetry and painting.628 Greenberg, in 
looking to music for a sense of purity – the result of its abstraction (freedom from 
subject matter) – found, for painting, an apparatus on which to engineer a retreat from 
the imaginary and the literary towards the self-referential. To Benjamin Buchloh: 
“[t]he formalist concept of self-referentiality had been a theoretical prescription which 
art until around 1965 had to abide”.629 
 
“To restore the identity of an art the opacity of its medium must be emphasized. For 
the visual arts the medium is discovered to be physical”.630 This notion of restoration 
is interesting, and, to Greenberg, ensured that medium specificity carried with it a 
																																																								
624 This can be considered the moment that, for Greenberg, subject matter takes secondary importance. 
625 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 25. This suppression is brought about, in large 
part, by Romanticism, the result of its appeal to the imaginative as method of retreat, in opposition to 
the seen.  Thus, for Greenberg, modernist painters strove to overcome this state of affairs and return the 
medium to visibility. 
626 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 34. 
627 Ibid. 
628 In its spatiality, the medium of paint is a suitable grounding to accommodate the spatiality of 
pictures. 
629 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American 
Art from 1955 to 1975, 12. 
630 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 32. Interestingly, Greenberg claims that the 
medium of poetry is psychological (sub or supra-logical) – appealing to general consciousness rather 
than intelligence – which draws him, in respect of poetry at least, somewhat closer to Krauss’s later 
notion of apparatus. 
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sense of returning to and freeing from, in pursuit of a purified form of painting.631 
Michael Fried and Rosalind Krauss would later take up the seeming ambivalence as to 
a temporal component to the medium’s specificity in respect of how it is that a work is 
received. This would involve the consideration of shape as medium, and distance as 
method.632 
 
Flatness 
Within Greenberg’s texts, flatness denotes something other than the property of having 
a level surface, and is not to be confused with utter flatness; an impossibility in 
painting.633 In “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”, 1939, in respect of Picasso’s paintings (in 
distinction from Ilya Repin’s works of kitsch), Greenberg writes of the, “impression 
left by the plastic values [of painting]”.634 The properties of this plastic value are 
greatly expanded on in “Towards a Newer Laocoon”. In Section V, Greenberg, for the 
first time, ties flatness to medium, stating that the: “resistance [of painting’s medium] 
consists chiefly in the flat picture plane’s denial of efforts to hole through it for 
realistic perspectival space”.635 To Greenberg, this moment served to rid painting of 
the stains of both imitation and literature.636 Later in the essay, Greenberg asserts that: 
“the pristine flatness of the stretched canvas constantly struggles to overcome every 
other element”.637 
 
In “Modernist Painting”, 1960, the stressing of flatness is couched in terms of an 
essential contradiction—the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the picture plane 
within or above illusionistic concessions whilst retaining a distinction from the world 
outside.638 Thierry de Duve has described how this integrity acted as a bulwark against 
																																																								
631 The notion of purity caused Greenberg a great deal of trouble, especially its use in Modernist 
Painting. In later interviews, he emphasised his placement of quotation marks around the term. 
632 Distance, here, means distance from the work in respect of what it is that is required for it to become 
operable as work. See: Chapter 2, 3.3.1.1 and 3.4.1 for an analysis of these issues. 
633 The result of both its material’s character and its propensity to picture. 
634 Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”, in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and 
Criticism, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 16. Ilya Yefimovich Repin (1844-
1930) was a renowned Russian realist painter. 
635 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 34. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Ibid., 36. 
638 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting”, in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and 
Criticism, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 90. 
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the sculptural too.639 Greenberg reminds the reader of the need to exaggerate, claiming 
that: “[t]he heightened sensitivity of the picture plane may no longer permit sculptural 
illusion, or trompe-l’oeil, but it does and must permit optical illusion”.640 He argues 
that with modernist paintings: “one is made aware of the flatness […] before, instead 
of after, being made aware of what the flatness contains”.641 Like Maurice Denis 
before him, Roger Fry had recognised this, but had not explored its implications in 
respect of the medium.642 To Greenberg, it was: “the stressing of the ineluctable 
flatness of the surface of a painting that remained, however, more fundamental than 
anything else to the process by which pictorial art criticized and defined itself under 
Modernism”.643  
 
Opticality 
Greenberg’s emphasis on opticality, which Caroline Jones has described as a 
positivistic management of the senses in mid-twentieth century America, is central to 
his project—judgment was response only, and it was the look of modernist paintings 
that supplied the criteria with which to test it.644 Yet it is the downplaying of other 
modes of sensory knowledge – in particular, the separation of seeing from touching – 																																																								
639 Thierry de Duve, in Reconstructing Modernism: Art in New York, Paris, and Montreal 1945-64, ed. 
Serge Guilbaut (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990), 250. 
640 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist painting”, 90. Manet, Post-Impressionism and Cubism brought 
painting’s longstanding reliance on perspective to an end. Thus, Greenberg asserted that it was not the 
recognisable object that had been abandoned by modernist painting, but the type of space; pictorial 
space superseded fake three-dimensional space. 
641 Ibid., 87.  
642 Maurice Denis (1870-1943) was a French Symbolist painter, decorative artist and writer, who 
offered an influential reminder of the priority of the integrity of the painting ahead of the concerns of 
the picture, by asserting that a painting is essentially a flat surfaced covered with colours assembled in a 
certain order. 
643 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist painting”, 87.	
644 Caroline A. Jones’s Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg's Modernism and the Bureaucratization of 
the Senses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Support for this came from Immanuel Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment, 1790. Kant identified four reflective judgments: the agreeable, the good, the 
beautiful and the sublime. It is his concept of the beautiful that is relevant here, which he defines, 
paradoxically, as a subjective-universal judgment. The judgment that something is beautiful is a 
subjective one, yet it is made from a conviction that others will agree with it, even though they may not. 
The beautiful appears to be constructed with purpose, though it serves no practical purpose. This 
purposiveness without purpose serves to establish the beautiful as beautiful, and functions to separate 
out objects of beauty from those without beauty. Though the beauty that Kant writes of is not contained 
within the object of scrutiny, the object, nevertheless, must be able to be seen to be beautiful, which in 
turn legitimises its subsequent labelling as an object of beauty. To discern a purposiveness without 
purpose the beholder must firstly discern no purpose, and, secondly, must retain a position of 
disinterestedness in respect of the non-purposive object. To respond to a work of art as a result of 
associations (e.g., red reminds me of home) is to acknowledge agreeableness, and, when intuiting 
beauty, the agreeable acts only to distract, re-introducing learned responses that short-circuit intuition 
and undermine the aesthetic. 
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that became problematic to those who saw the privileging of the optical as a willed 
reduction of the richness of experience, and as a method of retaining a separation 
between art and life.645  
 
This aside, opticality acted, in fact, as something more than an appeal to visual effects. 
In “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, Greenberg asserts that both painting and sculpture, 
“look what they do”.646 However, in his subsequent analysis of pictorial space, he does 
not name opticality per se, although it becomes clear that he is framing seeing within a 
broader sphere of activity, as that which maintains itself in proximity to the 
material.647 In considering the increasing shallowness of the picture plane – a seeing 
less – as integral to a realisation of the characteristics of the painted support, 
Greenberg roots an optical primacy in the activity of resisting a conflation of painting 
and picture.648 Hal Foster has described the notion of pure opticality as one of the two 
doctrines (along with Clive Bell’s idea of significant form) to which modernist 
painting pledged allegiance.649 
 
In The Optical Unconscious, Krauss differentiates, in respect of the formalism of 
Roger Fry, two types of seeing.650 The look that sees is opposed to the look that sorts. 
The latter denotes an everyday form of attendance to (things with which one is 
familiar), and the former points to what is potentially important about the formal 
arrangement of things.651 In effect, this model of seeing and suspending seeing, when 
combined with flatness and a sense of medium, became that on which Greenberg 
erected his formalist framework. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
645 To Alois Riegl, the optic and the haptic were dialectically connected, acting as a method of advance 
for the arts of earlier times. Michael Fried would adopt this position, too, in respect of modernist 
painting.  
646 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 34. 
647 Ibid., 35. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: Art and Theory at the End of the Century: Avant-garde at the 
End of the Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 4. 
650 Rosalind Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 141. 
651 Ibid. 
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2. Medium Specificity within Formalism 
 
The relation between formalism and medium is a somewhat slippery one – until we get 
to Clement Greenberg – primarily because Greenberg’s formalism, unlike Alois 
Riegl’s, is conditioned by developments in modernist practices, and, unlike Fry’s, 
eschews a notion of design per se. Greenberg envisioned “Towards a Newer Laocoon” 
as a modern companion piece to Lessing’s “Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of 
Poetry and Painting”, in which Lessing had defined poetry as a temporal art and 
painting as a spatial one.652 However, medium specificity – what Rosalind Krauss 
referred to as, “a pointing-to-itself” – came late to formalist writing.653 To understand 
its nuanced development is thus, in part, to consider both a type of questioning and a 
locatable period of changing ideas that originated in Austria and Germany before 
emigrating to Great Britain, then on to the United States. Greenberg, disliking Roger 
Fry’s interdisciplinary reach, re-directed attention from the extrinsic values of design 
to the intrinsic flatness of the painted object, in opposition to the sculptural.654 What 
came to matter was the vehicle itself—not what form evidenced, but how it was. Fry 
thus failed to ground a workable mechanism for the aesthetic in the conditions of the 
object itself.655  
 
In Problems of style: Foundations for a History of Ornament, Riegl, under the 
influence of Hegel, set out to counter a technical-materialist view of ornamentation, in 
which formal properties of design in textiles and other areas were deemed little more 
than a logical consequence of an availability of materials and an application of 
artisanal processes and techniques.656 Osborne contends that, for Riegl, form became 
objectivised as autonomous spirit, from which he developed the concept of 																																																								
652 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting, trans. 
Edward Allen McCormick (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press), 1962. 
653 Rosalind Krauss, Under Blue Cup (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 4. 
654 Christopher Reed, The Roger Fry Reader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 278-9. 
655 The progressive surrender to the resistance of its medium was, for Greenberg, part of the solution to 
a form of aesthetic homelessness, evident in Fry, that permitted a creeping indeterminacy to develop 
between the work as cause and its presumed aesthetic effect. 
656 In the mid-nineteenth century, for the professors of the Vienna School (in respect of painting), form 
consisted largely of shape, harnessed within a structural framework that sat behind the surface of the 
work, yet operated through it; and style denoted the particularity or configuration that a work evidenced. 
Many at the Vienna School worked with museum collections as curators or advisors and developed 
ideas in response to the objects within their purview. This nearness to the structures of art compelled a 
specific understanding of the relationships among objects, the consequence of which drew the artwork 
closer to the response to it. 
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Kunstwollen.657 To Riegl, who believed in various modes of stylistic circumscription, 
a formed unity of practices appealed. Earlier accounts of the development of 
ornamentation failed to provide a distinct sense of historical interconnectedness, and 
ignored the causes of continuity.658   
 
In Principles of Art History, 1915, Heinrich Wölfflin outlined a system of 
classification designed to facilitate the measurement of visual differences between 
Renaissance and Baroque works.659 He produced a series of markers to measure 
formal developments over several centuries: markers that, through logic and inference, 
could be used to envisage probable change too—to predict the future course of 
development based on observable differences from a publically verifiable present.660 
Wölfflin’s binaries denoted sequences of formal movement, which could be used to 
mark differences between religious and historical works that addressed the same 
theme.661 These markers placed an emphasis on seeing, whilst ensuring the 
subjugation of the iconographic possibilities of images, and also of the material 
through which design became manifest.662 To Wölfflin, art was a language, with a 
grammar and vocabulary that, when grounded by historical specificity, permitted 
utterances in the form of material works. His system made no distinction between the 
characteristics of discrete parts of works in respect of the whole, to the point where a 
painting’s style is recognisable throughout.663 
 
																																																								
657 Riegl envisioned the Kunstwollen as a tendency of an age to drive stylistic development in the arts. 
658 Alois Riegl. Problems of Style: Foundations for a History of Ornament (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992). 
Riegl’s analysis drew on an acute attentiveness to stylistic differences, and resulted in the construal of 
artistic periods – of epochs even – as able to bring with them their own distinct sets of artistic problems, 
which in resolved form served as starting points for the next, and so on—design compels design from 
within, in what Friedrich Nietzsche might have termed the will to ornament.  
659 Wölfflin’s pioneering use of two projectors made formal comparison easier by allowing lecturers and 
students to point to polarities of difference, so as to provide close readings of objects and images from 
disparate times and places. 
660 Heinrich Wölfflin, Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1932). Wölfflin’s works were highly influential, and were translated 
into English earlier than Riegl’s, taking hold more quickly. This was felt first in Britain, then in 
America, where a greater inclination to pragmatism allowed formalism to resonate more strongly still. 
661 Heinrich Wölfflin, Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art. 
Wölfflin binaries included: from linear to painterly, from plane to recession, from closed (techtonic) 
form to open (a-techtonic) form, from multiplicity to unity, and from absolute clarity to relative clarity. 
662 Riegl had conceived of a dialectical interplay of the material and the optical. 
663 Richard Wollheim, On Art and the Mind, Cambridge (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 
201. 
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Roger Fry was the most influential art critic in the English-speaking world, from 1910 
up until the Second World War.664 In 1906, he discovered the works of Paul Cézanne, 
an encounter that would change the course of his life and, indeed, the orientation of art 
criticism thereafter.665 Fry saw in Cézanne how it was possible to pass from the world 
that is actual – or appears to be so – to a plastic form of geometrical simplicity, which 
sat in situ as design.666 In Vision and Design, Fry identified what he subsequently took 
to be Post-Impressionism’s gradual break with Impressionism, the result of a 
withdrawal to earlier values of design and an abandonment of the realism of Monet.667  
This permitted an increased focus on plastic form, or formed arrangements in painting. 
 
In 1914, Clive Bell presented the idea of significant form, declaring nothing outside of 
the formal properties of an artwork to be of any aesthetic relevance.668 Whilst this 
shored up the distinction between form and content, it did little to advance an 
understanding of the causes of form’s significance. To grasp a modernist work, in 
Bell’s analysis, is to discern significance from an arranged conjunction of lines, 
shapes, tones and colours.669 Susan Platt contends that Bell promoted feelings more so 
than Fry, who stressed vision.670 The English formalism of the Bloomsbury Group was 
certainly influenced by Wölfflin’s ideas.671 Fry expounded the notion of classic 
quality, to denote an aesthetic attribute common to the best of ancient and modern 
works, and it was from this point onward that formalism became modern.672 A 																																																								
664 Solomon Fisherman, The Interpretation of Art: Essays on the Art Criticism of John Ruskin, Walter 
Pater, Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Herbert Read (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 2. 
Establishing a reputation as a Renaissance scholar, through works on Giovanni Bellini, and other of the 
Italian Masters, Fry contributed to the founding of The Burlington Magazine, 1903, which he later 
jointly edited. 
665 Christopher Reed, The Roger Fry Reader. Kenneth Clarke considered Fry to be the greatest 
influence on taste since John Ruskin. 
666 In 1910, Fry organised Manet and the Post-Impressionists at the Grafton Galleries, in London, and 
followed it with a second Post-Impressionist exhibition in 1912. On show, in addition to works by 
Edouard Manet and Cézanne, were works by Paul Gauguin, Vincent van Gogh, Henri Matisse, George 
Seurat and Maurice Denis. This exhibition came several years before the so-called Armoury Show took 
place in New York, and permitted a British audience access to the flattened, simplified planes of recent 
French painting.  
667 Which brought with it an undesirable externality – a pointing elsewhere – in Monet’s case, to light. 
668 Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1914). 
669 Bell’s inclusion of colour was novel, and rested on the impossibility of perceiving a colourless space, 
or a formless arrangement of colours. 
670 Susan N. Platt, Modernism in the 1920s (Michigan: UMI Press, 1986), 73. 
671 Roger Fry wrote a positive review of Wölfflin’s The Art of the Italian Renaissance, published in 
Athenaeum in 1903. In 1930 Kenneth Clark delivered lectures at the University of London on the works 
of both thinkers (Reigl, from the German versions of the texts). 
672 With such distillation an effect of thinking, classic quality could be considered a value judgment—
the recognition of an a priori truth. Fry stressed the role of the spectator: in the first instance, in the 
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newfound access to the studio processes of painters – the result of a preponderance of 
easel painting – ignited great interest in the stuff of painting that, in turn, drew 
attention to paint’s formed correlation with surface. 
 
Yet it would be Greenberg, who, in “Towards a Newer Laocoon” set out to establish a 
link between the painting’s picturing form and its actual material presence in the 
world. In sharing Fry’s inclination to address the now, and also Riegl’s desire to 
perpetuate a series of resolutions, Greenberg, in effect, conflated form and content and 
abandoned the notion of design (other than as vague support for the idea of 
compositional rigour), to push the material constituents of painting to the fore. At the 
same time, and in seeming contradiction, he effectively disavowed the substance of 
paint (as of importance in and of itself) in favour of a pictorial situatedness arrived at 
though a particular appeal to the logic of the picture plane.673 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																
honing of an ability to distinguish classic quality from non-classic quality, and, in the second, through a 
pressure to negate knowledge of lived experience (of all that might interfere), so as to garner an 
untainted universal resonance. Additionally, with Fry, form replaced style, with the latter term tending 
to be used to denote the signature mannerism of a painter, or else a characteristic of formal particularity. 
Furthermore, in conceiving of formalism on the back of the Vienna School, Fry’s and Bell’s 
understanding of the characteristics of contemporary French painting (and on the English painting that 
took up in its wake) rested in large part on translations of academic studies of the works of late 
antiquity, the Renaissance and the Baroque. Thus, early twentieth century formalism redeployed a 
toolkit designed to service very different groupings of artworks.  
673 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon”, 34-35. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
This is a transcript of an email exchange between the author and Dr Michael Belshaw. 
The conversation took place between 03/07/16 and 11/07/16 and explored a possible 
distinction between medium and material. The content of Chapter 2, Part 3, Section 
2.3.2 derives, in large part, from this discussion. 
 
 
03/07/16 at 11:03 AM 
 
Hi Tom 
Here's a puzzle. When Leonardo saw a battle scene in the stains on his studio wall, 
were those stains material or medium? 
Cheers, 
Mike 
 
 
03/07/16 at 6:47 PM 
 
Hi Mike, 
I have an answer, though it might not satisfy. And it is this: it depends on whether the 
stain is taken to be “a work”. If the stain is taken to be a stain, then it remains 
material—it remains a stain. 
If the stain is taken to be “a work”, then as work it becomes operable through the 
stainness of the stain, and thus occupies the position of medium. As medium, the stain 
enables the work, whose parameters remain rooted to its particularity as stain (in being 
taken as work, the work doesn't relinquish the stain, but remains of stain...of material). 
To claim the stain as a work is to position it both as and as not a stain in the process of 
becoming a work. 
How does that sound? 
Tom 
 
 
07/07/16 at 11:30 AM 
 
Hi Tom  
That sounds interesting, though I need to improve my grasp of Heideggerese. 
Intentionality is needed for material to become medium. Agreed. But should it be the 
recognition of an intention – i.e. if the spectator believes the marks to be made with 
that intention they will appear as medium. Medium is an effect of the social world – 
not a literal thing like material. 
What happens when there is intention, but a different intention? Spot the Pink Panther 
(attached),  
Cheers, 
Mike 
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08/07/16 at 8:39 PM 
 
Hi Mike,  
My feeling is that there are two issues here that might be becoming entangled (that of 
medium and art). 
1. Medium is not dependent on actual intention (in the sense that the spectator does not 
need to intuit intention in order to have the stain become medium). The spectator 
needs only to see the stain as an image (faces in the wallpaper suffice). This seeing as 
probably brings with it the presumption of intention, but maybe not—where the 
spectator knows the 'image' is simply the result of a natural occurrence, like a rock 
formation or face on Mars. 
2. However, for the work to seen to be art there needs to be a sensed intention 
(whether there proves to be intention or not, the spectator need to act as if there is). 
Yet there can be medium and not art (face on Mars, where the rocks become medium 
and intention is not an issue…but image is). 
Yes, I believe that medium is an effect of the social world, in so far as it seems 
dependent on symbol, image, sign etc. (some form of escape from material), and 
presumably to have language is to be social. 
But I don't think there is a distinction to be made about the accuracy of one intention 
over another, though definitely not in terms of medium (I can misread Guernica, yet 
still impute intention and therefore deem it to be art...and in the very act of considering 
it anything other than material it is medium too). 
Tom  
 
 
11/07/16 at 1:26 PM 
 
Hi Tom 
Pretty much agree with all that—an image seen presupposes medium, and art 
presupposes intention. Without that image one only has spatial effect—a Newman 
monochrome deploys the medium of paint, a Rauschenberg blank canvas only 
material? 
Cheers, 
Mike 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 207	
Bibliography 
 
 
Books and Anthologies 
Adams, Laurie Schneider. The Methodologies of Art: An Introduction. New York: 
 Harper Collins Publishers, 1996. 
 
Alperson, Philip, ed. The Philosophy of the Visual Arts. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1992. 
 
Audi, Robert, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1999. 
 
Austin, John L. How to do things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
 Press, 1962. 
 
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz, 1967. 
 
Bal, Mieke. Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative. Toronto: University 
 of Toronto Press, 1985. 
 
Barker, Garry. Art and Fiction. Leeds: Workshop Press, 2011. 
 
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981. 
 
Barnard, John, ed. John Keats: The Complete Poems. London: Penguin, 1988. 
 
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulations. New York: Semiotext, 1983. 
 
Beaulieu, Jill, Mary Roberts and Toni Ross, eds. Refracting Vision: Essays on the 
 Writings of Michael Fried. Sydney: Power Publications, 2000. 
 
Bell, Clive. Art. London: Chatto and Windus, 1914. 
 
	 208	
Belshaw, Michael, Garry Barker, Richard Miles, Joanna Geldard, and Tom Palin. 
 Readings in a Rumour of the End of Art. Leeds: Workshop Press, 2012. 
 
Berger, John. Ways of Seeing. London: Penguin Books, 1973. 
 
Bernstein, J. M. The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and 
 Adorno. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 
 
Bois, Yve-Alain. Painting as Model. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993. 
 
Bryson, Norman, ed. Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation. London: Polity 
 Press, 1990. 
 
     - Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze. New Haven: Yale University 
 Press, 1983. 
 
Buchloh, Benjamin H. D. Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European 
 and American Art from 1955 to 1975. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
 2000. 
 
Cavell, Stanley. Must We Mean What We Say? New York: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1969. 
 
Charmet, Raymond. Utrillo’s Paris. Translated by D. Imber. Lausanne: International 
 Art Book, 1963. 
 
Clark, Timothy J. The Sight of Death: An Experiment in Art Writing. New Haven: 
 Yale University Press, 2006. 
 
     - Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution. London: 
 Thames and Hudson, 1973. 
 
Colpitt, Frances. Minimal Art: The Critical Perspective. Seattle: University of 
 Washington Press, 1990. 
	 209	
Constantine, David. Friedrich Hölderlin: Selected Poems. Newcastle upon Tyne: 
 Bloodaxe Books, 1997. 
 
Cordileone, Diane Reynolds. Alois Riegl in Vienna 1875-1905: An Institutional 
 Biography. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014. 
 
Crary, Jonathan. Suspensions of Perception,  Attention, Spectacle, and Modern 
 Culture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
 
Crespelle, J. P. Utrillo: Churches. Paris: Fernand Hazin, 1960. 
 
Danto, Arthur. After the End of Art. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Daniels, Patrick. Early Photography. London: Academy Editions, 1978. 
 
De Duve, Thierry. Clement Greenberg: Between the Lines. Paris: Dis Voir, 1996. 
 
De Polnay, Peter. Enfant Terrible: The Life and Work of Maurice Utrillo. New York: 
 William Morrow and Company, 1969. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx: The state of the debt, the work of mourning and 
 the new international. New York and London: Routledge, 1993. 
 
     - The Truth in Painting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
  
Doig, Peter. Peter Doig. London: Phaidon Press, 2007. 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert. What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. New 
 York: Harper and Row, 1972. 
 
Elkins, James and Montgomery Harper, eds. Beyond the Aesthetic and the Anti-
 Aesthetic. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013. 
 
Falkenheim, Jacqueline, V. Roger Fry and the Beginning of Formalist Art Criticism. 
	 210	
 Michigan: UMI Press, 1980. 
 
Fernie, Eric. Art History and its Methods. London: Phaidon Press, 1995. 
 
Fisherman, Solomon. The Interpretation of Art: Essays on the Art Criticism of John 
 Ruskin, Walter Pater, Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Herbert Read. Berkeley:
 University of California Press, 1963. 
 
Forty, Adrian. Objects of Desire: Design and Society Since 1750. London: Thames 
 and Hudson, 1986. 
 
Foster, Hal. The Return of the Real: Art and Theory at the End of the Century: Avant-
 garde at the End of the Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 
 
Fried, Michael. Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press, 2008. 
 
     - Art & Objecthood: Essays & Reviews. Illinois: University of Chicago 
 Press, 1998. 
 
Fry, Roger. A Roger Fry Reader. London: UCP, 1996. 
 
     - Last Lectures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939. 
 
     - The Artist and Psycho-Analysis. Solis: Tunbridge Well, 1924. 
 
     - Vision and Design. London: Chatto and Windus, 1920. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books 
 Inc., 1992. 
 
Gaiger, Jason and Paul Wood, eds. Art of the Twentieth Century: A Reader. New 
 Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003. 
 
	 211	
Gamez, David. Positive Scepticism and the Collapsing Hermeneutic Circle. 
 Colchester: University of Essex, 2002. 
 
Genette, Gérard. Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1997. 
 
Geulen, Eva. The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel. California: Stanford 
 University Press, 2006. 
 
Gombrich, Ernst, H. Art & Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial 
 Representation. London: Phaidon Press, 1960. 
 
Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. 
 Indianapolis: Hacket, 1968. 
 
Graw, Isabelle and Lajer Burcharth, eds. The Medium in the Post-Medium Condition. 
 Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016. 
 
Guilbaut, Serge, ed. Reconstructing Modernism: Art in New York,  
Paris, and Montreal 1945-64. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990. 
 
Hanfling, Oswald, ed. Philosophical Aesthetics. An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell 
 Publishing, 1992. 
 
Harrison, Charles. Conceptual Art & Painting: Further Essays on Art and Language. 
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993. 
 
Harrison, Charles, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger, eds. Art in Theory, 1815-1900: An 
 Anthology of Changing Ideas. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998. 
 
Hayward, John, ed. The Penguin Book of English Verse. London: Penguin Books, 
 1956. 
 
Heaney, Seamus, ed. William Wordsworth. London: Faber and Faber, 2001. 
	 212	
Heidegger, Martin. Being & Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State 
 University of New York Press, 2010. 
 
     - Hölderlin's Hymn: The Ister. Translated by William McNeill and Julia Davis. 
 Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
 
     - On Time and Being. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 
 
Hickey, Dave. The Invisible Dragon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
 
Hopkins, David. After Modern Art 1945-2000. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 2000. 
 
Inwood, Michael. Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1997. 
 
Jacquette, Dale. Ontology. Chesham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2002. 
 
Jiménez-Blanco, María Dolores, ed. The Prado Guide. Madrid: Museo del Prado 
 Publications, 2008. 
 
Jones, Amelia. Self/Image: Technology, Representation, and the Contemporary 
 Subject. London: Routledge, 2006. 
 
     - Body Art: Performing the Subject. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press, 1998. 
 
Jones, Caroline. Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg's Modernism and the 
 Bureaucratization of the Senses. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. New York: Cosimo Books, 2007. 
 
Klee, Paul. Pedagogical Sketchbook. London: Faber and Faber, 1954. 
 
Krauss, Rosalind. Perpetual Inventory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. 
	 213	
     -  Under Blue Cup. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011. 
 
     - A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition. 
 London: Thames and Hudson, 2000. 
 
     - Bachelors. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
 
     - The Optical Unconscious. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993. 
 
Leicht, Hermann. History of the World’s Art. Germany: Spring Books, 1965. 
 
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Laocoön: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and 
 Painting. 1766. Trans. Edward Allen McCormick (Baltimore: The John 
 Hopkins University Press), 1962. 
 
Lewison, Jeremy. Looking at Barnett Newman. London: August Media, 2002. 
 
Lippard, Lucy. Six Years: The Dematerialisation of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972. 
 New York: Praeger, 1973. 
 
Marks, Laura. The Skin of The Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the 
 Senses. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000. 
 
     - Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media. Minnesota: The University 
 of Minnesota Press, 2000. 
 
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media. Montreal: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge, 
 2002. 
 
Meyer, James, ed. Minimalism. New York: Phaidon Press, 2000. 
 
Mitchell, W. J. T. Picture Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
	 214	
     - Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 
 1987. 
 
Motion, Andrew, ed. John Keats. London: Faber and Faber, 2005. 
 
Munitz, Milton K. The Question of Reality. Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Oberlé, Jean. Utrillo: Monmartre. Paris: Fernand Hazan, 1956. 
 
O’Brian, John, ed. Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism (Volumes 
 I-IV). The University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
 
Osborne, Peter. Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art. London & 
 New York: Verso, 2013. 
 
Palgrave, Francis, T. The Golden Treasury. Third edition. London: Macmillan, 1926. 
 
Palin, Tom. Tom Palin: Artist Statements: 1992-2012 (foreword by Michael Belshaw). 
 Leeds:  Workshop Press, 2013. 
 
     - The Feiweles Trust Painting & Drawing Bursary 2002 Journal. Wallasey: 
 Cottages Press, 2002. 
 
Panofsky, Erwin. Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the 
 Renaissance. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 
 
- Perspective as Symbolic Form. 1927, reprinted in New York: Zone Books 
 (1997). 
 
- Idea: A Concept in Art Theory. 1924. Translated by J. J. S. Peake. South 
Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1968. 
 
Parker, Rozsika and Griselda Pollock. Old Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology. 
 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. 
	 215	
Paskow, Alan. The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Platt, Susan N. Modernism in the 1920s. Michigan: UMI Press, 1986. 
 
Powell, Amy Knight. Depositions: Scenes from the Late Medieval Church and the 
 Modern Museum. New York: Zone Books, 2012. 
 
Preziosi, Donald, ed. The Art of Art History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Rampley, Matthew. The Vienna School of Art History: Empire and the Politics of 
 Scholarship, 1847-1918. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
 Press, 2013. 
 
Reed, Christopher. The Roger Fry Reader, Chicago: University of Chicago 
 Press, 1996. 
 
Riegl, Alois. Problems of Style: Foundations for a History of Ornament. Translated by 
 Evelyn Kain. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Rollins, Hyder E., ed. The Letters of John Keats, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1958. 
 
Rosenberg, Harold. The De-definition of Art: Action Art to Pop and Earthworks. New 
 York: Horizon Press, 1972. 
 
Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1946. 
 
Silverman, Hugh J. Textualities: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. New 
 York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Staff, Craig G. After Modernist Painting: The History of a Contemporary Practice. 
 London: I. B. Taurus, 2013. 
 
	 216	
Steiner, George. Heidegger. Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1978. 
 
Stiles, Kristine, ed. Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of 
 Artist’s Writings. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. 
 
Scruton, Roger. A Short History of Modern Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan 
 Paul, 1981. 
 
Smith, James C., ed. A Book of Verse for Boys and Girls. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
 1927. 
 
Sorrell, Martin, ed. Federico García Lorca: Selected Poems. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press. 2007. 
 
Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art? London, New York, 1995. 
 
Walwin, Jeni and Henry Krokatsis. You’ll Never Know: Drawing and Random  
Interference. London: Hayward Gallery Publishing, 2006. 
 
Warnod, Jeanine. Maurice Utrillo. Naefels: Bonfini Press Corporation, 1983. 
 
Werner, Alfred. Modigliani, Utrillo, Soutine. New York: Tudor Publishing, 1969. 
 
     - Utrillo. New York: H. N. Abrams, 1969. 
 
Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
 
     - Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1976. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. 
 Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1953. 
 
	 217	
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. Charles Kay Ogden. London: Kegan 
Paul, 1922. 
 
Wölfflin, Heinrich. Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of 
 Style in Later Art. Translated by M. D. Hottinger. New York: Dover 
 Publications, 1932. 
 
Wollheim, Richard. On Formalism and its Kinds. Barcelona: Antoni Tapies 
 Foundation, 1995. 
 
     - On Art and the Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
 1974. 
 
 
Wood, Christopher. S., ed. The Vienna School Reader. Politics and Art Historical 
 Method in the 1930s, New York: Zone Books, 2000. 
 
Woolf, Virginia. Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown. London: The Hogarth Press, 1924. 
 
Young, Julian. Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2001. 
 
Vattimo, Gianni. Art’s Claim to Truth. Chichester, NH: Columbia University Press, 
 2008. 
 
 
Essays and Journal Articles 
Barthes, Roland. “From Work to Text,” in Aesthetics, edited by Susan Feagin and 
 Patrick Maynard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
      - “The Death of the Author,” in Image, Music, Text, edited and translated by 
 Stephen Heath. New York: Hill, 1977. 
 
Beardsley, Monroe, C. “Symbolism,” in The Philosophy of the Visual Arts, edited by 
 Philip Alperson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.  
	 218	
Benjamin, Walter. “Thesis on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, edited by 
 Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 
 1969. 
 
Birnbaum, Daniel. “Where is ?.” Tate 1 (2002): 60-63. 
 
Buchloh, Benjamin H. D. “Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of  
Administration to the Critique of Institutions.” October 55 (1990): 105-143. 
 
Clark, Timothy, J. “Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art,” in Critical Inquiry 9, no.1 
 (1982): 139-156. 
 
Costello, Diarmuid. “Greenberg’s Kant and the fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art 
 Theory.” The journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (2007): 217-228. 
 
Crimp, Douglas. “The End of Painting.” October 16 (1981): 69-76.  
  
     - “Pictures.” October 8 (1979): 75-88. 
 
Denis, Maurice. “Definition of Neo-Traditionism,” in Art in Theory, 1815-1900: An 
 Anthology of Changing Ideas, edited by Charles Harrison, Paul Wood and 
 Jason Gaiger. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.  
 
Feldman, Edmund Burke. “Formalism and its Discontents.” Studies in Art Education 
 3 (1992): 122-126. 
 
Fried, Michael. “Art and Objecthood,” in Art & Objecthood: Essays & Reviews, edited 
 by Michael Fried. Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
     - “Larry Poon’s New Paintings,” in Art & Objecthood: Essays & Reviews, edited 
 by Michael Fried. Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
     - “Three American Painters: Noland, Olitski, Stella,” in Art & Objecthood:   
 
	 219	
 Essays & Reviews, edited by Michael Fried. Illinois: University of Chicago  
 Press, 1998. 
 
Greenberg, Clement. “Modernist Painting,” in Clement Greenberg: The Collected 
 Essays and Criticism, (Volume IV), edited by John O’Brian. Chicago: The 
 University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
 
     - “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays  and 
 Criticism, (Volume I), edited by John O’Brian. Chicago: The University of 
 Chicago Press, 1986. 
 
     - “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays 
 and Criticism (Volume I), edited John O’Brian. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 1986. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Heidegger: Basic Writings, 
 edited by David Krell. Oxford: Routledge Classics, 2010. 
 
Krauss, Rosalind. “A View of Modernism,” in Perpetual Inventory, edited by 
 Rosalind Krauss. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. 
 
- “Michel, Bataille et Moi,” in Perpetual Inventory, edited by Rosalind Krauss. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. 
 
- “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,” in Art in Theory, 1815-1900: An 
Anthology of Changing Ideas, edited by Charles Harrison, Paul Wood, and 
Jason Gaiger. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. 
 
- “Grids,” in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, 
edited by Rosalind Krauss. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985. 
 
- “Sculpture in the Expanded Field,” in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and 
Other Modernist Myths, edited by Rosalind Krauss. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
	 220	
Press, 1985. 
 
McCormick, Peter. “Heidegger, Politics and the Philosophy of History.” Philosophical 
 Studies 27 (1980): 196-211. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Cézanne’s Doubt,” in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics 
 Reader: Philosophy and Painting, edited by Galen A. Johnson, translated by 
 Michael B. Smith. Evanson, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993.  
 
Mitchell, W. J. T. “Word and Image,” in Critical Terms for Art History, edited by. 
 Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff. IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Olin, Margaret. “Forms of Respect: Alois Riegl’s Concept of Attentiveness.” The Art 
 Bulletin 71, no. 2 (1989): 285-99. 
 
Podro, Michael. “Depiction and the Golden Calf,” in Visual Theory: Painting and 
 Interpretation, edited by. Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly and Keith 
 Moxey. London: Polity, 1991. 
 
Richter, Paul. “On Professor Gombrich’s Model of Schema and Correction.” The 
 British  Journal of Aesthetics 16, no. 4 (1976): 338-346. 
 
Rosenberg, Harold. “The American Action Painters.” ARTnews 51, no. 8 (1952): 22- 
 50. 
 
Zangwill, Nick. “Feasible Aesthetic Formalism.” Nous 33, no. 4 (1999): 610-629. 
 
 
Theses 
Key, Sarah. “Grids: Painting in a Dialogue with the Digital.” Unpublished PhD diss.,
 Loughborough University, 2008. 
 
Mathus, Miguel. “Tactility and Opticality in Contemporary Abstract Painting.” 
 Unpublished MPhil diss., The University of London, 2011. 
	 221	
Palin, Thomas S. “Something and Nothing: A Consideration of the Ontology of 
 Painting.” Unpublished MA diss., The University of Manchester, 2006. 
 
Payne, Alistair J. “Redefine and Reteritorialise: Painting as an Interdisciplinary 
 Form.” Unpublished PhD diss., The University of London, 2005. 
 
Rock, Neal. “Herm as Askēsis: Prosthetic Conditions of Painting.” Unpublished PhD 
 diss., The Royal College of Art, 2016. 
 
Stubbs, Michael, M. “Digital Embodiment in Contemporary Abstract Painting.” 
 Unpublished PhD diss., The University of London, 2003. 
 
Swiboda, Marcel. “The Pragmatic Constructions of Deleuze, Guattari and Miles 
 Davis.” Unpublished PhD diss., The University of Leeds, 2002. 
 
 
Websites 
About Art (Tom Palin’s Writing Blog). Accessed December 29, 2017. https://wwwtom 
 palinaboutart.blogspot.co.uk/.  
 
Art 21. “Robert Ryman. Colour, Surface and Seeing”. Accessed February 11, 2016. htt 
 p://art21.org/read/robert-ryman-color-surface-and-seeing/. 
 
Baker, Richard. Artist’s personal website. Accessed July 31, 2017. http://www.richard 
 bakerpainting.com/.  
 
Bielik, Karl. Artist’s personal website. Accessed August 2, 2016. http://www.karlbieli 
 k.com/.  
 
Boi, Yve-Alain. “Whose Formalism”. Accessed April 14, 2018. https://www.mutualart 
 .com/Article/Whose-formalism-/6B323BBF31A195F8. 
 
	 222	
Dawkins, Richard. “A Threshold Model of Behaviour”. Accessed February 27, 2015. 
 https://richarddawkins.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/The-attention-threshol 
 d-model.pdf. 
 
Finch, Mick. Artist’s personal website. Accessed November 23, 2017. http://www.mic 
 kfinch.com/.  
 
     - “Supports/Surfaces: Contexts and Issues”. Accessed June 12, 2017. http://mick 
 finch.com/texts/ss.html.  
 
     - “Painting as Vigilance”. Accessed July 30, 2016. http://mickfinch.com/paintin 
 g_as_vigilance.htm.  
 
Gilbert-Rolfe, Jeremy. “A Marginal Note on Art and Objecthood”. Accessed
 December 19, 2017. http://nonsite.org/article/a-marginal-note-on-art-and-objec 
 thood. 
 
Hockney, David. Artist’s authorised website. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.h 
 ockneypictures.com.  
 
Image and Narrative. Interview with W. J. T. Mitchell. What do Pictures Want?
 Accessed March 29, 2016. http://www.visual-studies.com/interviews/mitchell. 
 html. 
 
Kerr, Dylan. “How to Understand Rosalind Krauss, the Art Critic who made Theory 
 Cool (and Inescapable)”. Accessed May 10, 2017. http://www.artspace.com/m 
 agazine/art_101/know-your-critic s/how-to-understand-rosalind-krauss-53988.
   
Krauss, Rosalind in conversation with Yve-Alain Bois. Accessed, June 15, 2016. http:/
 /www.brooklynrail.org/2012/02/art/rosalind-krauss-with-yve-alain- bois.   
 
Kruczenyk, Freya. Artist’s personal website. Accessed February 16, 2014. http://www. 
 freyakruczenyk.co.uk/.  
 
	 223	
Lehmann Maupin. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lehmannmaupin.com/.  
  
Liverpool Museums. John Moores Painting Prize. Accessed December 4, 2015. http:// 
 www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/walker/jonnmoores. 
 
Marra, Enzo. Artist’s personal website. Accessed August 4, 2016. http://www.contem 
 porarybritishpainting.com/wordpress/?pageid=2635.   
 
Mitchell, W. J. T. “Addressing Media”. Accessed February 28, 2014. file:///Users/pali 
 nt/Downloads/1771-4989-1-PB%20(1).pdf. 
 
Mosley, Duncan. Artist’s personal blog. Accessed February 17, 2018. http://duncanpai 
 ntz.blogspot.co.uk/.  
 
Munday, Roderick. “Glossary of Terms in Being and Time”. Accessed June 16, 2015. 
 http://www.visual-memory.co.uk/b_resources/b_and_t_glossary.html. 
 
Musée d'Orsay. Accessed August 18, 2014. http://www.musee-orsay.fr/en/home.html.  
 
Museums Association. Accessed September 13, 2014. http://www.museumsassociatio 
 on.org.  
 
Nichols, David. “Antigone’s Autochthonous Voice: Echoes in Sophocles, Hölderlin, 
 and Heidegger”. Accessed September 29, 2016. http://www.iwm.at/publication 
 ns/5-junior-visitin g-fellows-conferences/vol-xxv/antigones-autochthonous-voi
 ce/. 
 
Nothing But Good. “Tom Palin / Maurice Utrillo”. Accessed March 19, 2016. http://no 
 thing-but-good-art.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/tom-palin-maurice-utrillo.html. 
 
Palin, Tom. Artists’s (and the author’s) personal website. Accessed August 3, 2017. ht
 tp://www.tompalin.co.uk/.  
 
	 224	
Podro, Michael and Ernst Gombrich in Conversation. Accessed August 3, 2016. https:/ 
 /gombricharchive.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/showdoc1091.pdf.   
 
Quin, James. Artist’s personal website. Accessed August 6, 2016. http://jamesquin.tu 
 mblr.com/. 
 
Smith, Terry. “One and Three Ideas: Conceptualism Before, During, and After 
 Conceptual Art”. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://www.e-flux.com/journal/one-
 and-three-ideas-conceptualism-before-during-and-after-conceptual-art/. 
 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. “Wittgenstein”. Accessed June 1, 2017. http:// 
 plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein.  
 
Sweet, David. “Abstraction’s Organising Principles”, 2012, in response to David  
Ryan’s “What does This Represent”. Accessed May 11, 2016. https://abstractcr 
itical.com/note/david-sweet-on-abstractions-organising-principles/index. html. 
 
Tate: Online Resources. Accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online- 
 -resources. 
 
The Chicago School of Media Theory. “Medium Specificity”. Accessed February 1,
 2014. https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/medium-specifi
 city.   
 
The New York Times. “Hubert L. Dreyfus, Philosopher of the Limits of Computers, 
 Dies at 87”. Accessed October 13, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02 
 /us/hubert-dreyfus-dead-philosopher-of-artificial-intelligence.html. 
 
Turps Banana. Accessed March 1, 2017. http://turpsbanana.com/.  
 
Victoria Miro. Accessed February 2, 2016. http://www.victoria-miro.com/.  
 
Virgoe, April. Artist’s personal website. Accessed January 15, 2018. https://aprilvirgo 
 e.com/.  
	 225	
Whitehead, Derek H. “Martin Heidegger's Technites, Paul Klee's Gestalt, and starting 
 from the very beginning”. Accessed March 22, 2017. http://castle.eiu.edu/~mo 
 dernity/whitehead.htm.  
 
 
Video Resources 
Barrison, David and Daniel Ross, The Ister, Melbourne: Icarus Films, 2004. DVD. 
 
“Becoming Medium: Stephen Melville, The Central Saint Martins Tableau Project 
 Group, at CSM, Friday 22 November 2013, introduction by Mick Finch.” 
 YouTube video, 113.47, Posted by “UALPaintClub,” November 24, 2013, 
 accessed October 25, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=peXeZ3GAaN 
 Y. 
 
“Charles Harrison on History, Politics and Art, The Politics of Representation. 
 Symposium, The University of Brighton.” YouTube video, 18.52. Posted by 
 “Ian McDonald,” March 22, 2014, accessed July 13, 2016. https://www.youtub 
 e.com/watchv=PJJvXqhKg4Y. 
 
“Donald Judd on Ovation TV.” YouTube video, 3.27, Posted by “ArtPatrolTV,” 
 December 7, 2008, accessed June 26, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
 v=t0stpkzsNDU. 
 
“New Art History: Bill Readings. Musée d'Art Contemporain de Montréal.” 
 YouTube video, 15.03. Posted by “MichelCroz,” September 13, 2017, 
 accessed August 6, 2017. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=danAEcnlS-o&t= 
 783s. 
 
Ruspoli, Tao. Being in the World, Berlin: Kino International, 2010. DVD. 
 
“The Great Philosophers. Brian Magee in conversation with Hubert Dreyfus,” 
 YouTube video, 45.51. Posted by “Philosophy Overdose,” June 12, 2017, 
 accessed July 18, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaGk6S1qhz0.  
 
	 226	
Exhibition Catalogues 
Bourne Gallery Ltd. Fine English Drawings and Watercolours. Exh. Cat., Reigate, 
 1987.  
 
Neo, Neo Art Prize. Exh. Cat., Bolton, 2012. 
 
Royal Academy of Arts in collaboration with The Broad. Jasper Johns. Exh. Cat., 
 2017.  
 
Tate Gallery Liverpool, W. R. Sickert: Drawings and Paintings 1890-1942. Exh. Cat., 
 1989. 
 
The Feiweles Trust, Yorkshire Sculpture Park, Tom Palin. Exh. Cat., Wakefield, 2002. 
 
The Lowry, The Art of White. Exh. Cat., Salford, 2005. 
 
University of Liverpool, Richard Creed. Exh. Cat., 2004. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 19. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 1992. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 20. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 1994. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 21. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 1996.  
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 22. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 1998.  
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 23. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2000. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 24. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2002. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 25. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2004. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 26. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2006. 
 
	 227	
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 27. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2008. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 28. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2010. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 29. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2012. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 30. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2014. 
 
Walker Art Gallery, John Moores 31. Exh. Cat., Liverpool, 2016. 
 
 
Conferences, Symposia and Public Events 
A History of Drawing Symposium. Camberwell College of Arts, London, 2018. 
 
An Interview with Jake Chapman (interviewed by Dr Catriona McAra). Leeds Arts 
 University, 2017. 
 
Classification Symposium. Leeds College of Art, 2013. 
 
Launch of the Journal of Contemporary Painting 3.1+2: Painting as Commitment 
  (panel discussion chaired by Tom Palin). Royal College of Art, 2017. 
 
Teaching Painting: A Conference. Manchester School of Art, Whitworth Gallery, 
 2015. 
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Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum, Glasgow, UK. 
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Park Guell, Barcelona, Spain. 
 
Roman Baths, Bath, UK. 
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The Courtauld Institute, London, UK. 
 
	 230	
The Dean Clough Galleries, Halifax, UK. 
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Free Range 2017. The Old Truman Brewery, London, UK, 2017. 
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 UK, 2017. 
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 Leeds,  UK, 2016. 
 
     - Curator’s Choice: Domestic Front (Paula Chambers). Leeds College of Art, 
 Leeds, UK, 2017. 
 
Jackson Pollock: Blind Spots. Tate Liverpool, Liverpool, UK, 2015.  
 
Jasper Johns: ‘Something Resembling Truth’. The Royal Academy of Arts, London, 
 UK, 2017. 
  
Jim des Rivierès: The Magnificent Moths. Gallery on the Green, Settle, UK, 2017. 
 
Jiro Takamatsu: The Temperature of Sculpture. The Henry Moore Institute, Leeds, 
 UK, 2017. 
 
Joe Legg: Near Source. STCFTHOTS, Leeds, UK, 2015. 
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Kenneth Armitage: Sculpture and Drawing of the 1950s. The Stanley & Aubrey 
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	 236	
Library Interventions: Moving Knowledge. Leeds Arts University, Leeds, UK, 2018. 
 
Light Night. Leeds, UK, 2017. 
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 Bilbao, Spain, 2016. 
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Maria Lassnig. Tate Liverpool, Liverpool, UK, 2016. 
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Skin: Freud, Mueck and Tunick. Ferens Art Gallery, Hull, UK, 2017. 
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Vera Lutter. Gagosian (Britannia Street), London, UK, 2018. 
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Art on a Postcard. Soho Review, London, UK, 2015. 
 
Art on a Postcard. Unit London, London, UK, 2017. 
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The Discerning Eye. Mall Galleries, London, UK, 2015. 
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